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ABSTRACT
The impacts of national parks do not stop at their borders, and neither should their
histories. Located less than a day’s drive from California’s biggest cities, Yosemite
National Park remains a product of their combined influences. “Urban in Nature” is a
relational history of the park and its nearby metropolitan areas like Merced (70 miles
away), Berkeley (180), San Francisco (200), and Los Angeles (300).
Since the advent of the automobile Yosemite has been a mirror of the state’s
urban areas, rather than an escape from them. Passenger cars drove Yosemite’s
urbanization in two interconnected ways. Firstly, increasing amounts of tourist traffic in
the early 1900s forced National Park Service personnel to construct increasingly
sophisticated built environment; this process is especially evident in Yosemite Valley, a
spectacular chasm containing waterfalls, sheer cliffs, and—most importantly—tens of
thousands of humans at any given time. Secondly, automobiles served as crosspollinators between the park and urban California, facilitating a statewide exchange of
ideas, architecture, and political allegiances. In both its physical form and its connections
to other cities, Yosemite Valley became “urban in nature.”
This study expands the political, economic, and cultural significance of areas that
are often considered escapes from urban industrial society. I argue that, on the contrary,
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places like Yosemite are integral parts of the world outside their gates. It has become
common to bemoan the level of development in America’s national parks, but I argue
that we must acknowledge their connections with urban spaces in order to reach a more
nuanced understanding of the interdependency between nature and civilization.
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Introduction

National parks, especially those in the American West, are a relatively new
nation’s claim to an ancient past. They uniquely American landscapes that have helped
define the United States as separate (and maybe better) than its antecedents in Western
Europe. Their isolation only adds to their mystique. Certainly, then, these parks—
Yellowstone, Glacier, Mesa Verde—cannot really have neighbors; they might as well
exist on another plane of being. Yosemite may be a national park, but it also belongs to
the cities and towns around it.
America’s national parks have well-defined geographic boundaries, but their
influence often strays beyond them. Parks are often considered museums of older (and
simpler) times, but Brown’s letter illuminates just how connected they can be. Ever since
the first automobile entered its gates, Yosemite served as the crossroads of a massive
transportation network linking California’s coastal cities—and thus its highest
concentrations of potential tourists—with smaller towns on the way to the park. These
were not merely one-way relationships; Yosemite’s built environment and its highway
system changed in tandem with the needs of an increasingly mobile state.
Yosemite’s increasingly smooth roads and its ever-growing parking lots hosted
cars, and lots of them; however, these vehicles carried less tangible cargo—ideas,
expectations, building types, political power, and even police intelligence—into the park.
In the pages that follow, I will explore Yosemite’s influence on the Golden State’s
university system, tourist patterns, extractive industry, highway building, city planning,
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and law enforcement. Although created by federal action, Yosemite owes its modern
form to years of interchange with cities across California.
Until recently, though, the chroniclers of national parks thought at considerably
smaller scales. Historians have spent many years (and lots of ink) trying to unpack the
contradictory language in the National Park Service’s Organic Act (1916), which charged
the nascent agency with both preserving land and developing for tourism. This tricky
language has kept many historians busy for a long time. When Yosemite does appear in a
textbook, it is likely regarding the controversial damming of Hetch Hetchy Valley to
provide water and power for San Francisco—the fight that cemented John Muir’s
national reputation. The Park Service did not eliminate the need for impassioned
wilderness defenders; in fact, the agency is constantly charged with overdeveloping the
nation’s most precious lands. Some of the most useful histories of the National Park
Service investigate the agency’s conflicted relationship to its lofty environmental goals.
A newer cadre of historians have ventured farther afield, linked by a postmodernist desire
to question the wilderness/civilization binary. Inspired by these broader histories of
national parks, I expand Yosemite’s story beyond the stock narrative of federal
preservation in the American West.1

1. A quick read of the National Park Service Organic Act (1916) reveals language fraught with loopholes,
the most glaring being the pledge to “conserve the scenery” and simultaneously “provide for the enjoyment
of the same.” To this day, historians of Yosemite—and other parks—focus on the contradictions of this
mission statement. Muir and Pinchot’s disagreement over the damming of Hetch Hetchy epitomizes a
similar binary that has become indispensable (perhaps too much so) in the histories of our nation’s parks.
Many academics use the Mission 66 era (1956-1966), which brought features of the modern landscape (like
highways and malls) into the parks, as another case study in the debate between conservation and
preservation.
Some scholars address this tension by acknowledging the Park Service’s ignorance of scientific
and issues. The agency’s origins, they argue, were much more cultural than environmental. See Stanford E.
Demars, The Tourist in Yosemite, 1855-1985 (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1991); Alfred
Runte, National Parks : The American Experience (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979); and
Richard West Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks : A History (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1997). Runte’s book on Yosemite takes a similar tack, dooming the Park Service’s
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Internal combustion technology allows residents of the West to bridge the gaps
between urban and rural faster and more frequently than ever. It has become almost
cliché to note that a region known for its rugged landscapes now houses some of the
nation’s most powerful metropolitan areas—yet, it bears repeating. Growing up in rural
coastal California, I grew up ignorant of the other states in the Union; I knew quite well,
however, the driving distance to San Francisco or San Jose, the nearest cities of any
magnitude. Working in Yosemite, visitors ask me to approximate driving distances daily.
This exercise shifted my image of the West from a series of isolated places to a set of
spatial relationships. There is no spatial or cultural relationship more important to the
region’s history than that of city and country; however one defines these, they remain
essential ingredients that must be understood in relation to one another. My work
redefines Yosemite as a crucial example of the blurred lines between urban and rural.2

management of the park’s resources on the basis that “[s]elf-interest and the environment could never
coexist.” Runte, and historians like him, tend to reinforce the binary between the human and natural world.
Alfred Runte, Yosemite: The Embattled Wilderness (University of Nebraska Press, 1993), 150.
New histories of parks, probably inspired by the mandate William Cronon’s “The Trouble With
Wilderness” to break the wilderness/civilization binary, rely more on connecting national parks to the
world around them. For Cronon’s call to action, see William. Cronon, “The Trouble With Wilderness; or,
Getting Back to the Wrong Nature,” in Uncommon Ground: Toward Reinventing Nature, ed. William
Cronon (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1995), 69–90. See Ethan Carr, Mission 66: Modernism and the
National Park Dilemma (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007); Jen A. Huntley, The Making
of Yosemite: James Mason Hutchings and the Origin of America’s Most Popular Park (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2011); and Theodore Catton, National Park, City Playground: Mount Rainier
in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006).
2. The American West used to be a lot farther east; as a result, some of the best books on the region’s cities
occur in the Midwest. See Richard C. Wade, The Urban Frontier: The Rise of Western Cities, 1790-1830
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996) and William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the
Great West (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1992). Cronon, in particular, expertly unpacks the
processes through which a city consumes the natural resources surrounding it. Along with Nature’s
Metropolis, one of my biggest inspirations has been John Findlay’s John M. Findlay, Magic Lands:
Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
While not exclusively an urban history, Magic Lands contains some really thrilling pieces of cultural
landscape analysis; Findlay uses four quasi-urban spaces (like Disney Land and the Seattle Center) to speak
larger truths about post-World War II West. To my knowledge, Earl Pomeroy’s The Pacific Slope: A
History of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada (New York: Knopf, 1965) was the
first work of history to treat the Far West's cities as important in their own right. Squabbling over natural
resources and dependency on federal money—two important characteristics of Western cities, even
today—receive thorough treatment in Patricia Nelson Limerick, The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken
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Technology plays a major role in this blurring. A well-developed historiography
suggests that Americans have come to know nature more intimately through the internal
combustion engine. If we broaden our definition of technology, however, to encompass
other parts of the material world—buildings, roads, bridges—the story gets even more
interesting. In a nation seemingly convinced of the purity of its national parks, histories
of technology show that “wild” lands are more connected to our day-to-day lives than we
let on. Automobiles demonstrate the ever-shrinking distance between wilderness and the
workaday world in twentieth-century California. I expand on this theme by examining the
highways connecting Yosemite with the stage’s biggest cities, rather than just the roads
inside the park.3

Past of the American West (New York: Norton, 1987). See Char Miller, ed., Cities and Nature in the
American West (Reno: University of Nevada Press, 2010)--in particular, the essays by Matthew Klingle,
Phoebe Young, and Andrew G. Kirk--for a sampler platter of the region's urban/rural dichotomy.
3. The succinct account of the auto industry in Thomas K. McCraw, American Business Since 1920: How It
Worked (Wheeling, Ill: Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) provides a useful background. Mobility and gender are
inextricably linked, especially in the wide-open spaces of the American West. See Virginia Scharff, Taking
the Wheel: Women and the Coming of the Motor Age (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press,
1992) and Scharff, Twenty Thousand Roads: Women, Movement, and the West (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2002). Histories of the automobile in nature remain some of my most treasured sources.
See David Louter, Windshield Wilderness: Cars, Roads, and Nature in Washington’s National Parks
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2010); Paul Sutter, Driven Wild: How the Fight against
Automobiles Launched the Modern Wilderness Movement (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002);
and David G. Havlick, No Place Distant: Roads and Motorized Recreation on America’s Public Lands
(Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002). Each owes a tremendous debt to Leo Marx, The Machine in the
Garden: Technology and the Pastoral Ideal in America, 35th Anniversary edition (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2000). If Henry Nash Smith’s Virgin Land is the essential American Studies title about
the American West, then Marx’s Machine in the Garden fills the same niche for the history of technology.
Whether trucks or telegraphs, technology creates networks. The foremost historian of information
networks is Richard John; see his Spreading the News: The American Postal System from Franklin to
Morse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998) and Network Nation: Inventing American
Telecommunications (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press, 2010). Just as often, however, technology—and its
attendant debates—can tear people apart. The American West has a rich history of hosting these kinds of
debates, especially ones involving federal power. See Andrew Needham et al., Power Lines: Phoenix and
the Making of the Modern Southwest (Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2016); Robert W.
Righter, The Battle over Hetch Hetchy: America’s Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern
Environmentalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); John M. Findlay and Bruce W. Hevly, Atomic
Frontier Days: Hanford and the American West (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2011); and
Joseph Masco, The Nuclear Borderlands: The Manhattan Project in Post-Cold War New Mexico
(Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2006).
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Yosemite is more than just the park itself—it is an accretion of all the corridors
leading to it. The park is connected to circuits of movement extending far beyond its
boundaries. It is a place of migration, for humans and animals alike; it is part of a
highway network, a mountain range, and a system of federally preserved land. Spatial
helped me identify system worth tracking, serving as a sort of analytical bond across
great distances. Given that California’s largest metro areas (Los Angeles, San Diego, San
Francisco, and San Jose) contribute the lion’s share of the park’s visitors, I decided that—
if I were to truly unpack Yosemite’s urbanization—these cities would have to play major
roles; I would imagine the park as urban cousin to these bigger cities, rather than an
escape from them. My work details the automotive networks that eventually broke
Yosemite’s isolation and forged its new quasi-urban identity.4

4. Whether or not they name-check the obligatory big theorists, many classic histories of the American
West utilize spatial framework. Spatial theory and urban history are an ideal combination to unite the
region’s historically wide-open spaces with its more modern metropolises. Writing in 1960, the historian
Earl Pomeroy called the American West a collection of “watersheds of urban allegiance and control.”
Pomeroy, The Pacific Slope, 120. Gunther Peck’s study of padrones (labor bosses often employing recent
European immigrants) may not necessarily revolve around cities, but links the West’s concentrations of
capital with their hinterlands in another unique way. Peck’s padrones, who profited on providing reliable
manpower across great distances, as something like a pinball player gunning for a high score: “The longer
the distance between sites of labor supply and labor demand and the more frequently their compatriots had
to cross the political, cultural, and economic portals they controlled, the greater their potential profits and
power.” Gunther Peck, Reinventing Free Labor: Padrones and Immigrant Workers in the North American
West, 1880-1930 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 57. The analytical tension
between home and mobility (particularly, the automobile) is essential to understanding the American West.
See Virginia Scharff et al., Home Lands: How Women Made the West (Los Angeles: Autry National Center
of the American West, 2010) and Scharff, Twenty Thousand Roads. Even the oft-maligned frontier thesis—
that westward movement continually created and refined our national character—employs a kind of spatial
analysis. Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History,” Annual Report
of the American Historical Association, 1894, 197–227.
For the importance of space in the social sciences, see David Harvey, The Condition of
Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford [England]: Blackwell, 1990);
David J. Bodenhamer, “Creating a Landscape of Memory: The Potential of Humanities GIS,” International
Journal of Humanities and Arts Computing 1.2 (2007): 387–427; and Edward W. Soja, Postmodern
Geographies: The Reassertion of Space in Critical Social Theory (London: Verso, 1989). A personal
favorite of mine remains J.B. Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” Cartographica 26, no. 2 (1989): 1–20.
Harley provides an object lesson in spatial analysis, demystifying some of the highfalutin ideas surrounding
it.
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Gradually I realized that I could not study Yosemite’s urbanization unless I
studied cars. But rather than simply bemoaning the sheer amount of “blunt-nosed beetles”
(John Muir’s words) in the park, I had to find more meaning in them. The concept of
automobility—a way of considering the broader effects of cars, like auto-centric
architecture, carbon monoxide creation, and decreased spatial and temporal distances
between places—proved essential in this regard. Since much of Yosemite’s urbanity
resides in the park’s built environment, I paid particularly close attention to studies of
automotive cultural landscapes in the twentieth century; particular building types, like
motels and shopping malls, showed that even Yosemite Valley was not immune to the
architecture of the commercial strip. Unlike many environmental histories of national
parks, “Urban in Nature” focuses on the physical environments that demonstrate
Yosemite’s connections with its surrounding cities.5
The meta-categories at work here do not have clear-cut meanings. The
connotation of the word ‘city’ has changed over time, and—as practitioners of the new
suburban history suggest—cities and suburbs may be best analyzed as parts of the same
system (rather than diametric opposites). The sociologist Mark Gottdiener notes the
persistence of “the ‘city’ as the form of urban settlement,” often accompanied by
observations on “the ‘differences’ between the ‘urban way of life’ and its ‘suburban’ or
‘rural’ counterpart.” Citing the “obsolete nature of these concepts,” he argues that “the
lists of terms and the alleged contrasts between them…provide little help in
5. The essential primer on automobility is John Urry, “The ‘System’ of Automobility,” Theory, Culture,
and Society 21, no. 4–5 (October 2004): 25–39. For a monograph-length application of the concept, see
Scharff, Taking the Wheel. A keen eye for cultural landscapes helps highlight the significance of
automobility. Classic studies include Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour, Learning
from Las Vegas: The Forgotten Symbolism of Architectural Form (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977);
Chester Liebs, Main Street to Miracle Mile: American Roadside Architecture (Baltimore, Md.: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1995); and John Brinckerhoff Jackson, Discovering the Vernacular Landscape
(New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984)
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understanding current spatial transformations.”6 The instability of commonly-used terms
can be frustrating, but the ensuing messiness can offer new insights. The hybridity of
cities and nature is not a new theme; thus, just as ‘city’ is an elastic category, so too is
‘park’—especially in the context of the National Park Service, which has strayed from its
original model of Western “wilderness parks” to provide interpretation and recreation in
more developed (and less isolated) areas. There already exist excellent works on “urban
parks” across the United States, some run by the National Park Service (Golden Gate
National Recreation Area, the National Mall) and some by their respective cities (Central
Park). Since Yosemite is perhaps the archetypal wilderness park, it is an ideal setting for
examining the physical, philosophical, and etymological overlap between nature and
civilization.7
Academic works aside, we often learn about cities or parks through maps. Maps
appear as objective representations of reality, a messy world made simple; on the ground,
however, things are not so simple. Space—the abstract playing field upon which all
human actions take place—is subjective. Maps always reflect some kind of agenda,
whether the machinations of an empire or simply a desire for the most efficient route to
the grocery store. A map of Yosemite, for instance, might show the park as a tightlybounded space far from any major urban areas; the map may even zoom in enough to
6

Mark Gottdiener, The Social Production of Urban Space (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), 5.
Some classic works of the new suburban history are Kevin M. Kruse, White Flight: Atlanta and the
Making of Modern Conservatism (Princeton, N.J.; Princeton University Press, 2007); Robert O. Self,
American Babylon : Race and the Struggle for Postwar Oakland (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University
Press, 2003); and Kevin Kruse and Thomas J. Sugrue, The New Suburban History (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2006). For more on urban parks, see Hal Rothman, The New Urban Park : Golden Gate
National Recreation Area and Civic Environmentalism (Lawrence : University Press of Kansas, 2004) and
Setha M. Low, Dana Taplin, and Suzanne Scheld, Rethinking Urban Parks : Public Space & Cultural
Diversity (Austin : University of Texas Press, 2005). Cities even have environmental histories. See Martin
V. Melosi, “The Place of the City in Environmental History,” Environmental History Review 17, no. 1
(April 1, 1993): 1–23 and Joel A. Tarr, “The Metabolism of the Industrial City: The Case of Pittsburgh,”
Journal of Urban History 28, no. 5 (July 1, 2002): 511–45.
7
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exclude any other cities or towns entirely. Because the park is rendered in green, we
know it is a natural area of some kind. There may even be a mileage table telling us that
San Francisco is over 200 miles away and Los Angeles over 300. These cartographic
simplifications are not necessarily harmful, but they do not tell the whole truth. Although
maps may portray Yosemite as a place apart, the park is inextricably connected to urban
California.8
The park is roughly the size of Rhode Island, but most visitors come to see
Yosemite Valley. Seven miles long, half a mile wide, and roughly 3,000 feet deep, it is
home to spectacular rock formations and several tall waterfalls; it also boasts a relatively
mild climate despite its elevation (4,000 feet above sea level), making it habitable yearround. Observers have called Yosemite Valley ‘urban’ for over a century, but this is not
merely a commentary on the park’s center and its stores, campgrounds, and traffic. The
years covered in this study coincide with massive urban (and suburban) growth in
California—not to mention a drastic spike in auto ownership. When I talk about
Yosemite’s urbanization, I am referring to two interconnected processes: development of
the park’s built environment (especially in Yosemite Valley) and of linkages (both
tangible and intangible) between Yosemite and its urban neighbors. Using a cast of
different cities from around the state, I chronicle the connections between city and
country in California that transformed Yosemite National Park (and especially Yosemite
Valley) into something “urban in nature.”
--8

For abstract treatises on space, see David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the
Origins of Cultural Change (Oxford [England] ; Blackwell, 1990); and Michel de Certeau and Steven
Rendall, The Practice of Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984). For more on how
maps can mislead, see J.B. Harley, “Deconstructing the Map,” Cartographica 26, no. 2 (1989): 1–20 and
Mark S. Monmonier, How to Lie with Maps (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
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The preceding paragraphs may convey the impression that human habitation of
Yosemite is a new phenomenon, but that is absolutely not the case. Yosemite’s first
residents were the Ahwahneechee, a Miwok people that lived in Yosemite Valley (which
they called ‘Ahwahne’) for thousands of years. After gold was discovered at Sutter’s Mill
in the late 1840s, Anglo American settlers spread further and further into the western
foothills of the Sierra Nevada in search of gold and, to a lesser extent, trading
opportunities. Following some violent conflicts in the area, the Ahwahneechee were
violently evicted by the Mariposa Battalion—an anti-Indian militia formed to protect
white settlers—as part of larger genocidal efforts across California.9
In 1864 President Abraham Lincoln signed the Yosemite Grant into law, setting
aside Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Grove of Giant Sequoias (south of the Valley in
Wawona) to be preserved by the State of California. Around the same time, John Muir—
one of the park’s most famous defenders—set foot in Yosemite. Visitation gradually
increased, and so did public alarm about the despoiling of the park’s natural wonders. In
1890 the lands around Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Grove became Yosemite
National Park, under jurisdiction of the Department of the Interior. Since the job ‘park
ranger’ did not exist yet, the United States Army stepped in to protect the area. California
continued to administer the Valley and the Mariposa Grove until 1906, when they
became part of Yosemite National Park. The Army remained until around 1914, at which

9

For more on the Native history of Yosemite, see Huntley, The Making of Yosemite; Benjamin Madley, An
American Genocide: The United States and the California Indian Catastrophe, 1846-1873 (Yale University
Press, 2017); and Mark David Spence, Dispossessing the Wilderness Indian Removal and the Making of the
National Parks (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). For more on the Mariposa Battalion, see
Lafayette Houghton Bunnell, Discovery of the Yosemite, and the Indian War of 1851, Which Led to That
Event (New York: F.H. Revell Co., 1892).
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time the park began its short period of civilian administration before the founding of the
National Park Service in 1916.10
1913, the starting point for this work, is important for multiple reasons. Most
famously, it marks the approval of the damming of Hetch Hetchy Valley—a crucible for
the modern environmental movement.11 More pertinently for this study, however, the first
auto permit to Yosemite was sold that year. The National Park Service, though, was not
founded until in 1916. What happened in those intervening three years? Berkeley,
California—and the University of California, in particular—provided the social and
educational ties that would staff the Department of the Interior (and, eventually, the Park
Service) for years to come. The University would also train and employ the minds behind
Yosemite’s earliest urban place: Yosemite Village.
Chapter One takes us to the eastern shores of San Francisco Bay. In Berkeley for
the national parks conference of 1915, Mark Daniels described Yosemite Valley’s
“municipal problems”: poor planning, bad drainage, unimproved roads. Daniels, a
University of California grad who made his name as a developer, had recently been
10

For more on the early history of Yosemite, see Huntley, The Making of Yosemite; Runte, Embattled
Wilderness; and Harvey Meyerson, Nature’s Army: When Soldiers Fought for Yosemite (Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2001).
11
For more on early conservation organizations and efforts, see Donald Worster, A Passion for Nature: The
Life of John Muir (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Susan R. Schrepfer, Nature’s Altars:
Mountains, Gender, and American Environmentalism (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005); Karl
Jacoby, Crimes against Nature Squatters, Poachers, Thieves, and the Hidden History of American
Conservation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and Samuel P. Hays, Conservation And The
Gospel Of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890–1920 (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of
Pittsburgh Press, 1999). For more on the postwar grown on environmentalism, see Andrew G. Kirk,
Counterculture Green: The Whole Earth Catalog and American Environmentalism (Lawrence: University
Press of Kansas, 2007) and Collecting Nature: The American Environmental Movement and the
Conservation Library (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001); Finis Dunaway, Natural Visions: The
Power of Images in American Environmental Reform (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Adam
Ward. Rome, The Bulldozer in the Countryside: Suburban Sprawl and the Rise of American
Environmentalism, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Tom Turner, David Brower: The
Making of the Environmental Movement (Oakland: University of California Press, 2015); and Hal
Rothman, The Greening of a Nation?: Environmentalism in the United States Since 1945 (Fort Worth:
Harcourt Brace, 1998).
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tapped to manage the nation’s parks; he proposed to save the Valley from haphazard
development with a new village north of the Merced River. Although his plan would not
be realized until the late 1950s, Daniels remains the first to envision Yosemite Valley as
an urban place. Another Berkeley graduate, Ansel Hall, took the first step towards
Daniels’s vision by establishing a dedicated museum complex on the Valley floor
(designed by Herbert Maier, another Berkeley man). My first chapter examines how
Maier and Hall used natural history to anchor a large complex of offices, shops, and
parking that serves tourists to this day. The small social world of Berkeley alums created
a satellite campus in the Sierra Nevada, an auto-accessible testament to the educational
function of national parks.
Even if Yosemite’s natural wonders were cause for celebration, some of them—
like snow-packed roads—remained a nuisance. In Chapter Two we see how a city
without winter paved (or plowed) the way for the park’s ski industry, the subject of my
second chapter. Between 1926 and 1931 the Auto Club of Southern California engineered
two all-season roads to Yosemite Valley, essentially placing the park on Los Angeles’s
doorstep. The new roads also helped Yosemite’s concessioner bolster winter attendance,
a goal shared by the park’s friends in Southern California. Together, promoters from Los
Angeles and Yosemite redrew the state’s tourist calendar as well as its geography. The
road(s) to Los Angeles’s recreational future ran through the Sierra Nevada, drawing
Yosemite away from its Bay Area roots.
During the rationing of World War II, the park’s visitation dropped precipitously.
Seventy miles to the west lay another struggling small city, the subject of Chapter Three.
Merced lay at the western end of the only railway and all-season highway into the park,
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earning it the moniker “The Gateway to Yosemite.” Yet as other roads improved and car
travel became the norm, Merced’s economic and geographic advantages vis á vis
Yosemite evaporated; by World War II, the Yosemite Valley Railway was basically
insolvent. Business leaders from Merced, desperate to keep their railroad functioning,
tried to resume logging inside the park; though in line with the Park Service’s mission of
preservation, the superintendent’s refusal sealed Yosemite’s fate as a car’s park. No
longer the gateway, Merced became simply one of many.
The postwar tourist boom left the park’s brain trust scrambling for solutions and,
like so many before them, they put their faith in the automobile—much to the chagrin of
the Sierra Club. Chapter Four follows attempts to unclutter Yosemite Valley using
foundational elements of suburbanization like annexation, tract housing, and highway
building. El Portal, a newly purchased plot on the park’s western edge, offered space for
employee housing and other functions deemed “nonessential” to the Valley. Cars
presented new possibilities for redistributing tourists, as well; new facilities in Tuolumne
Meadows and Wawona promised to draw excess summer visitors out of the Merced
River canyon. Yet the Curry Company, the park’s concessioner, had a vested interest in
keeping visitors inside Yosemite Valley. As planners attempted to spread human impact
around the park, they created a city-suburb complex like that of San Jose, Orange
County, or San Diego.
In Chapter Five, we return to the Bay Area. An influx of young visitors in the
1960s—first hoodlums, then delinquents, and finally hippies—spawned Yosemite
Valley’s most urban feature to date: a police force. Long considered a mixture of
hospitality worker, mountain man, and biologist, park rangers learned to dismantle
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bombs, handle weapons, and quell riots. Yet no amount of training could disguise the
popular perception that the Valley had become a kind of ghetto. Urban ills like traffic,
crime, and smog made headlines. The superintendent solicited help from around the state,
developing especially close ties to San Francisco’s police force that specialized in dealing
with “’hippies’ and juvenile matters.” A riot between rangers and young visitors on July
4, 1970 left Yosemite on lockdown; at entrance stations, armed rangers turned away any
vehicles with long-haired passengers. The Bay Area, so instrumental in the park’s early
years, became its antagonist.
In less than sixty years, Yosemite Valley evolved from a simple village into a socalled ghetto embodying the darkest fears about the American metropolis. Fully
unpacking this transformation requires embracing the unpleasant truths of Yosemite:
overcrowding, traffic, crime, noise pollution, wildlife depletion, tricky commutes, and
prejudice. These might not be what we think of when we imagine national parks, but they
constitute some of the firmest evidence of Yosemite Valley’s urbanization. Thus, to call
the Valley ‘urban’ is not an insult; it is an invitation. Only by moving past the Park
Service’s mandate to leave parks “unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations”
can we appreciate the complex (and car-driven) relationship between Yosemite National
Park and its fellow metropolitan areas. To understand Yosemite we must look to the
cities around it. If we are to fully grasp the codependence between nature and civilization,
we must see parks as they are—and not how we want them to be.
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Chapter 1
A “City of Learning”: The University of California Comes to Yosemite, 1913–1926

In November of 1916, shortly after the founding of the National Park Service,
Berkeley, California’s Daily Gazette announced: “Yosemite Park Road Introduced to
World.”12 This was not entirely correct, as the article detailed the discovery of a new
species of toad in Yosemite National Park by a researched from the University of
California’s (now referred to as the University of California-Berkeley) Museum of
Vertebrate Zoology (MVZ), one of the preeminent scientific institutions on the West
Coast. The typo unintentionally reveals the tension between infrastructural improvement
and natural history that defined the first decade of the National Park Service’s
administration of Yosemite.
Access to the park was, by 1916, predicated almost entirely on the automobile;
travel by train and bus dwindled. Even visitors from the MVZ, bent on inventorying
Yosemite’s flora and fauna, needed cars, roads, bridges, and gasoline—a decidedly unnaturalistic tool kit if ever there was one. University of California employees and alumni
like George Bird Grinnell (Camp’s supervisor) and Ansel Hall, an information rangerturned-museum curator, cemented the university’s legacy in Yosemite. Some of the
school’s associates, however, tended more towards the promotional side. Early Park
Service leaders Stephen Mather and Horace Albright, known for their slick promotional
stunts and media savvy, also earned degrees from Berkeley. Landscape architect Mark
Daniels, in charge of the nation’s parks from 1914–1915, was a Golden Bear; so was
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architect Herbert Maier, designer of the Yosemite Museum and countless other structures
in the nation’s parks.
In short, the University of California provided the employees who dreamed,
designed, and built the infrastructure necessary to convey the park’s wonders to a curious
public. Berkeley alums and associates—whether scientists or builders—replicated
California’s famous “City of Learning” on the floor of Yosemite Valley. The addition of
a new museum building, in particular, cemented a new downtown district that remains
entrenched to this day.
--The San Francisco Bay Area has always been tied to Yosemite—and the National
Park Service at large. The 1849 discovery of gold at Sutter’s Mill triggered San
Francisco’s explosion as a global economic powerhouse; gold also led to the “discovery”
of Yosemite Valley by the controversial Mariposa Battalion.13 Rev. Thomas Starr King,
one of the first to call for Yosemite’s preservation, began preaching at San Francisco’s
First Unitarian Church in 1860. John Muir, although no native of the Bay Area, used his
contacts among the Bay Area’s elite lawyers, teachers, and writers to form the Sierra
Club in 1892.14 When the 1906 earthquake left San Francisco decimated, calls for
improved water and power supplies put the damming of Yosemite’s Hetch Hetchy
Valley—and, by proxy, the Sierra Club into the national spotlight.
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Berkeley, a small outpost on the eastern shores of the San Francisco Bay, played a
particularly large role in guiding Yosemite after its Army administration left in 1913.15 A
product of the Morrill Land Grant Act (1862), the University of California was
established in 1868; although nearby San Francisco offered more connectivity with the
rest of the world, Berkeley—sited roughly five miles north of rapidly-growing Oakland—
offered what geographer Gray Brechin calls “a more rural site conducive to studious
virtue.” It quickly became California’s claim to national, international, and even historic
educational excellence; Brechin notes that, “as Rome had once depended upon Greece for
a ready supply of intellectuals, so would San Francisco’s capitalists increasingly rely
upon the academy at Berkeley to provide managers and engineers for their Pacific
imperium.”16 A great number of the city’s intellectuals flowed eastward, as well, many of
them landing in Yosemite.
Phoebe Hearst, philanthropist and mother of William Randolph Hearst, soon
became the university’s major benefactor.17 Like many Americans, she admired Daniel
Burnham’s architectural achievements at Chicago’s World’s Columbian Exposition in
1893; Burnham had created an entire city out of thin air, and Hearst needed to do
something similar on the tabula rasa of Berkeley. In 1898 Bernard Maybeck, who would
go on to design the Sierra Club library in Yosemite’s high country, convinced Hearst to
sponsor an international design competition—not just for one building on the Berkeley
campus, but for its entire architectural plan. Harper’s Weekly noted that the victor would
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“place at the western portal of a State imperial in its resources, and soon to match the
greatest empires of the world in population, wealth, and culture.” The Overland Monthly
detected echoes of “the early and superlative genius that wrought beside the Aegean
Sea.” For her part, though, Hearst had a simpler ideal in mind: a “City of Learning.”18
The resulting city, nestled at the base of the sloping Berkeley hills, would walk a
tightrope between competing with eastern schools for national prestige and
simultaneously serving as a training ground (and charity magnet) for the Bay Area’s
professional elite.19
Most importantly for this chapter, the nascent academic power would produce
three of the first four directors of the National Park Service.20 Besides bureaucrats,
Berkeley’s scientific expertise also initiated nature guiding and museum building in
Yosemite (which then spread to other parks). The university’s contributions to the
national parks movement—and to Yosemite National Park, in particular—would help
fulfill its twinned missions of local excellence and national recognition. Berkeley faculty
and alumni would leave an indelible footprint on the floor of Yosemite Valley, using
education to toe the fine line between preservation and visitation in a satellite campus of
Hearst’s “City of Learning” through the construction of a new museum building.21
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Figure 1: Overhead view of the University of California campus, looking towards San
Francisco Bay (c. 1900). Courtesy of USC Digital Library
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--1913, an especially heady year for Yosemite, is a good starting point for
examining the University of California’s influence on Yosemite. That year, the park
transitioned from Army custody to civilian administration, marking the end of a great
experiment that occurred in many western national parks. Yosemite’s rangers also issued
their first automobile permit that summer, formally acknowledging the role machines
would play in popularizing the park’s natural wonders. The year is perhaps most famous,
though, for the passage of the Raker Act authorizing the damming of Yosemite’s Hetch
Hetchy Valley to provide water and power for San Francisco; the news of this bill
supposedly killed the Sierra Club’s John Muir, who died almost exactly a year after the
act’s passage.22
The national debate over Hetch Hetchy brought Berkeley to Washington, D.C.
Franklin K. Lane, who attended the University of California in the 1880s but did not
graduate, became Secretary of the Interior in 1913; his assistant Horace Albright—a
Berkeley graduate who would go on to head the NPS—believed that the sole reason for
Lane’s appointment was to push the Raker Act through Congress.23 Albright remembers
the dam controversy vividly:
There was tremendous opposition from John Muir and the Sierra Club,
newspapers, magazines, and just plain citizens who realized that the loss
of Hetch Hetchy would be irreparable. Letters came into Lane’s office by
the thousands and had to be answered. I, along with several other
secretaries, had to learn to counterfeit Lane’s signature and sign letters in
reply, trying to explain why the grant should be made or saying ‘careful
22
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attention’ would be given to the protest. I hated this job, for I was in
sympathy with the protests.24
Despite their shared Bay Area ties, Lane and Albright stood on opposite sides of the
debate. The damming of Hetch Hetchy is often cited as a critical juncture in America’s
environmental history, pitting the utilitarian conservationists (headed by Gifford Pinchot,
the chief of the U.S. Forest Service) against the more spiritually motivated
preservationists (exemplified by John Muir).25 Berkeley graduates, many in positions of
power within the Department of the Interior, drew from both of these philosophies in
promoting science through development at Yosemite.
Other U. C. graduates entered public service through private practice. Talk of
damming of Hetch Hetchy, murmured since the late 19th century, grew louder after an
earthquake (and its subsequent fires) decimated San Francisco in 1906. One of the most
popular scapegoats for the damage was the Spring Valley Water Company, a powerful
and corrupt company that provided San Franciscans with exorbitantly-priced water
during their time of need; indeed, when Muir spoke out against the damming of the
Tuolumne River, many accused him of “fronting for the Spring Valley Water
Company.”26 The company amassed properties around the peninsula, including some
seafront land near San Francisco’s Presidio that became a “high class residence tract” in
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1914.27 The stylist of those subdivisions (and other tracts owned by Spring Valley) was
none other than Mark Daniels, a Berkeley-trained landscape architect who would become
the general superintendent of the nation’s parks in 1914; he succeeded Adolph Miller, a
former professor of economics at the University of California.28
In Daniels’ short tenure, he became the national park system’s first urbanist,
introducing a vision for a “village” in Yosemite Valley that lives to this day.29 Known for
planning “attractive residence sub-divisions of San Francisco and Berkeley,” Daniels had
a good deal of practice in high-dollar landscape design.30 Albright remembers him as a
“very smooth and personable young man, a fine speaker, a wealthy man-about-town
type” who made an instant impression in his first meeting with Adolph Miller.31 His new
position carried no salary, but—because he maintained his private practice the whole
time—he did not need the extra cash. Daniels’s discerning eye for landscape followed
him to the Interior Department; soon after he began, he called Yosemite’s current
architecture “nondescript” and promised to provide buildings “in harmony with the
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wonderful region.”32 As a private developer, his vision for California rested on what he
called the “subdivision plan” which would “eventually dot California from end to end
with picturesque estates.” Yet this kind of rapid development was nothing without
harmony, the same kind he promised to bring to Yosemite. “When Natures [sic] hand and
man’s are linked in friendly clasp,” he advised, “artificiality ceases to be artificiality and
a perfection is wrought wherein beauty and utility are mingled in right proportions.”33
When Secretary Lane tapped Daniels as superintendent of the national parks, the
landscape architect did not relocate to Washington, D.C. Thus Daniels’s appointment
helped the Department of the Interior gain a toehold in a rising city of the American
West, where practically all its national parks lay. Daniels’s new job carried broad
responsibilities: tour and inspect the parks, plan their development, estimate the costs of
improvements, and even purchase supplies for them.34 Daniels would, in fact, eventually
resign at the end of 1915 because of his excessive administrative duties. His signal
contribution in his short time in the Department of the Interior became the idea of “park
villages”; he planned them for Glacier, Mount Rainier, and Crater Lake and, of course,
for Yosemite.35
Important environmental writings of the latter 19th century advanced the idea that
cities and the natural world were not so distant from one another.36 After Hetch Hetchy,
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though, Americans on both sides of the dam debate believed the metropolis and its
hinterland occupied separate worlds; people like Muir advocated for parks as escapes
from the ills of civilization, while those like Pinchot stressed the ability of forests to
provide for neighboring communities. Daniels, however, had no qualms envisioning
cities in parks themselves. As Horace Albright detailed, “he [Daniels] visualized that
when visitors to a park became numerous, five thousand or so, the visitors’ area would
resemble a small city and should be treated as such.”37 City planning, for Daniels, was a
necessary evil. He lamented that “[m]ost cities and towns that just grow without any
thought of proper development, civic architecture, public health or social conditions,” so
he set about to change that in Yosemite Valley—specifically, the “old” Yosemite Village
which looked “hastily thrown up…to meet the demands of the growing number of
tourists.”38 At a meeting with other park personnel in 1915, Daniels dispelled any illusion
of Yosemite Valley as a bucolic paradise:
In the Yosemite Valley there are times when there are five or six thousand
people congregated at one time. That community ceases to be a camp; it
becomes a village. It can no longer be administered or looked upon in the
light of a camp. It has its municipal problems. There are many
incorporated cities in this State and in the United States that do not have
5,000 in population.39
With those words, Daniels thus became Yosemite Valley first urbanist. His advice—that
it was best to accept Yosemite’s urban aspects and move to better plan them in the
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future—moved past generations of idealized depictions of the Valley and into something
much more concrete.
The “village” idea in the Valley entailed a move away from the cluttered Old
Village to a new site on the opposite (north) side of the Valley. Besides its haphazard
appearance, the southern site also lacked adequate drinking water, waste disposal, and
traffic circulation. Because he was working in a national park (and not a major American
city), Daniels could play with the river bottom landscape in almost infinite permutations;
he could even advise the demolition of the old site and no one would bat an eye.40 His
plan for the new site revolved around a central lodging area surrounded by residential and
service buildings; these structures would be sited along curving roads that met in wye
intersections (a triangular junction shaped like a ‘Y,’ often used by railroads). Somewhat
spectacularly, he even called for damming and excavating parts of the Merced River to
create a system of lagoons and pools near the new village.41 Daniels attempt to allay the
Valley’s “municipal problems” was not just utilitarian, but also based on a “careful study
of the best arrangement of the buildings and for picturesqueness.”42 This idea of
development in “harmony” with the landscape became a signature element of Park
Service rustic style of architecture—the closest thing the fledgling agency had to a
unified building code.43
Daniels’s pro-development philosophies fit handsomely with increasing auto
traffic to, from, and within Yosemite. . Shortly after his appointment in 1914, the
40
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Oakland Tribune trumpeted his determination to “encourage auto tours to the valley as
much as he can.”44 In his life, as well as with his words, he stressed the role of
Californians in publicizing Yosemite. He called it “shameful” that the park was “not
better known to Californians,” suggesting that “we ought to make it as easy as possible”
for cars to access it.45 In this sense he predicted the future form of Yosemite. But Daniels,
who left his post late in 1915, would leave his village plans unfinished. According to
Horace Albright, Daniels not only had a tendency to alienate powerful men (like Louis
Hill, the president of the Great Northern Railway) but he was also a bad administrator;
Daniels—charged with purchasing and procuring supplies for park improvements—used
an extremely complicated accounting system that put his co-workers off.46
It is worth nothing that a significant portion of Daniels’s stated plan above did
materialize: the central area on the north side of the Valley flanked by residential and
service districts. When it finally came to be, the central area was not lodging but a
complex featuring a museum, administration building, and ranger housing all built by
(and for) the University of California’s many disciples in the park. Daniels envisioned a
central complex that could be managed as a city. The promotional and scientific acumen
of his fellow Golden Bears would will that city into existence.
--If Daniels dreamed the city, then Stephen Mather would eventually fill it with
people. Mather arrived in Washington, D.C. during Daniels’s brief tenure. The story
generally goes that Mather, dismayed at the haphazard state of the nation’s parks, wrote
Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane—an old friend from their days at Berkeley—to
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complain; Lane allegedly wrote back, “Dear Steve: If you don’t like the way the national
parks are run, why don’t you come down to Washington and run them yourself?”47 In
reality, though, it was Adolph Miller (class of 1887, like Mather), the U. C. professorturned-assistant to Lane, who connected the men (Mather and Lane did not know each
other from college).48 In that fateful year of 1913, Mather—upon learning that his old
friend Miller was to become Lane’s assistant—scheduled a meeting with Miller to
discuss the proposed extension of Sequoia National Park. Thus began a chain of events
that culminated in Mather interviewing for his friend Miller’s former job under Secretary
Lane.
Mather, a self-made millionaire in the Borax business, immediately impressed
Lane with his gregarious and energetic presence. Lane, however, was also interested in
Mather’s fortune; the Secretary’s instinct would prove keen, as Mather would use his
private wealth to acquire the Tioga Road through Yosemite’s high country, construct the
Ranger Club on the Valley floor, and jump-start a nature guide service in Yosemite.
Because his role in promoting the Raker Act made him a “marked man,” Lane needed
help lobbying Congress for a national parks bureau. Mather took his time considering the
job offer, no doubt unimpressed by Lane’s disclosure that federally-owned parks were
“orphans”—split amongst three departments, each with little interest in the project. The
Secretary sweetened the deal by promising Mather yet another Berkeley graduate to help
him out. After accepting the position in early 1915, Mather met with his new assistant—
Horace Albright, who famously came to Washington, D.C. in a borrowed suit— to offer
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Figure 2: Stephen Mather, 1916. Despite his serious bearing here, his enthusiasm and energy earned him the
moniker “The Eternal Freshman.” Taken by Marian Albright Schenk. Courtesy WikiCommons
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him an additional one thousand dollars a year of Borax money.49 These comically
mismatched University of California men, the slick-talking millionaire and the son of a
miner—would control the Park Service for its first seventeen years.
Mather soon decided to assemble park personnel from around the nation so he
could assess them face-to-face. California was close to the nation’s parks and their
employees, plus it was slated to host two major fairs (San Francisco’s Panama-Pacific
International Exposition and San Diego’s Panama-California Exposition) beginning in
1915. Mather, known as “The Eternal Freshman” for his boyish gusto, chose to host most
of the events where it all began: the University of California. Albright and Mather arrived
in the Bay Area on March 9, 1915, even though the conference was not scheduled to start
until the 11th. Albright high-tailed it to Berkeley immediately, where his fiancée (another
University grad) was waiting—but not before Mather ordered him to bring her to an
important dinner that night. By the close of the meal, Mather convinced each of his
dining party to contribute $1,000 towards the purchase of Yosemite’s Tioga Road; he
even got one of the dinner guests to handle the legal work pro bono. Before the
conference in Berkeley had even begun, Mather had secured a trans-Sierra highway.50
Despite the supposedly national focus, the conference remained Californiacentric. Young up-and-comers like Mark Daniels, Horace Albright, and Stephen Mather
stood testament to the importance of western talent in the national parks. Attendees all
fawned over the Golden State, but some went further than others; California
Congressman Denver S. Church even called out the East’s moon, calling it a “little, old,
freckled, measly, weather-beaten moon…not even a half sister, or a sister-in-law, or a
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mother-in-law to the great big California moon that we have out here.”51 With the
superiority of the state’s natural resources established—parks, beaches, and celestial
objects—the focus moved to man-made accomplishments.
The conference’s host institution, the University of California, received its fair
share of praise—as did the Berkeley connections that brought the gathering to fruition.
U.C. Regent James K. Moffitt asserted that, since its inception, “this university has been
concerned with the love of the mountains, the mountain lakes, and the mountain parks of
this glorious State.” Noting with pride the “sons of the University of California” in
attendance, Moffitt expressed the “great pleasure and privilege” of knowing them at
school.52 Congressman J. Arthur Elston of Berkeley called attention to his town’s nonacademic achievements, like hosting John Muir’s headquarters, the artist William Keith’s
studio, and lawyer William Colby’s struggles on behalf of the Sierra Club.53 Horace
Albright, another Berkeley alum, crowed that “from this center much of the works on
behalf of the national parks is to radiate.”54
The conference schedule permitted Mather, a fraternity fellow from way back in
the 1880s, a walk down memory lane. Not long after he had given his Sigma Chi
fraternity money for a new house, Mather asked them to evacuate it for a week; the
current brothers obliged, sleeping at friends’ houses or in hotel rooms (at Mather’s
expense).55 The fraternity house thus became the after-hours social center of the parks
conference. On the first day, Mather took the opportunity to thank the Sigma Chi brothers
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who “so willingly threw open their house as an abiding place for our superintendents,
supervisors, and members of the official party from Washington.” He also revealed some
of the logic behind his lodging plan, arguing that in bunking together in his old fraternity
house he and his lieutenants would “develop that same fraternity life, and make a
fraternity that will be of value to us personally and to the Nation as a whole.”56
Mather did little more than introduce speakers during the conference; Daniels, the
young and handsome general superintendent of the parks, did most of the work.57 But at
the conference’s end, it was Mather’s fraternal attitude that won the day. The publicist
Robert Sterling Yard reminisced about the event like it was a wedding (or maybe, more
accurately, a bachelor party):
…when we broke up last night over there in Berkeley that same silent,
nervous group had become as closely bound together in bonds of
sympathy and common effort and affection as any crowd of 24 men I have
ever seen. It was a great idea of Secretary Mather’s getting us together in
Berkeley in the atmosphere of that old college, his alma mater, which he
loves so dearly.58
The origin story of the National Park Service often revolves around dedicated, selfless
individuals driven to protect scenery for future generations. Mather’s dormitory-style
socializing, however, serves as a reminder that male bonding played a major role.
It should come as no surprise, then, that Robert Sterling Yard’s reminiscence of
the “sympathy and common effort…of 24 men” omits some important female characters.
One evening during the Berkeley conference, “the ladies of the Sierra Club” treated
attendees to dinner at the Sigma Chi House. Horace Albright’s fiancée, Grace, played the
piano; this is how Albright learned that his boss had “a fine baritone voice and loved to
56
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belt out the songs.” Perhaps because of these extracurricular activities, the conference
began an hour later than usual the following morning. The following evening, however,
Mather hosted a dinner for “park personnel only” at Sigma Chi. Albright decided to “slip
away” for a quick dinner with Grace, returning to find “the gang”—a group of
“experienced men” Mather’s age (or older)—in the midst “a real rouser.”59 Like his first
night in town, Albright was caught between his burgeoning romance and his burgeoning
career. Women could feed and entertain the men responsible for the National Park
Service, but they would be categorically excluded from the category of “park personnel”
for many years to come. There could be no more apt setting for the Park Service’s
prologue than a fraternity house.60
--Daniels would resign his position eight months after the conference, but Mather—
who would become head of the newly-created National Park Service in 1917—kept his
fellow Golden Bear’s village idea alive. The day that the Berkeley conference ended in
March 1915, Mather was a man possessed by new and ambitious plans for Yosemite
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(which was, Horace Albright notes, his favorite park). He shared many of Daniels’s
aspirations for the Valley floor: sewage disposal, power production, lodging, hotels, and
even restaurants. Albright, his constant companion on this trip, noticed that Mather had
begun to use Daniels’s pet word—‘village’—quite frequently. Asking him what exactly
he meant by the term, Albright did not receive a straight answer; he noticed, however,
that roads, concessions, and increased tourism seemed much more important to Mather
than the establishment of a national park bureau.61
Mather’s tenure as director of the NPS, lasting from 1917 to 1929, remains
notable for his enthusiasm for urban infrastructure development in the parks. During his
time with the agency, he authorized over 1,000 miles of new roads, almost 4,000 miles of
new trails, and 1,600 miles of telephone and telegraph lines in parks across the nation. He
also oversaw the development of sophisticated physical plants in the nation’s parks:
museums, campgrounds, and even office buildings now dotted America’s sacred scenic
landscapes.62 As historian David Louter puts it, Mather was responsible for “opening
parks to cars and turning them into urban villages.”63 All this focus on architecture and
engineering left the nascent Park Service’s scientific side feeling a little neglected. Other
historians have credited (or blamed) Mather for “entrenched preconceptions that visitors
were of first importance and resources a distant second” in the nation’s parks.64
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I argue that Mather’s Berkeley connections mean a lot more than historians
acknowledge. That ever-controversial statement of the Park Service’s mission—to
“conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein” while
simultaneously “provid[ing] for the enjoyment of the same”—cannot be evaluated
without considering the agency’s connections to the University of California.65 As head
of a new federal agency, Mather played the underdog for perhaps the first time in his
life—hence his focus on packing the parks full of tourists to show their political and
economic viability. In doing so, however, he created the conditions necessary for
Yosemite to become a sort of recreational university. However, during Mather’s reign,
other affiliates of the University of California stepped in to re-focus the Park Service’s
rampant development in Yosemite around the idea of natural history. In other words,
Daniels and Mather provided a vision for an urban Yosemite Valley; their scientificallytrained counterparts from Berkeley adapted this urban vision to include ranger talks,
guided walks, and—most notably—a museum.
--Yosemite’s drift towards natural history began in 1908, with the founding of the
University of California’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology (MVZ) by philanthropist
Annie Montague Alexander.66 Alexander tapped an energetic young naturalist, George
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Bird Grinnell, to head the nascent museum. At this time, the school walked a precarious
tightrope between its national aspirations and its comfortable role as “a pet charity for
many of the San Francisco Bay Area elite, and a training ground for local doctors, layers,
industrialists and agriculturalists.”67 The MVZ had many missions, but its central task
under Grinnell was charting the distribution of flora and fauna across the American
West.68 Luckily, Grinnell and Alexander shared a dedication to local landscapes. While
notable natural history museums like the Smithsonian cast a global net, the MVZ
remained primarily focused on California’s birds, mammals, reptiles and amphibians.69
In the museum’s early days, Alexander had a wide variety of constituents to
consider: nature lovers, institutional sponsors, the University of California’s president
and regents, and the Bay Area’s social elite. Alexander and Grinnell formulated a mission
that would ostensibly please them all: the establishment of California, or even the whole
American West, as a nature preserve. While the federal government had pursued this
since the Yosemite Grant of 1864, Grinnell’s tenure at the MVZ added a scientific
dimension to this process. University administrators delighted in his pledge to put
regional research first. Amateur scientists and natural historians also approved, as
Grinnell’s research would help their goals of preservation and conservation—those
watchwords of the Progressive Era—in California. In other words, a more complete
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understanding of geographic range (the museum’s overall goal) would help decide which
landscapes to be protected and which to be managed for public use.70
Yosemite emerged on Grinnell’s radar shortly before Mather headed to
Washington, D.C. Only one obstacle remained for the young naturalist: a collecting
permit. In October 1914, Grinnell informed his fellow U.C. alumnus Secretary Lane of
his plans to undertake “a Natural History Survey, under the auspices of the University of
California Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, along a line through Yosemite from Merced
Falls to Mono Lake.” After this first request was denied, he sent in a second request; this
time, he enclosed a letter of support from the Sierra Club. Grinnell reached out to Mather
(now Lane’s assistant), asking if the Department of the Interior could “formally request a
report from me bearing on the…treatment of wild animals in the Yosemite National
Park”; he figured that this public gesture would “give standing” to his wildlife study. The
ever-generous Mather declined to ask for a report, but he did quietly contribute $100 to
what he termed “completion of the park’s natural history.” Since every attempt since
1911 to establish a national park bureau had failed, Mather could not request a report
suggesting any faults in the management of national parks.71
In the end, the MVZ study did nothing to jeopardize its hosts’ political
positioning. Grinnell’s preliminary findings appeared in Science only three weeks of the
establishment of the National Park Service in the fall of 1916. Titled “Animal Life as an
Asset of National Parks,” the article (co-written with study partner Tracy Storer) argued
for nature study as an important part of recreation in national parks. Perhaps more
interestingly, though, it also described national parks as the antithesis of “city parks”:
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while city parks were “artificial” and “planned,” national parks were “entirely natural”
and “kept fairly immune from human interference.”72 In closing, Grinnell advocated for
“a trained resident naturalist” in the largest parks to protect animal life and “mak[e] it
known to the public.” This naturalist would educate visitors via “popularly styled
illustrated leaflets and newspaper articles, on sign posts, and by lectures and
demonstrations at central camps.”73
The report established Grinnell as a committed public educator. His early work in
the MVZ had taught him about the value of constituents—that no matter how rigorous or
peer-reviewed they may be, the true test of scientific findings was their accessibility.74
Back when Grinnell first requested a collecting permit from Lane, he vowed that his
findings would be shared with the public and not just specialists with university training.
This reflected his personal view that the conservation movement could only remain
strong if its ideas were sown far and wide.75 Connecting the University to its federallymanaged backyard helped immensely. As environmental historian Alfred Runte notes,
Grinnell’s biggest accomplishment may have been “the marriage between Berkeley and
Yosemite.” Along with Albright, Lane, and Mather, Grinnell and the MVZ founded a
“university in the wilderness.”76
But what form would this university take? Grinnell’s efforts to make natural
history accessible would hinge upon a different kind of accessibility. The Mather era in
Yosemite would not hew to Grinnell’s “entirely natural” guidelines, but the two
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Berkeley-ites’ goals would mesh in another way. “Animal Life” argued persuasively that
nature study would enhance recreational opportunities in national parks. Mather would
eventually jump on the bandwagon, financing a Nature Guide Service himself. Though
Mather and Daniels envisioned Yosemite as a city park, its “artificial” and “planned”
qualities attracted massive crowds—all of them potential converts to conservationism.
--Berkeley’s educational efforts in Yosemite began way back in 1870, when
geology professor Joseph LeConte led his students on a summer field trip through the
park. Public education in the park lagged until a U.C. extension course on California’s
birds drew twenty-seven of San Francisco’s best doctors, teachers, and businessmen; this
proof of public interest inspired Grinnell to continue his quest to bring Yosemite’s natural
history to a wider audience.77 In 1919 he excitedly wrote Enos Mills, a Colorado
conservationist, to proclaim that—with the help of the University of California in general,
and Horace Albright in particular—he would begin a summer “extension course” in
Yosemite Valley. This “laboratory-out-of-doors” idea would be bolstered a museum
“illustrating the local natural history” that the Park Service would establish. The museum
would encourage visitors to “go out of doors and hunt up the animals, alive, in their
natural surroundings.” Grinnell was especially tickled to imagine a museum that “would
not merely be a morgue!”78
Grinnell’s quest to bring science to the public was inspired in large part by the fin
de siècle “New Museum” movement. To understand the New Museum movement, one
need look no further than a study on Boston first graders published in 1891. Ninety
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percent of respondents had no understanding of an elm tree, a field of wheat, or even the
origin of leather, demonstrating a stark separation from the natural world. As historians
of science Karen Rader and Victoria Cain point out, this “perceived national crisis”
caused reformers to embrace science education in an attempt to bring Americans closer to
the natural world; this would provide pleasure while stressing the rational use of
resources—a key tenet of the Progressive Era.79 The U.S. Forest Service—founded on a
similar intermixture of enjoyment and wise use—was founded in 1905.
The New Museum movement also had something in common with the nascent
National Park Service. Museum reformers, attempting to reach a variety of visitors
through the effective use of displays, rooted through their respective basements in search
of specimens that could “spark interest in scientists and schoolchildren” alike. Rather
than merely preserving specimens and producing scientific knowledge, museums
gradually become educational institutions.80 Based on the contradictory language in the
agency’s founding document, the National Park Service experienced similar tensions
between the ideas of preservation and public engagement; the Mather-led NPS (1917–
1929) dabbled in natural history but stressed visitation and auto access above all. It
should be noted that even “museum men” (period terminology for museum reformers)
were not above using commercialism to “sell” their subject matter; many consulted with
department store display designers, theater directors, and even magazine illustrators to
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utilize “a more explicitly commercial look for educational ends.”81 Grinnell’s efforts to
establish education in Yosemite Valley led to the same kind of negotiation between
consumption and conservation. A museum building could instill a sense of conservation
in park visitors, but it also needed to “sell” the idea—just as Mather would “sell” the
parks to the American public.
The first museum in Yosemite can be traced back to Maj. John Bigelow, of the
Ninth U.S. Cavalry, the acting superintendent of Yosemite National Park before the
advent of civilian administrators in 1906. Together with Grinnell, he developed a series
of displays showing off Yosemite’s flora and fauna; when Albright became
superintendent of Yellowstone in 1919, he took Bigelow’s museum idea with him and
began curating a collection there.82 Isolated in Yellowstone, Albright did not have the
luxury of borrowing from a world-class research university like his friends (and fellow
Berkeley alumnae) in Yosemite. In a letter to Mather in 1918, Secretary of the Interior
Franklin Lane stressed that national parks did not need to employ their own scientific
experts when they could simply “utilize [the] hearty cooperation” of biologists from other
agencies.83 Unnamed but implied here is the Berkeley connection, which would be
crucial in establishing yet another tenet of Lane’s letter to Mather: encouraging “[t]he
educational, as well as the recreational, use of the national parks.” To further this goal,
the Secretary advised the establishment of “[m]useums containing specimens of wild
flowers, shrubs, and trees and mounted animals, birds, and fish native to the parks, and
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other exhibits of this character.”84 Athough primarily known for the black bear (Ursus
americanus), Yosemite’s museum owed a lot to the fictional Golden Bear.
Not long after Lane reminded Mather of his educational duties, the Californian
conservationist (and eugenicist) Charles Goethe happened on a lecture by a U.C. biologist
while in the Lake Tahoe area; impressed, he started his own lecture series the following
summer at nearby Fallen Leaf Lake.85 Stephen Mather dropped by one evening and,
convinced of the project’s merit, decided to start a series of ranger talks in Yosemite—
essentially beginning NPS interpretation as we know it. The University of California
played an active role in this quantum educational leap. During the summer of 1919,
Berkeley’s university extension division offered its first LeConte Memorial lectures
(named for the field trip leader from 1870) in Yosemite Valley. Prominent faculty
members like anthropologist Alfred Kroeber and botanist Willis Jepson spoke on the
natural (and human) history of the Sierra Nevada “in the simplest of language,” heeding
Grinnell’s idea of accessibility. The lectures drew over 250 people on average, indicating
massive interest beyond the academy.86
Mather seemed to believe that, by emphasizing Yosemite’s natural wonders, the
Park Service could combat—or at least slow—the park’s commercialization.87 Beginning
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the summer of 1920, Yosemite added another Berkeley-centric natural history feature to
augment the LeConte lectures: the Nature Guide Service, started with Mather’s own
funds (but at Grinnell’s urging). Grinnell envisioned “a natural history leader or guide” to
be “available for service at the several public camps of the Valley;” this person would
have “the highest standing as a biologist,” with a “pleasing personality” to boot. Their
duties would include “twenty minute evening talks on local natural history—birds,
mammals, reptiles, fishes, flowers—perhaps two or even three such talks…in one
evening.” There would be a nationwide search “to secure the approval of the best
educated classes in the country.” He summarily listed some ideal candidates, all of whom
were men with Ph.D.’s and university jobs.88
Two Nature Guides emerged from a crowded field: Drs. Loye Miller (of the State
Normal School in Los Angeles, later UCLA) and Harold Bryant (of Berkeley’s MVZ).
The Los Angeles Times described Bryant, who earned his Ph.D. in zoology from
Berkeley, as “one of the best-known scientists in the State.”89 Two other park naturalists
would help Miller and Byrant initiate interpretation in Yosemite Valley: Ansel Hall
(another Berkeley man), and Enid Michael (a schoolteacher from Pasadena). Michael was
Yosemite’s first female ranger-naturalist, and would eventually become the park’s first
female Nature Guide in 1923; she specialized in collecting flower specimens for
display.90 Bryant would be instrumental is operating the Yosemite Field School of
Natural History, established in 1925 as a way to train applicants (regardless of gender)
for naturalist positions within the Park Service. It soon became apparent that only male
students would be considered for jobs; regardless of the label ‘ranger-naturalist,’ Park
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Service personnel believed that women lacked the necessary skills—fighting fires,
rescuing climbers, or enforcing the law—to be considered for employment.91 Historian
Alfred Runte has also revealed that over half of the field school’s enrollees were
associated with the University of California or George Grinnell.92 Thus the National Park
Service’s new emphasis on natural history did little to change the agency’s preference for
university-trained men—especially those from Berkeley.
Yet the proof of this new program’s success would only be measured in one way:
human traffic. Indeed, by 1923 the Nature Guide Service—through its walks, talks, and
museum work—was serving over 100,000 visitors per year, roughly three quarters of the
park’s total visitors.93 Despite Park Naturalist Hall’s contention that the Nature Guide
program success “not be measured entirely by attendance but by the …stimulated public
sentiment favoring the conservation of natural resources,” these missions remained at
odds.94 Although Mather used the Guide Service to prevent commercialization, the
innovative interpretation program still had the same goal as other parts of Mather’s
agenda: growth. In order for Yosemite to function as an outgrowth of the University of
California, it needed proper “enrollment” figures.
---
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Figure 3: Nature Guides Dr. Loye Miller (left) and Dr. Harold C. Bryant (right) showing off snakes in
front of the Old Village Superintendent's Office, 1920. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Yosemite’s innovative system of interpretation had funding, staff, and
considerable publicity; the only thing it lacked was a home. Back when Major Bigelow
was curating his collection, Yosemite Valley’s downtown sat on the southern banks of
the Merced River. Amongst the “nondescript” and “hastily thrown up”(Mark Daniels’s
words) development of photography studios and curio shops stood the Park Service’s
headquarters, where ranger Forrest Townsley had started a little museum in the late
nineteen-teens. The pairing of administrative and scientific authority—a hallmark of the
Progressive Era—spoke to Berkeley’s twinned roles in the park.
Townsley found a kindred spirit in Ansel Hall, a Berkeley forestry grad who
became an information ranger in 1919. Hall spent most of his first season in Yosemite
registering campers and answering questions—noting, when he could, visitors’ reactions
to the flora and fauna on display in the same building. The next summer (1920) brought
the inaugural season of the park’s Nature Guide Service, and—with it—even more
questions for Hall about the park’s natural history.95 Hall would go on to not only answer
these questions, but lead the fight for a permanent (and fireproof) museum building
befitting Yosemite’s wondrous collections.
The drive for a permanent museum had lots of pit stops along the way. Mather’s
largesse once again proved crucial in 1920 when he paid for a handsome dormitory for
Yosemite’s rangers (the Rangers’ Club, still standing today). This created a ripple effect,
allowing bachelor rangers like Hall to leave behind their rooms at Jorgenson’s studio,
built in 1899 as a home office for successful California artist Chris Jorgenson; once
relieved of dormitory duty, Jorgenson’s studio became the next site to house the park
museum. Hall began preparing the new site on a shoestring budget in September 1920,
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turning extra doors into exhibit tables and begging lumber from a nearby logging outfit.
The amateurish exhibition of objects (including some taxidermy donated by Townsley
himself) communicated little concern for the museum’s collection. Hall’s guiding
principle was simple: allow visitors to observe without interference.96
Funding remained a constant thorn in Hall’s side, making him an expert
fundraiser. He also solicited gifts and loans of appropriate objects from collectors
throughout California. This skill, which would define his curatorial career in Yosemite,
resulted in a collection that—by the time the museum opened at Jorgenson’s studio in
June 1922—could have fetched more than $30,000 (roughly $425,000 in today’s
dollars).97 Encouraged by the success of his collecting efforts, Hall also started the
Yosemite Museum Association (later the Yosemite Natural History Association) in 1923
to aid his fundraising for a permanent and fireproof museum building; it was the first
organization of its kind established in the Park Service.98
There remained one problem. Even though Daniels and others might describe the
Valley as a city, it was not the kind of city that could host a world-class museum. The
streets remained unpaved, and during rainy periods the Old Village turned into a swamp.
Luckily, Mather’s Rangers’ Club helped him accomplish one of his pet projects:
abandoning the ramshackle and poorly-sited Old Village.99 On the north side of the
Merced River, newly constructed schoolhouse and cottages for government employees
emerged shortly before Mather’s new dormitory; the Holy Trinity of the Park Service’s
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rustic style—the Rangers’ Club, the administration building, and eventually the new park
museum would follow in waves.
The Rangers’ Club proved to be the first puzzle piece in the Valley’s new urban
village. The handsome new structure may have triggered the Valley’s urban migration
from south to north, but the administration building provides a particularly potent symbol
of this move. The headquarters in the Old Village had always symbolized federal
authority; motorists entering the Valley headed there first to register and ask questions of
friendly rangers stationed there (like Hall). As first contact point, however, it left a lot to
be desired. Its makeshift appearance and general inefficiency caused park managers to
worry about both visitors’ perceptions and employees’ morale. Luckily, Congress
appropriated funds for a new park headquarters in 1923.100 Approval for a new post
office building—another symbol of federal authority— arrived in 1923, as well. By the
end of that year, a long-range plan for “village” (or city) development in the Valley
became clear. In contrast to the rambling plan of the old site, the New Village was to be
arranged neatly around a plaza—with ample parking, of course. Park Service architect
Daniel Hull dutifully noted that the new structures would “harmonize with their natural
surroundings,” essentially an agency-wide mandate ever since Lane’s letter of 1918 and a
fitting summary of the rustic style.101 While the aesthetic of the Ranger Club and the
administration building—rough hewn beams, locally quarried rocks, and secluded
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siting—meshed with the landscape in its own way, Hall’s pet museum project would
harmonize Yosemite’s built and natural environments in a way all its own.102
--Around the time of the Old Village’s demise, national parks underwent a
reshuffling of their own. After World War I, with a patriotic tide rising throughout the
home front, the nation’s parks became yet another symbol of the country’s superiority.
Parks transcended their image as mere playgrounds; they became, as historian Marguerite
Shaffer notes, a “recreational public school system.”103 Stephen Mather, Berkeley man
and director of the Park Service, used another academic metaphor when he claimed that
“[t]he National Parks are national museums.”104 The transformation of parks from
pleasuring grounds to educational facilities shaped the social and political climate that
would birth the new Yosemite museum building. Perhaps more importantly, though, it
represented a new image for the NPS. Rather than an a tourist agency masquerading as a
preservationist cause—as some historians have argued—the National Park Service’s
emphasis on education suggested that the agency had finally figured out how to balance
its contradictory missions of public enjoyment and preservation.
Mather’s required a dependable assistant that could become the agency’s public
face whenever it was required. Horace Albright, Mather’s fellow University of California
alum, left Washington, D.C. in 1919 to become superintendent of Yellowstone; into his
place stepped Arno B. Cammerer, a capable career bureaucrat. Beginning in the early
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Figure 4: Ansel Hall standing by the cornerstone of the Yosemite Museum, 1924. Courtesy
NPGallery Digital Archive
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Figure 5: Traffic outside the Administration Building in the New Village, 1925. This is where motorists entering the park
would check in. The Ranger Club (not pictured) is to the left (south), and the new Yosemite Museum would occupy a spot to
the right (north) the following year. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Figure 6: The Rangers' Club, a fine example of the National Park Service's trademark rustic
style. Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons user almonroth
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Figure 7: Yosemite Valley, c. 1920. The Old Village is the dense concentration of
buildings at bottom center; the New Village site is located in the upper right
corner just east of the cemetery (marked with a cross). Ansel Hall, Guide to
Yosemite (San Francisco: Sunset Publishing House, 1920). Courtesy of Yosemite
Library Online
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nineteen-twenties, Cammerer presided over the years that turned national parks into
“nature’s greatest laboratories of natural history.”105 The following year, Cammerer sent
letters to 134 (!) colleges and universities, urging them to form “National Parks Travel
Committees” to organize some sort of summer travel to the parks.106
Publicly, Cammerer displayed great pride in “the educational side of Park work”
which, he argued, would transform parks into “Nature’s outdoor classrooms.”107 While
not exactly informed by the same urges as Grinnell or Hall, Cammerer was in a position
to enact such a great change to the Park Service’s mission statement. In fact, his public
advocacy for the Service’s educational mission changed one of the agency’s founding
documents: the aforementioned letter from Lane to Mather, written in 1918. Lane
advanced three central principles, one of which was that parks should be “set apart for
the use, observation, health and pleasure of the people.” Cammererlobbied , the
Secretary of the Interior to change ‘observation’ to ‘education,’ thereby signifying a more
active role for the parks in public education.108 With Cammerer at the helm, the parks
began their transformation into “a super-university of the natural sciences.”109
For all the big talk of the agency’s changing priorities, Yosemite’s rangers still
housed their expensive collections in a glorified shack. Shortly after establishing the
Yosemite Museum Association in 1922, Hall enlisted Herbert Maier—the future assistant
Regional Director, possessing a degree in architecture from the University of
California—to prepare drawings of the proposed structure. One of the park’s
concessioners donated almost $2,000 to the cause; soon, the Museum Association had
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collected roughly $9,000 towards the construction of a new fireproof home.110 Visitor
counts at the museum, its sponsored campfire talks, and its naturalist-led hikes continued
to rise through the early nineteen-twenties.111 A victim of his success, Hall moved to
Berkeley in 1923 after Mather appointed him Chief Naturalist of the NPS’s new Field
Educational Headquarters stationed at—where else?—the University of California.112
Despite the distance, Hall remained dedicated to Yosemite’s museum program.
Little did he know he had already secured its success years earlier. Flash back to 1921,
when Ansel Hall—fresh from an ascent of Middle Palisade, in the southern Sierra—
encountered a party of mountaineers including Chauncey J. Hamlin, future president of
the American Association of Museums. As they got to talking, Hall detailed his current
work involving museums in national parks. Remembering the conversation years later,
Hamlin approached the president A press release celebrating the Rockefeller funds noted
that Yosemite “will probably become one of the foremost places in all the world for
natural history study,” making a vacation in the park a “period of mental improvement as
well as of physical improvement.” It also mentioned the museum’s place in the larger
scheme of park improvements, including the Ranger Club and the improved
administration building. The latter proved particularly important, for as “the registration
place for all private campers motoring into the Valley” it guaranteed a steady flow of
vehicles. Without traffic, Yosemite’s educational mission could only advance so far.113
---
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The New Village’s museum remained tethered to the automobile. The same
month of the announcement of the Rockefeller grant, Congress—in response to the
entreaties of Yosemite superintendent W. B. Lewis—appropriated $1.5 million to pave
the roughly twenty-nine miles of roads in Yosemite Valley El Portal and improve the
remaining one hundred and ten miles. This funding was probably inspired by the
imminent arrival of the All-Year Highway, connecting Merced to El Portal—and thus
announcing the true opening of Yosemite to the automobile, and to the world (see next
chapter).114 In fact, the party traveling to the Valley in November 1924 for the laying of
the museum cornerstone would travel this very same route.115 Progressive Era Americans
noted the interdependence of cars and nature not with irony, but with hope. As Louter
writes, parks became spaces “where it was possible for machines and nature to coexist
without the same industrial transformation that was affecting other parts of the nation.”116
As construction in the New Village progressed, visitors accustomed to the “string
of old buildings” in the Old Village could be forgiven for their confusion; the Oakland
Tribune announced that “the village has moved across the Valley,” clarifying that—
instead of simply moving the old buildings—the government “put up some handsome
new ones.”117 Just as the downtown moved, so did the park’s visitors; the administration
building and the museum promised helped motorists check in their vehicles and check
out the park’s wildlife. Organized around a parking plaza, these modern-but-rustic
structures demonstrated the influence of cars in connecting Berkeley to Yosemite and
visitors to the natural world. The new buildings and the road leading to them lent a
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Figure 8: Herbert Maier's sketch of the new museum building, undated. Yosemite
National Park archives, Old Central Files, Series 12, Subseries 1, Box 80
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natural appearance to the newly constructed city.118
Cars had been essential on the curatorial side of Hall’s museum, as well. A mad
rush to open (and fill) the new museum commenced with the Rockefeller grant, leading
Hall and his replacement—Park Naturalist Carl P. Russell—to use the Park Service’s
designated “museum truck” on a four-day collecting trip to Merced that netted them
valuable paintings and photographs.119 Hall’s new job in Berkeley begat another feather
in his cap: Executive Agent for the Committee on Museums in National Parks, a title
bestowed on him by the American Association of Museums. Moving between multiple
jobs and multiple places, Hall became hard to pin down; he had to nag both of his
employers to pay his mileage for one of his various duties which, for him as well and his
employers, had started to blur together.120 Hall’s mobility helped and hurt him.
He never forgot the Park Service’s failure to grant him an adequate vehicle.
During his early years, he used his own automobile and “ran thousands of miles on
Government business at my own expense.” When he finally received a government car in
the spring of 1923, it was a discarded Ford that “was too much of a wreck to be taken off
the floor of Yosemite Valley”—yet when he left for a trip to Europe, the park’s plumbing
department repossessed it to use its engine as a pump. Sick of the run-around, Hall finally
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bought a Chevrolet truck for the museum using funds he had collection for construction
and equipment; he also bought a car for himself with his own personal funds. Extracting
mileage expenses from the Park Service remained difficult, and in early 1925 Hall told
NPS Director Cammerer that he would just pay his most recent bill himself; the
unpleasant alternative, he concluded threateningly, was to tell the American Association
of Museums or the Laura Spelman Rockefeller Memorial that “the Park Service is not
cooperating in the way that it should.”121 His struggle with mileage reveals the
overlapping layers of authority that came with the New Village’s museum. Stationed in
Berkeley, loyal to Yosemite, and working for the American Association of Museums,
Hall struggled to negotiate educational, federal, and institutional demands. For better or
worse, his mobility enabled him to juggle these tasks.
Hall’s new gig in the East Bay was a reward for his revolutionary work, but he
remained head of a rag-tag bureau with no official recognition. In early 1925, citing the
permanent homes of the Park Service’s Landscape Architectural Division in Los Angeles
and the Engineering Division in Portland, Hall lobbied to permanently house the
Education Division in Berkeley. The city provided easy access to many of the nation’s
parks, but it remained far enough away from them to avoid “the constant interruptions
that are always occurring in the parks.” The University of California played a major role
in Hall’s plea. In addition to providing “[s]cientific information of all kinds” and
“technical experts,” it also proved a ready source for “[a]ll kinds of skilled labor.”
Perhaps most personally for Hall, Berkeley had been his home since 1923 (and before
that, during his education in the nineteen-teens); he bought property there shortly after his
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relocation, adding studios, laboratories, and shops at his own expense.122 Hall’s wish
would come true in 1925, when Mather established the Education Division there,
furthering Berkeley’s role as the urban backdrop to natural history in the nation’s parks.
However, in late 1924 and early 1925, the imminent opening of Yosemite’s new
museum consumed most of Hall’s time. He asked Yosemite’s superintendent to loan him
Park Naturalist Carl Russell for three months to help with “models and other exhibits
preparatory to opening the new Yosemite Museum.”123 Obsessed with finishing the new
building by spring of 1925, he even brought Herbert Maier—now employed by the
American Association of Museums as the architect for the Yosemite project—to
Berkeley to work on museum installation plans and models.124 Travel between Berkeley
and Yosemite became a foundation of the new museum. In his quest to bring the park’s
natural world to a larger audience, Hall became Yosemite’s first commuting employee.
--A product of the Valley and the Bay, the new museum building bore hallmarks of
both places. Maier designed it to fit alongside the Ranger’s Club and the new
administration building, two symbols of the University of California’s indelible influence
on the park. Taken together, the three structures—and their indigenous logs, shingles, and
stone—formed a crash course on the Park Service’s emerging rustic style. The Berkeleytrained Maier, aware of “what has been said of preserving parks undefined by man’s
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handiwork,” kept the building flat; a tall building, he said, would somewhat foolishly
enter into “competition with the cliffs” while remaining visible rather from above (rather
than disappearing under the oak and pine canopy).125 Famed Bay Area architect Bernard
Maybeck, known for his hillside houses in Berkeley, also proved a crucial influence on
the rustic architectural style of the Park Service.126 Berkeley thus provided architectural
as well as scientific grounding for the project.
While the outside harmonized with the landscape, the inside resembled a
university re-created in miniature. The foyer contained background information
grounding the subsequent exhibits squarely in California: a naturalist sat next to relief
models of Yosemite Valley, the park, and the entire state. Like buildings on a campus,
the rest of the rooms were dedicated to specific subjects. The first room contained the
geologic story of the park. The next room, dedicated to life zones, showed how flora and
fauna changed with elevation along the Sierra Nevada. After that came the ethnology
room, filled with the baskets that anchored earlier museum collections. Next came the
history room, featuring bygone objects like stagecoaches; abutting that was a public
library. Like many academic buildings, the bottom story contained “classrooms” while
the upper story of the contained the more specialized—and non-public—functions. The
offices of the naturalist and nature guides sat side by side, sharing an administrative
assistant like faculty members might. A printing room, a darkroom, and a taxidermy
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room rounded out the top floor, along with a special room for lectures and a “club room”
complete with a fireplace—a kind of faculty lounge, if you will.127
But the building was not meant to keep visitors indoors all day. To Hall’s boss, H.
C. Bumpus of the American Association of Museums, the museum was not an “end in
itself” but instead “a means for preparing the visitor to understand the stories that nature
outside the building can tell so abundantly and so dramatically.”128 The south side of the
building, facing the Yosemite Village plaza—the main source of parking—contained two
openings (both to the museum and the open-air auditorium); this helped connect the
visitors’ automobiles with their educational enhancement.129 The museum’s location also
spoke to the automobile’s importance; the administration building, where motorists
registered, and the museum—essentially serving as a visitor center—would serve as a
collecting jumping-off point for most tourists.130
The automobile actually occupied an important place inside the museum, as well.
By beginning with a glacier and ending with a stagecoach, the layout put vehicles on par
with some of Earth’s most impressive forces. Bumpus’ own travels to and from the park
shaped his thoughts; he appreciated that specimens were arranged according to the “plant
and animal zones that one passes through in motoring from the warm climate of the low
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lands (Upper Sonoran) into that of the Valley (Transition Zone).”131 More subtly than the
building’s siting, the internal layout made transportation an important part of Yosemite’s
natural world.
The museum’s opening in May 1926 corresponded with Yosemite’s automotive
history in a big way. That July, the park celebrated the “discovery” of Yosemite Valley
by white men seventy-five years prior in conjunction with its traditional Indian Field
Days. Yet such an anniversary could not be celebrated in isolation, not with the
completion of the much-anticipated All-Year Highway from Merced so imminent. In the
past, the park’s Indian Field Days had been used to bolster visitor counts in the late
summer (prime waterfall season in the spring used to be a bigger draw).132 In the context
of cars, however, Native residence in the Valley was presented as merely another
milestone on the way to modernity. On the second day of the celebration, August 1, both
eras would be celebrated with pageant performed by over 200 players. Starting with a
pyrotechnic display, the play covered all stages of the park’s history from Native
habitation until the present day.133 The implied end of the pageant was, of course, the
opening of the new highway that the Berkeley Daily Gazette called the “dawn of a new
transportation era.”134 Like the museum exhibits, the seventy-fifth anniversary of the
Valley’s “discovery” would culminate with the automobile era—representing not only
the current moment, but also infinite progress beyond.
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Figure 9: The Yosemite Museum, 1938. Note the multiple entrances facing the plentiful parking lot.
Courtesy of the Mariposa County Public Library and the San Joaquin Valley Digitization Project
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--To pragmatists like Stephen Mather and his publicist, Robert Sterling Yard,
automobiles remained essential to the Park Service’s educational mission; indeed, at
other parks like Crater Lake, naturalist-led motor caravans were already part of the
syllabus.135 But could internal combustion really help Americans understand the natural
world? If tourists stayed on the road, would they spare less durable parts of the park?
Could technology allow park visitors to be a part of the natural world without disturbing
it?136
The goal of teaching conservation in Yosemite had not died with Grinnell. Even
in its early phases, the Valley’s humble museum promised to lessen the impact on
surrounding landscapes. Naturalists implored visitors to “do your botanizing at the flower
exhibits” so as to not disturb wild specimens.137 Writing to a prospective lecturer in 1924,
Carl Russell (Hall’s replacement) admitted that the park’s visitors remained “largely
pleasure seekers of the jazz-lover sort”; thus, any messages of conservation had to be
tempered by “the popular science side.”138 By the time the New Village’s museum
opened, Russell was more adamant than ever: “If I were asked what I thought the greatest
purpose and greatest opportunity of educational work in the national park is, I should say
it is conservation teaching.”139
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Could crowds actually be good for Yosemite? The New Village’s museum
emerged as the All-Year Highway sparked a massive boom in auto tourism. It also,
however, gave the conservationist gospel to large numbers of visitors. As with Mather’s
philosophy during the Park Service’s early years, crowds would mean success: although
they would tax park resources like never before, mass amounts of tourists and cars would
demonstrate the agency’s political and economic viability. Crowding became similarly
important as a barometer of the new museum’s popularity. In the months following its
opening, H. C. Bumpus requested reports that showed an “increasing number of visitors,”
presumably to demonstrate the viability of such a project in other parks.140 Herbert Maier,
reporting “tremendous crowds deluging the Yosemite Museum” in the fall of 1927,
actually recommended enlarging the museum—not for exhibit space, but for floor space;
Maier’s design, while handsome, “had not been expected originally to accommodate the
crowds the new highway is bringing in.”141 Like many successful galleries, the new
Yosemite museum could anchor an urban environment.
T. S. Palmer, chief of the U. S. Department of Agriculture’s Biological Survey,
said as much upon visiting Yosemite in the summer of 1927. Like others before and
since, he noted that on the most crowded weekends Yosemite Valley became “one of the
15 largest cities in the State.” Palmer observed that, even though the new highway had
“broken down the wall which formerly surrounded the Park,” the nature guide service
remained important “for preventing the ‘jazzing’ and impairment of Yosemite as a
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Figure 10: Traffic waiting to enter the park on the All-Year Highway, 1927. Courtesy NPGallery Digital
Archive
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National Park.”142 Even visitors interested in the park’s natural history—what the
museum was promoting—had to overcome an “aversion to crowds” if they wished to call
on a park naturalist. During his trip, Palmer met a man who loved birds but hated crowds,
and thus skipped all the guided walks emanating from the museum; upon learning that he
might have seen a quarter of the Valley’s bird species on one particular walk, he was
“disappointed.”143 On certain weekends, the museum’s popularity inhibited its
educational functions.
Bumpus may have taken pride in the growth of the museum’s clientele, but he
also took pride in its growth as an organization. As he proudly reported to the Laura
Spelman Rockefeller board, during 1927 the museum’s staff increased from six to fifteen
and the attendance at museum-sponsored lectures in the Valley grew from 38,000 to
100,000. Attendance on naturalist-led field trips had almost quadrupled. Perhaps most
importantly for the museum’s mission, over one half of Yosemite’s 500,000 visitors
during 1927 visited the museum at some time during their trip. “There were times,” he
reported with pride, that the “rooms were literally crowded.”144
--The University of California produced Yosemite’s first urbanists and its first
natural historians, its developers and its defenders. The new museum—a crowd-creator
and people-educator extraordinaire—served both camps. Taken by itself, it represented a
triumph for conservation: educating visitors, housing the Nature Guide Service, and
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allowing visitors to do their botanizing in a controlled environment. In the larger context
of the Valley, however, the museum anchored a new metropolitan area on the Merced’s
northern banks, bringing order to the “ramshackle” situation that had accrued over the
years; along with the administration building, it served as a makeshift visitor center.
As an institution, the museum altered the course of Yosemite’s urban history. In
the early twentieth century, Berkeley was its university; nearby San Francisco had a
busier port and a bigger industrial base, but no municipality had a bigger effect on the
early history of Yosemite—and the National Park Service in general. The university’s
(ultimately successful) quest for national notoriety began with some federal property a bit
closer to home.
In the early years of the Park Service Yosemite emerged as a reflection of
Berkeley, beginning a process of metropolitan mirroring that would continue for the next
fifty years. “[T]he wall which formerly surrounded the Park” dissolved as the automobile
became a fact of life, shaping Yosemite in the image of its neighboring cities and blurring
the lines between city and country. Commenting on the New Village’s newest asset, the
Los Angeles Times noted that “the most striking individual feature of the entire
institution” was not a Miwok basket or a piece of taxidermy, but in “thirty-four
remarkable camera studies of the valley executed by Mode Wineman of Pasadena.”145
Curatorial squabbling aside, Los Angeles would take over where Berkeley left off.
Yosemite’s journey southward (or the Southland’s journey northward) is the subject of
the next chapter.
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Chapter 2
“Invade the North”: The Auto Club of Southern California and Yosemite’s New Season,
1913–1941

The Automobile Club of Southern California’s tranquil off-street parking almost
makes one forget the busy intersection of Figueroa and Adams next door. In 1924 it was
actually the nation’s busiest crossing, hosting almost 70,000 cars each day.146 As traffic
choked downtown, professionals moved their families increasingly farther out into the
city’s suburban ring. But, for the Auto Club, Los Angeles stretched even farther to the
north, out of the transverse ranges and into the southern tip of the San Joaquin Valley,
past Fresno and increasingly rustic-sounding towns like Madera, Coarse Gold and
Oakhurst—all the way to Yosemite.
Despite the Bay Area’s crucial role in creating and configuring the park, the
1920s and 1930s saw a new tourist geography emerge in California. Led by the
Automobile Club of Southern California (ACSC), the Southland’s promotional mavens,
like the All-Year of Club of Southern California, Los Angeles Times publisher Harry
Chandler, the city chamber of commerce, and a coalition of car dealers and outdoor
retailers, embarked on a quest to make their city a true destination in all seasons. Better
roads to Yosemite—especially those from the south—form a crucial part of this effort.
Thanks in large part to the ACSC’s tireless lobbying, three new highways in the span of a
decade gave Southern Californians easier access to the park; these modern all-year roads
allowed travelers to subvert the typical tourist seasons, taking their cars where—and
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when—they wanted. The ACSC thus made Yosemite the northernmost extension of the
Los Angeles area, incorporating the park into Southern California’s booming urban
geography.
--At the turn of the century, forty percent of Californians (all 1.5 million of them)
lived in either the San Francisco Bay Area or greater Los Angeles area. These two urban
areas continue to duel for prominence, each possessing some kind of edge in terms of
weather (Los Angeles), innovation (San Francisco, at least since 2000), or traffic (tie).
Fin de siècle Bay Area had all the eastern institutions—opera, museums, universities—
but Los Angeles had sheer momentum, possessed by what one scholar terms “a civic
ambition comparable to the high provincial security of San Francisco.”147 What the
Southland lacked in stature, it made up in audacity.
The Automobile Club of Southern California dates back to 1900, right as Los
Angeles’s ambition hit new highs. The ACSC was one of many organizations founded
around the turn of the century that sought to capitalize on the region’s potential for
tourism. Along with its predecessors (the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce and the
Los Angeles Board of Trade) and its peers (the Merchants and Manufacturers Association
and the Los Angeles Realty Board), the Auto Club’s executives joined an important class
of citizens that one scholar terms “entrepreneurs of place.” While their methods differed,
each of these groups sought one thing above all: the growth of the Los Angeles area.148
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Their efforts succeeded: by 1920, the City of Angeles had surpassed San Francisco in
population; by 1930, it was the fifth most populous city in the nation.149
The ACSC’s original goals belied its future clout. The club’s bylaws humbly
claimed it was “a social organization” for those “owning, manufacturing, or interested in
the sale of self-propelled vehicles.” Its officers pledged to seek “rational legislation” and
“proper rules,” and to protect the “lawful rights and privileges” of auto owners. Perhaps
the only hint of the Auto Club’s broader ambitions came in its promise “[t]o promote and
encourage in all ways the construction and maintenance of good roads and the
improvement of existing highways.”150 True to its pledge, the ACSC focused on local
issues in its first decade: organizing auto parades, lobbying for higher speed limits, and
even cracking down on reckless chauffeurs.151
The Auto Club’s footprint soon expanded, both literally and figuratively. Its local
political influence had grown considerably by 1915, including fights for highway bonds
and against speed traps. Its Touring Bureau answered hundreds of queries each day, and
its six branch offices issued hundreds of thousands of road maps each year. The club’s
spatial expansion spoke to its increasing ambition, some 8,500 signs over nearly 10,000
highway miles (including the coast-to-coast National Old Trails Highway) testifying to
the Club’s powerful presence. 152 The club’s efforts to open Yosemite National Park to
automobile traffic marked another important phase in its development.
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Figure 11: A stagecoach on the old Wawona Road, c. 1905. Notice the steep
drop just beyond the road's edge. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Although three toll roads reached Yosemite Valley by the 1870s, they remained
for stagecoaches only; automobiles represented a potentially unsafe addition to the
equation.153 The Auto Club’s interest in the nation’s oldest park began in 1911 with the
simple adoption of a motion in favor of “the opening of Yosemite to motorists.” By early
1912, powerful allies like the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce joined the fight.154
The Southern California coalition led by the Auto Club grew even broader—car dealers,
Chamber of Commerce representatives, realtors, and even former U.S. Senator Frank
Flint—in time for the National Park Conference held in Yosemite in October 1912. While
the Los Angeles delegation made the trek to lobby for automotive access, they also
managed to sneak in a plug for their preferred route: the Wawona Road, which offered
Angelenos easier access to wonders like Glacier Point, the Big Trees, and—most
importantly—Yosemite Valley.155 Fifty years after its preservation as part of the original
Yosemite Grant, Wawona held the key to Los Angeles’s nascent tourist industry.
The Southern California delegation did not make the trip in vain. Disappointingly,
though, the Department of the Interior’s had a strange conception of “access.” The first
automobile permit into Yosemite, issued in August 1913, came with a host of strings
attached: a $5 permit for each car (over $100 in today’s dollars); a strict schedule
dictating when motorists could leave and enter Yosemite Valley; and a sinister speeding
policy (cars were actually timed to make sure they obeyed the rules). The Los Angeles
153
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Times, a strong supporter of the Auto Club’s mission, dubbed this hands-on approach a
“Russian Spy System.”156 More importantly for the Auto Club of Southern California,
though, motorists could only enter the Valley from the Coulterville and Big Oak Flat
Road, inconveniently located at the park’s northwestern boundary.
The Coulterville route presented another major problem for Los Angeles’s growth
entrepreneurs: its heights of roughly 6,000 feet made it impassible in winter. And so,
even before the first automobile permit was issued, the ACSC started a campaign to raise
funds for another road into the park—a highway from Mariposa to El Portal (on the
park’s western boundary) that the Club’s engineer dubbed “by far the most feasible
route” for auto access to Yosemite Valley.157 Its relatively low elevation (roughly 2,000
feet, mostly along the banks of the Merced River) and its connection to an existing road
to the Valley at El Portal (home of the railroad depot) made it a likely candidate for the
first “all-year” road into Yosemite, an economic and recreational lifeline even when
covered with ice.
First, though, the Auto Club would tackle the park’s restrictive rules by heading
straight for their source. After a meeting in late summer 1913 in which ACSC brass
convinced Secretary of the Interior Franklin Lane (a Californian himself) to loosen
Yosemite’s auto regulations, the Los Angeles Times celebrated the Club’s determination
to “invade the North.” The Auto Club scored another serious coup at this tete-a-tete with
Lane: the sole responsibility for opening the Wawona route to auto traffic.158 The
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Figure 12: Yosemite's road system in 1919. Note the two northwestern routes, as well as the sharp curves of the
Wawona Road to the south; the spur heading east from the Wawona Road offers access to Glacier Point.
Courtesy Yosemite Online Library
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Department of the Interior, wanting to evade its road-building responsibility, still
recommended the Coulterville Road to access Yosemite Valley.
The hardy souls using the Wawona Road endured a number of inconveniences.
Before the road allowed private autos, motorists parked cars at any number of resorts and
took a stage down the twisty route. Pressure from the Auto Club and other southern
communities, like Madera and Fresno, finally convinced the Department of the Interior to
act. Once the Wawona Road opened to private auto traffic in the summer of 1914,
motorists had to contend with the same stringent rules that had been waived for
Coulterville Road traffic: they had to leave Wawona between 6:00 and 8:00 am, leaving
the Valley not much later than 6:00 pm to return to Wawona by their 8:00 pm “curfew.”
Motorists violating this schedule were still subject to fines.159
The Auto Club remained unsatisfied, and its corporate board urged their in-house
engineer to offer Lane his services on the Wawona Road project; they insisted, though,
that the federal government pay for the road’s construction.160 Despite the road’s constant
openings and closings, the ACSC included the Wawona route in their “California
Exposition Tour,” a counter-clockwise arc flowing from Southern California to San
Francisco (the exposition site) via the inland route and returning via the coast.161 The
federal government officially took responsibility for the Wawona Road in 1917 after
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Figure 13: An auto run over the old Wawona Road to the Mariposa Grove, 1920. Courtesy
NPGallery Digital Archive
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Figure 14: The tour route recommended by the ACSC connecting
both of California's world's fairs. Note the thicker line along the
Wawona entrance to Yosemite. "California Exposition Tour,"
Los Angeles Times, 13 June 1915.
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acquiring the road’s southern portion from the Washburn family; however, its
commitment to making it merely passable kept motorists wary.162
--Despite progress on the Wawona project, the ACSC remained focused on the
Mariposa-El Portal project touted by the Los Angeles delegation of 1912. Unlike the
mountainous Wawona and Big Oak Flat entrances, the proposed road through the Merced
River canyon held the promise of a snow-free drive. Funding it, however, was another
question entirely. The Auto Club’s federal connections helped in this regard. When the
U.S. Forest Service’s Supervisor for Los Angeles County contacted the Club to ask
which mountain road the USFS should support with their 1918 appropriations, the answer
was obvious: the Mariposa-El Portal road.163
But the ACSC could not do it alone, as they had with Wawona’s opening. With
$700,000 in federal and state funds already appropriated, California’s motorists needed
to pony up $1,000,000 (via 200,000 certificates valued at $5 apiece) to completely fund
the all-season road. The Park Service offered a bonus: any motorist willing to contribute
$5 towards the new road would received a voucher good for entering Yosemite via any
road they pleased. Under an agreement with the Secretary of the Interior, the funds raised
would be held in trust until the State of California finished grading the new route.164
Yet reports from Auto Club secretary Standish Mitchell that Southern California’s
motorists might just “take up all the certificates available when the campaign opens”
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Figure 15: One of the many $5 certificates sold by the Department of the Interior in an attempt to
finance a new all-season highway. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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proved exaggerated.165 Mitchell ate crow in a major way and, four months in, the Auto
Club had raised only $19,900. The club withdrew its participation in the drive to focus on
an upcoming state bond measure for highway money.166 Mitchell’s bluster, though
misguided, remains important. Motoring may have been the ACSC’s primary motivation,
but a rivalry with San Francisco was not far behind. A Los Angeles Times article detailed
the Southland’s rightful claim to Yosemite:
That old bugaboo, the ‘claims of San Francisco,’ the best little ‘claimer’
on the Coast, has entered the arena and alleges that it will put over the
largest sale of Yosemite certificates in the State. Southern California, it is
pointed out, is as much a patron of Yosemite Valley as any other part of
the country, and therefore the Automobile Club is going to do all in its
power to show its willingness to go more than fifty-fifty in building the
road.167
That same month, the president of the Auto Club noted San Francisco’s annoying habit of
“throwing down the gauntlet at every opportunity”; he noted that “[t]he only thing San
Francisco hasn’t claimed an excess of, is cafeterias, and that will probably come next.”168
Even though the fund drive failed, the ACSC managed to distance itself through
another commodity: information. The ACSC chose to keep a “Club car” in Yosemite
beginning in 1919, enabling the Club to produce current road reports; previously, they
had relied on San Francisco’s California State Automobile Association (derisively called
the “northern club”) for such information.169 The Auto Club’s twenty (!) different branch
offices began sending their own cars over Yosemite’s roads that same summer.170 These
new ways of gathering and disseminating information on the park helped club members,
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but they also expressed symbolic ownership of a resource closer (both culturally and
geographically) to the Bay Area. In the fight for an all-year highway to Yosemite, Los
Angeles’s urban ambition moved to a new, more naturalistic theater.
Motorists from the Southland staked their claim to Yosemite in another kind of
public performance: economy runs. These races were more marathons than sprints,
rewarding “efficient and economical operation on long, severe trips.”171 The southern
route to Yosemite, marked by poorly maintained country roads on the approach and steep
hairpin curves inside the park, provided a perfect test for California’s newest
technological obsession. Beginning in 1917, the annual run from Los Angeles to
Yosemite Valley became “the yearly classic of the Pacific coast” by the early 1920s.172
The Auto Club of Southern California made special maps for all entrants and trophies for
the winners. Usually held in early May, the race also provided important information on
the progress of the spring thaw along roads inside and out of the park—particularly the
tangle of roads north of Fresno.173
Was the drive from L.A. to Yosemite a “long, severe trip”? Well, yes and no.
Economy runs marked the trip to the park as a serious undertaking, but they also created
a wealth of information—the maps, the road conditions, the newspaper coverage—that
could only encourage other aspiring motorists. More importantly, these races announced
the automobile (preferably, one bought in LA) as the perfect mediator between city and
country. Nationally covered in publications such as the Washington Post, the annual run
“center[ed] national interest on Los Angeles and Southern California; on the automobile
dealer activity here and the wonderful touring possibilities of the West.” Los Angeles’s
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“genuine enthusiasm” for the run—as well as auto shows and more traditional speedway
races—“earned for the California automobile man the name of being the most alive and
the most aggressive of all the American automobile fraternity.”174 While the race over the
treacherous road celebrated the automobile as a technology that could tame nature and
alter California’s geography, it also attested to the powerful business interests behind it.
Thus every car from L.A. to speed through the Wawona entrance became proof of Los
Angeles’s political and cultural control over Yosemite’s roads.
The Wawona Road used for the economy runs spoke primarily to Southern
California’s interests. The proposed all-year road from Mariposa to El Portal, however,
represented more of a bipartisan issue. Despite their petty gripes, both Southern and
Northern Californians had an urgent interest in the road—at least, that was the story that
L.A.’s growth entrepreneurs used to spur fundraising efforts. The Los Angeles Times
declared the all-year road “not a Central State project, nor…a Northern State project, nor
a Southern State project—but purely a whole State project.”175 Tempering his comments
on San Francisco’s annoying habit of “claiming,” the ACSC’s president noted that “the
Yosemite Valley is a scenic asset just as valuable to one part of the State as another”
(even though proprietary ACSC statistics showed that “local automobile owners are the
heaviest patrons of the valley extant”).176 As the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce
opined, “the Yosemite highway building is not a thing of sectional interest”; in the same
article, though, the Times insisted that Los Angeles would never stoop to San Francisco’s
fundraising tactics of canvassing streets and businesses.177 Messages of sectional
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cooperation did not help the subscription drive, nor did they reflect the true feelings of
the Auto Club, the Times, and their friends in the auto business. Perhaps fundraising
efforts would have succeeded had the project been sold as a race between California’s
northern and southern half.
--Despite their bombast, Southern Californian interests (and the ACSC in
particular) did have a point: Yosemite and Los Angeles shared a common goal. A drop in
winter visitation in the early 1920s irked the city’s ruling class—in particular, the
secretary of the Chamber of Commerce and Harry Chandler, the publisher of the Times.
At their behest, Los Angeles hoteliers raised $46,000 to promote true all-year tourism.178
Another essential part of the region’s growth machine, the All-Year Club (AYC),
emerged in 1921 with a similar mission. Previously dedicated to improving the summer
season, the AYC focused on improving winter visitation for the 1925-26 season. They
delivered in a major way, placing massive amounts of promotional messages in
magazines and newspapers nationwide at a time when the entire country was supposedly
“Florida-minded.” From January 1922 to January 1926, the number of tourists arriving in
cars doubled.179 Tourism emerged alongside oil, tires, and the Los Angeles port as a
principal economic driver. The All-Year Club succeeded wildly, attracting 600,000 more
visitors in 1930 than in 1920 (the year before its work began).180 While the organization
would swing from promoting summer to winter and back again, its officials retained
pride in the fact that they “revolutionized the local business cycle.”181
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All-year access to Yosemite presented an immense opportunity for growth
entrepreneurs inside and outside of the park. Since their respective beginnings, the
National Park Service and the park’s concessioners had looked for ways to expand
Yosemite’s busy season. The Indian Field Days of the nineteen-teens, which featured
including baby beauty pageants, craft demonstrations, and horse races, succeeded in
lengthening the lucrative summer season.182 But what about winter? The concessioners,
owners of all park lodging, took the lead. In 1920 Stephen Mather, promotional whiz and
first director of the National Park Service, joined forces with the Times’ Harry Chandler
in a reorganization of the Yosemite National Park Company.183 That year the Company
closed the Sentinel Hotel, the plushest lodgings at the time, and improved its baths,
heating, and cooking features in a pointed effort to attract cold-weather visitors.184 When
the park’s different concessioners consolidated as the Yosemite Park and Curry Company
in 1925, their long-awaited Ahwahnee Hotel promised new levels of luxury for winter
guests.185 Speaking at the Ahwahnee’s opening gala in 1927, Chandler made sure to
mention Southern California’s role in bringing development to Yosemite.186
Entrepreneurs in both Los Angeles and Yosemite lusted after the elusive winter season,
leading to a fruitful partnership.
Meanwhile, the quest for an all-year highway poked along, hampered by irregular
state funding. In 1922 Congress nixed a budget proposal that would have allocated
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$7,000,000 for park roads, leading the Los Angeles Times (who else?) to bring up “the old
question of when the all-year State highway will be finished.”187 The summer of 1923
saw private contractors finishing the penultimate link from the town of Mariposa to
Briceburg, yet the Times still derided the highway as “talked about for years” and only
just “start[ing] to become an actual fact.”188 The failure of a three-cent gas tax further
delayed road construction funds.189 Convicts completed the last seventeen miles, a
serpentine stretch of riverside roadway, just in time for Yosemite’s “Diamond Jubilee”—
the seventy-fifth anniversary of the Valley’s “discovery” by white men.
What more fitting way to honor the road’s opening than a motorcade on a hot
August day? California Gov. Friend Richardson, before taking his place at the head of
parade, addressed the competing regional forces that cooperated on the road. “The
citizens of every portion of the State have an interest in the completion of this highway, “
he intoned. “The San Francisco Bay section, Southern California and the two great inland
valleys each claim it as their own particular route to the Yosemite.” Now that the road
was a reality, the Los Angeles Times had reason to evenly distribute praise; in the words
of one Times scribe, that hot august motorcade represented the culmination of “the
thirteen-year struggle of the Automobile Club of Southern California and other California
interests.”190
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Figure 16: A portion of the newly completed All-Year Highway roughly thirty miles
west of Yosemite's gates, c. 1926. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archives
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As the ACSC’s field secretary proudly announced, “Yosemite Valley is part of
the playground of Southern California.” An editor’s note (maybe written by Chandler
himself) at the end of the same article suggested that the realignment be shared far and
wide, especially with “Eastern motorists” who might be “unaware of the nearness of
Yosemite and Sequoia to Southern California.” If every good Los Angeleno mailed the
article to “an eastern motoring friend,” that friend might have “a more enjoyable motor
vacation this winter or next summer.”191 Yosemite’s proximity was crucial to L.A.’s allyear tourist philosophy. Winter or summer, mountains or beach—locals and “Eastern
motorists” alike could have it all, and within a day’s drive no less. The joint efforts of the
Auto Club of Southern California and the Los Angeles Times created a physical archive
of this geographic shift. L.A.’s growth machine was now aimed squarely at the heart of
Yosemite, using expanded motoring possibilities to claim the central Sierra Nevada as an
extension the Los Angeles Basin.
Using concrete, convict labor, and state funds, the route through the Merced River
canyon promised a realignment of the state’s tourist geography. Once a jolting sevenhour drive, the journey from the State highway at Merced to Yosemite Valley became a
smoother three-hour jaunt.192 The new road, combined with the imminent opening of the
Ahwahnee, effectively lengthened Yosemite’s tourist season. At the highway’s
dedication, NPS director Stephen Mather promised “future development of the park” via
$1,000,000 in federal funds; no doubt Mather had his friend and business partner Harry
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Chandler in mind.193 No tectonic plates had moved, and yet Yosemite and Los Angeles—
partners in all-year recreation—were closer than ever before.
--Even before the completion of the All-Year Highway from Merced, the Auto
Club’s officials were busy planning yet another incursion into Yosemite. While the new
All-Year Highway from Merced cut off distance, it remained a primarily western route
claimed jointly by Northern California, Southern California, the Central Valley, and the
San Joaquin Valley alike. Still seeking a signature southern route, the ACSC found
willing partners in Fresno and Madera—two largely agricultural cities that had pushed for
improved southern access since the nineteen-teens. Yet citizens from this area were not
natural promoters; the ACSC’s field secretary C. E. McStay once bemoaned the loss of
“about two hours of my valuable time” talking with an excited Maderan who had been
advocating a new route to Yosemite “since the trees in the Wawona Grove were
saplings.”194
An improved southern approach meant little without a modernized road from
Wawona to Yosemite Valley—steep and treacherous, yet possessing one of the most
sublime views in the park. The ACSC began petitioning aggressively for this portion of
road shortly after the completion of the All-Year Highway, but Park Service officials
seemed dead-set on improving the Big Oak Flat Road first. Yet in the spring of 1928, the
Auto Club received some good news: funds allocated for Big Oak Flat would be
transferred to the Wawona Road. Even better, the project would be a wholesale alteration
of the twisty and terrifying grade. Acting National Park Service director Horace Albright
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informed the Auto Club directly, asking them to “publish the information I have given
you as widely as possible.”195
The new road promised to offer year-round visitation to Wawona’s Big Trees,
enhance Yosemite’s winter sports prospects, and relieve some of the congestion in the
Valley.196 Citizens of Madera and Fresno rejoiced, as did Clarence Washburn, whose
family had managed the Wawona Hotel (and a portion of the Wawona Road) since the
late 1800s; he thanked the Club for its “various letters and telegrams” that apparently
“reached Washington just at the right time.”197 After the embarrassing failure of the
statewide fund drive, Auto Club officials simply dealt with national policymakers
instead.
But Washburn, like the ACSC, recognized that an improved road from the Valley
was useless if the road from Fresno to the park boundary remained inconsistent. In the
same letter thanking the Auto Club for their support, Washburn implored them to finish
the job: “[N]ow is the time we should make our big effort to get a highway from the
intersection of this proposed road to Fresno.”198 Yosemite’s acting superintendent also
showed remarkable sympathy to the Southern California cause, showing that—like the
ACSC—he dreamed of linking the park with the beach, developing the smaller towns to
Yosemite’s south in the process. As he wrote to Auto Club engineer E. E. East:
Perhaps you already know that more than half of the visitors to Yosemite
National Park come from the southern part of the state, and with the
Wawona Road between Yosemite and the Mariposa Grove of Big Trees
now under construction on Bureau of Public Road [sic] standards, there is
every opportunity for the adjacent counties to the south of us, and the
southern part of the state generally, to get behind a movement to continue
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this road from the Mariposa Grove of Big Trees to Fresno, and from
Fresno to Morro Beach in San Luis Obispo County on the Coast highway.
As it is planned to make the Wawona road an all-year road, this would
make a wonderful southern entrance for our Southern California travel.199
This letter speaks to one of the ACSC’s signature accomplishments: enlisting the Park
Service as a promoter of Southern California in its own right. The Auto Club’s success in
Wawona showed a newfound ability to enlist federal policymakers, rural towns, and bigcity swagger for a common goal.
The Los Angeles Times broke an impressive number of stories about Yosemite,
aided no doubt by the Auto Club’s direct pipeline to Washington. Thus, when $2,000,000
in federal funds emerged in 1930 to improve the Wawona Road, the Times had it first.200
Before long seemingly every motorist in the state knew of Yosemite’s latest and greatest
road plan—to the detriment of other transportation offerings within the park. In 1930
over ninety percent of all automobiles entering the park came from California; a twenty
eight percent drop in rail travel and a thirty two percent drop in motor stage (bus) travel
demonstrated the success of the Auto Club’s efforts.201 Compared to October 1930,
October 1931 showed a forty eight percent drop in park entrances by any means other
than private automobiles.202 Thanks in large part to Los Angeles, the state’s largest
concentration of motorists, Yosemite became a car’s park.
The All-Year Highway through the Merced River canyon proved the opening
salvo of a concerted technological war against climate and geography. Perhaps even more
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impressive was the Wawona Road’s new tunnel designed to eliminate some of the
steepest and most treacherous parts of the old road. A Bureau of Public Roads engineer
working in the park since the 1920s decided on a tunnel, rather than a more traditional
“open cut” road, because it would leave less of a scar; he also feared that an open cut
might drop so much rock into the Merced River below that it would flood Yosemite
Valley.203 Construction on the almost mile-long stretch of solid rock progressed slowly,
with groups of as many as 190 workers often boring as little as one hundred feet per
week.204 Workers required two hundred tons of dynamite while working “night and day
for 300 days” to remove almost 2,000,000 cubic feet of stone from the mountainside.
When the dust settled, grades as steep as seventeen percent had been tamed to about five
percent—enough to permit “high-gear” use between Wawona and Yosemite Valley. With
the “sharp turns on the old mountain road” gone, one Times writer promised that even
“the most inexperienced motorist will feel as much at home while traveling through this
scenic portion of the Sierra as on his city boulevards.”205
In a park of engineering marvels—the Tioga Road over the mountains, the AllYear Road that subverted seasons—this new accomplishment took the cake. Anticipating
heavy traffic in the tunnel, engineers installed a state-of-the-art carbon monoxide detector
designed to close the tunnel should auto exhaust build up to dangerous levels:
A perfect robot mechanism which does not require attendance by a
watchman, automatically operates the ventilation system in the tunnel.
This engineering innovation tests the air of the tunnel for carbon
monoxide content. When a small amount of gas is discovered a great
wheel is set whirling, sucking the air out through the main adit opening on
the outside cliff wall. If heavy traffic causes the carbon monoxide to
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increase, a second wind-wheel is started, finally a third, and then each of
the three wheels is increased in speed. If all three wheels do not reduce the
percentage of carbon monoxide content, a semaphore arm holding a red
light signals ‘Stop’ at the entrance, thereby suspending traffic.206
This may well have been the first robot in a national park. Anticipation of thick crowds
fostered other innovations, like a “tiny photo-electric cell device” midway through the
tunnel that counted traffic passing in either direction.207 At the celebration of the road
opening, the Park Service even rigged a public address system to broadcast “details of the
pageant” to crowds further down the road at the tunnel’s east end.208 Even the pageant
itself (titled “History of Transportation in Yosemite”) stressed the role of technology in
this momentous new achievement, featuring “stage-coaches, old steam cars, and some of
the most ancient models of motor vehicles extant” in the inevitable march towards
modern cars and roads.209
But technology, like science, does not exist in a vacuum. The sheer technological
achievements of the Wawona Road shone brighter for California’s southern half. Movie
stars Lois Moran and John Barrymore, slated to appear at the road’s opening, symbolized
the project’s promise for the Los Angeles area.210 A relatively small change in the park’s
geography, the new tunnel brought Wawona and its historic Big Trees to within forty-five
and sixty minutes of the Valley floor, respectively; it promised to bring Glacier Point
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Figure 17: The parking area east of the Wawona Tunnel at Inspiration Point, 1939. Courtesy NPGAllery Digital
Archive
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Figure 18: A Standard Oil ad for the tunnel's opening ceremony. Note the simplified linking Fresno directly to
Yosemite. Los Angeles Times, 7 June 1933
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closer, as well, a long-held goal that caused some to rally behind a tramway to the
outcropping.211
The Times, dusting off the same rhetoric its writers had applied to the All-Year
Highway, described the Wawona route as if it had changed the state’s geography
overnight. As one article proclaimed, “Yosemite Valley is now thirty-five miles nearer to
Los Angeles,” crediting the Wawona tunnel in particular for its “destruction of
distance.”212 (Curiously, another Times piece claimed a savings of forty-five miles.)
Comparison with the highway from Merced to El Portal was inevitable. One Times writer
argued that it failed most tourists; supposedly, sixty percent of cars entering Yosemite
and sixty-six percent of all the park’s visitors still came from south of Fresno.213 In the
early days of the tunnel’s operation, travel via the park’s southern artery increased over
400 percent.214 Such a rapid uptick could be attributed to pent-up demand, but it is just as
likely that the Times exaggerated some statistics—distance saved, visitors’ origins—to
tell a better story. Regardless of the exact numbers, this “destruction of distance” had
major implications for both Los Angeles and its newly-claimed national park.
This closer connection to California’s hotter, drier south spurred the development
of winter recreation in Yosemite. This new spatial configuration influenced seasonal
recreation patterns; in even simpler terms, it created a new season. Between the Los
Angeles basin—with its ample sunshine, sun-baked coast, and acres of citrus—and
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Yosemite’s distinct mountain ecosystems, California truly had it all. As the New York
Times put it,
It is a far cry from orange groves to ski slopes, and from magnolia trees to
pungent evergreens weighted with snow. But here in California the
contrast is taken for granted, for the State has at last become snowconscious. It took Californians many years to realize that high in the Sierra
Nevada Mountains, just a few hours from the Pacific Ocean, they had
Winter sports conditions possibly equaling those at St. Moritz and Lake
Placid.215
With its merging of the montane and the coastal, California stood poised atop national
and international tourist destinations. The added bonus—something that Lake Placid and
St. Moritz could never top—was that, thanks to its all-season roads, only the fun parts of
winter came to Yosemite.216 Snow, ice, fog: they were no match for good roads and welltuned cars. As the Curry Company touted, Yosemite was now “as near in winter as in
summer.”217 It drew especially close to Los Angeles, the fastest-growing collection of
mobile and affluent citizens in the American West.
--The All-Year Highway opened the Valley to winter tourism, and the Wawona
Road eventually opened the park’s higher ground to ski exploration. But the relentless
quest for all-season access was one thing, and the creation of a winter sports scene
entirely another. Winter visitors to the Valley found less than inspiring prospects; one of
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the most popular activities was sliding down a snow slope on the lid of an ashcan. Skiing
was only possible in Yosemite Valley’s colder southern half, but these runs were short
and unsatisfying. Even the luxurious Ahwahnee Hotel, completed in 1927, could not
convince winter visitors to stay overnight (a crucial part of concessioner revenue). One
board member even suggested that the Curry Company shut down their operations at the
end of each summer.218
Yet the park concessioner, possessing a monopoly on tourist services in the
nation’s busiest park, had social and political capital to burn. In the late twenties
Company president Don Tressider founded the Yosemite Winter Club to “encourage and
develop all forms of winter sports [and] to advertise and exploit the great advantages,
beauties and healthy benefits of winter in the California Sierra to all lovers of outdoor
life.”219 He stocked the club’s rolls as a president would stock a cabinet—full of
influential and important men from California’s biggest urban centers. Stephen Mather
and Horace Albright, the first and second directors of the Park Service, also accepted
honorary positions.220
Despite Los Angeles’s lack of a winter sporting scene—or, for that matter, winter
in general—many of the area’s leading citizens joined the Winter Club. Members
included Times publisher Harry Chandler, stage and film actress Lois Moran, director
Cecil B. DeMille, real estate magnate and promoter William May Garland (who brought
the 1932 Olympic Games to Los Angeles), movie investor and early Auto Club member
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Frank Garbutt, and sporting goods salesman B. H. Dyas.221 Standish Mitchell, ACSC
secretary (and later president), was also an early member. Tressider even offered him a
spot on the Advisory Council, along with other “men and women who are prominent and
deeply interested in California progress.”222 If the club had former twenty years earlier, it
would have been packed with Berkeley and San Francisco addresses.
But the Basin’s boosters could not help Tressider acquire what he needed most: a
winter resort worth visiting. In 1928 he and his wife, Mary, contracted ski fever while
watching the Second Winter Olympic Games in Switzerland. With cowbells still ringing
in their ears, they returned home thinking that Yosemite could become the “Switzerland
of the West.” The Tressiders, never ones to procrastinate, simply hatched a scheme to
host the next Winter Olympics. Don ordered construction of a new ice rink (60,000
square feet) to host figure skating and speed skating events. Unfortunately, though, he
could not simply purchase world-class skiing terrain. The brash Tressider figured
Yosemite would be competitive with only a cross-country course (easily arranged on the
Valley floor) and a ski jump (which took a bit more doing). The park’s bid to host
advanced farther than anyone thought possible, but Lake Placid—a proven ski city rich in
history—won out; the International Olympic Committee found Tressider’s submission, a
video of majestic snow-capped peaks, high on style but low on substance. This defeat
became the less-than-immaculate conception of California’s ski industry. The state’s
Chamber of Commerce embraced winter sports, hiring a San Francisco skier to edit the
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Chamber’s magazine and promote winter sports around the state. A cover from 1929
summed up the change: “California’s Newest Industry—Winter Sports.”223
Unfortunately, the Great Depression intervened, and many of the park’s visitors
arrived seeking employment instead of fun. Even Ansel Adams’s iconic photographs of
Yosemite blanketed in snow—sent to media members nationwide—could not make good
on the promise of all-season tourism. The Curry Company lost money in 1931 and 1932,
leading to more grumblings about shutting down operations from autumn until Easter.
Winter sports remained confined to the Valley. Tobogganing, ice skating, and sleigh rides
were quaint enough, but they failed to capitalize on the vast ski fields waiting on
Yosemite Valley’s southern rim. Glacier Point, looming some three thousand feet above
the Merced River canyon, beckoned.224
Once again, the Auto Club of Southern California intervened in support of a new
cause: a tram from the Valley floor to Glacier Point. Knowing the Wawona Road was a
long way from completion, the ACSC argued that visitors were unfairly “denied the
pleasure” of reaching that vista during the winter months. It would barely be noticed,
Club officials argued, since “such tram will not be visible from the motor roads within
the Valley.”225 ACSC secretary Standish Mitchell sent a copy of the resolution to their
sister organization, the California State Automobile Association (CSAA) of San
Francisco. Mitchell urged his compatriots to support the project, chastising “the Sierra
Club and other people who think that we should still be visiting Yosemite Valley on
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shanks’ mares with a knapsack.”226 The CSAA’s secretary replied that their board did not
think motorists were actually interested in a tram; more to the point, Horace Albright, the
director of the NPS, seemed “very much opposed” to the scheme.227 Unsurprisingly, the
CSAA—located in San Francisco, home of the Park Service’s regional offices and
organizations like the Sierra Club—rebuffed the tram idea. Perhaps sensing an
opportunity to discredit their Bay Area competitor, the Auto Club stood firm. Donald
Tressider wrote to Mitchell soon after to personally express his thanks.228 Yosemite’s
advisory board (and the financial difficulties of the Great Depression) eventually killed
the tram for good, but the ACSC had made a new friend in Yosemite.
The Winter Club eventually grew tired of skiing the same slope in Yosemite
Valley, which, as one member recalls, was always “too low, too horizontal, or too
vertical.”229 Enter the new and improved Wawona Road, an unlikely hero of California’s
ski history. Restless skiers used the road in the fall of 1932, before the new tunnel’s
official opening. A few miles up the road to Glacier Point lay an untapped ski paradise.
At Badger Pass, skiers found a magical landscape of rolling hills and Douglas firs. It was
even north-facing, practically assuring a long snowy season. Tressider grew enamored
with the area’s potential, and soon afterward the Curry Company’s eighteen-passenger
white buses became a regular sight at the slopes.230 The ACSC simply wanted easier
access, but they ended up creating a recreational revolution.
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Figure 19: A car carrying skis down the Wawona Road, 1933. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Figure 20: An advertisement for the Curry Company's winter attractions. Los Angeles Times, 21 January 1936
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Figure 21: A crowded day at the Badger Pass parking lot, 1941. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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The Curry Company’s buses deserve a place of honor in California’s winter hall
of fame. Before the modernization of the Wawona and Glacier Point roads, skiers
interested in sampling high country steeps had to snowshoe up the Four Mile Trail to
Glacier Point—a grueling trek from the Valley floor.231 Once the new road was in place,
however, the Park Service used a Snogo plow (essentially a snow blower with an
enclosed cab) on twenty-four-hour shifts to keep the Wawona and Glacier Point roads
open.232 During the winter of 1933–1934 the concessioner’s buses began traveling from
Chinquapin to the slopes near Badger Pass; ridership on the buses doubled within a
year.233 The superintendent noted in 1934 that the high country’s winter attractions were
so popular that they actually improved Yosemite Valley’s traffic.234
Cars and roads were only a part of the technological puzzle at Badger Pass. The
new tunnel practically reshaped a mountainside to accommodate motorists. A powerful
rotary snowplow arrived for the winter of 1934–1935, ensuring auto access to the slopes
in all but the worst conditions.235 New electric lifts brought skiers to heights of 8,000 feet,
ready to tackle trails radiating downhill. Instead of side-stepping their skis up seemingly
endless slopes, thrill seekers could expend all their energy learning new skills on the
downhill.236 This marked increase in the number of runs per day accelerated the average
skier’s learning curve. The Wawona Road remained crucial, but other new technologies
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like snowplows and ski lifts allowed visitors to spend less time on logistics and more
time honing their skills. No longer did tourists have to earn their turns.
Buildings, too, shaped the ski experience. Meager snacks and subpar outhouses
branded Badger Pass as anything but a luxury attraction. The arrival of a new “Tyrolean
Ski House” (as the Times dubbed it), “modeled after a European ski center,” changed all
that.237 Despite the Depression, Tressider doggedly sought funds for a new ski lodge with
restrooms, ski rental, expert lessons, and a restaurant; he had a powerful ally in Yosemite
superintendent Charles G. Thompson. Together, the two promoters secured funding so
that the lodge would open in time for the 1935–1936 season. Some good actually came
from the terrible economic conditions, as the Civilian Conservation Corps helped clear
trees for new runs. The new Upski, a lift utilizing two counterbalanced sleds, carried
roughly one hundred skis per hour; nicknamed the “Queen Mary” in honor of Mary Curry
Tressider, it was the first such mechanical lift in the West. Ski lessons increased forty
percent by the end of the new lodge’s first season. Ski days almost tripled, from 12,000 to
31,000. Badger Pass had arguably the best ski school in the country, relying on star
Austrian athletes to promote the sport in style.238
Curry Company president Don Tressider parlayed his successful ski area into
regional fame. He became the vice president of the California Ski Association, using his
position to bring important races to his home turf. Badger Pass hosted California’s
downhill and slalom championships in 1937, and the following year CCC workers added
a ski jump, as well; now Tressider could credibly host every important ski event
(jumping, cross-country, slalom, and downhill) in Yosemite. The 1938 Pacific Coast

237
238

“Ski House Dedicated,” Los Angeles Times, 22 December 1935.
Rose, Magic Yosemite Winters, 34–43.

106
Intercollegiate Championships—boasting ninety-six participants from sixteen colleges—
marked the largest ski meet ever held in the park.239
Tressider soon collided with another budding ski empire, Mammoth Mountain,
located a few hundred miles north of Los Angeles on the Sierra Nevada’s eastern
escarpment. Dave McCoy, ski entrepreneur and hydrologist for the Los Angeles
Department of Water and Power (LADWP), hosted the California State Championships
there in 1939. An established ski center it was not; skiers plunged down the 2,000-foot
slopes of Mammoth Mountain with only start and finish gates to guide them. After World
War II, McCoy would civilize the mountain with a rope tow and develop the surrounding
area as a ski resort.240
Mammoth Lakes today remains Los Angeles’s domain. License plate holders,
Dodgers hats, Lakers jerseys—all of it attests to an enduring connection spanning
roughly two hundred miles of desert. It all started more than a hundred years ago, when
another set of Southland boosters (mayor Fred Eaton and engineer William Mulholland)
built an aqueduct from the Owens Valley to quench the Los Angeles Basin’s growing
thirst; the shady ways that city interests acquired water rights have become the stuff of
legend—or, at least, Hollywood movies. Farmers, recognizing that the aqueduct was
essentially bleeding their fields dry, attempted to destroy it in the 1920s to no avail. Dave
McCoy’s ski skills made him the perfect candidate for the LADWP, a physical extension
of Los Angeles’s water interests who could range deep into the Sierra Nevada. Thanks to
him, the City of Angels eventually colonized yet another facet of the Owens Valley’s
water: its snowpack.
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Each winter, as the Sierra passes closed one by one, the Valley’s major towns—
Bishop, Lone Pine, Mammoth—essentially became part of Nevada. Businesses in the
area waited impatiently for spring to come and, with it, renewed flows of tourist dollars
from California’s coast. Only the state’s truly southern cities like Los Angeles could
reach the Owens Valley during winter without driving hundreds of miles out of the way.
Already known for hunting and fishing, the area became Los Angeles’s designated ski
center, as well. The new Wawona Road and the accompanying rise of Badger Pass
whetted the Southland’s appetite for winter recreation, but the National Park Service
controlled an even greater asset to the eastern Sierra’s economy. Every year around tax
day, the same gossip spread up and down Highway 395: when would Yosemite’s
superintendent open Tioga Pass? From their gleaming urban offices, the staffs of the Los
Angeles Times and the Auto Club of Southern California wondered the same thing.
--As the crow flies, Badger Pass and Mammoth Mountain sit no more than thirty
miles apart. The road between them, however, traverses no less than four distinct
ecosystems via one ribbon of asphalt. From the mixed conifer forest around Badger Pass,
one heads downhill to the oak-studded river bottom of Yosemite Valley, back up through
mixed conifers to the subalpine splendor of Tuolumne Meadows, passing through Tioga
Pass and descending to the arid bottomlands of the Owens Valley—all before climbing
thousands of feet to Mammoth Mountain. Tioga Pass, California’s highest mountain pass
(just shy of 10,000 feet), mediates between vastly different environments. The road itself
takes a shockingly bold line, threading between a rubble-strewn cliff band on one side
and a sheer drop on the other. Before assuming his post as first director of the National

108
Park Service, Borax magnate Stephen Mather pooled funds from his wealthy friends to
purchase the road; it opened to the public in July of 1915.
The road’s strategic position—connecting California’s coastal cities and
recreational meccas like Mammoth, Lake Tahoe, and Death Valley—made its annual
opening date a subject of much speculation. Tioga Pass sits on the border of Yosemite,
meaning that snow removal efforts must be coordinated between the National Park
Service and the State of California; naturally, concerned citizens petitioned both parties
to open the road and thus open the eastern Sierra to summer tourist traffic. Despite the
hullabaloo in the 1920s about all-year recreation, the Tioga Road remained a summeronly attraction. Its inaccessibility, however, only added to its attraction; one journalist
deemed it the “[l]ast of all the California roads that summer unlocks to travel.”241 When it
finally opened, whether in May, June, or July, nearby towns held celebratory trout feeds
to celebrate.242 The shindig in June 1929, held at the bottom of the Tioga grade, featured
over 200 pounds of trout caught in Mono County’s streams; with leading citizens of the
area (plus the obligatory representative from the ACSC), publicists from the Los Angeles
Chamber of Commerce spoke of the city’s desire to “promote tourist traffic to the high
Sierras this season.”243
Tioga Pass was a big deal for the City of Angels, marking the annual return of
access to plentiful trout, abundant flowers, and crisp cool air of Yosemite’s high country.
Motorists from the Southland were usually the first each season to make the treacherous
climb into the park, unofficially “opening” the road to travel. “Outdoor Franklin,” a scout
for the Howard Automobile Company of Los Angeles, claimed first rites in 1921, 1922,
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1924, and 1928. In May of 1924—supposedly a low snow year—Franklin battled “snow
drifts, deep slush-filled ruts and fallen trees” during an eighteen-day (!) trip from Los
Angeles to Yosemite Valley via Tioga Pass.244 In late June of 1922, after a heavy winter,
Franklin and his traveling companion encountered snowdrifts of forty-five feet; using
planks to stabilize the surface, they lost their car and spent three days shoveling show to
liberate it.245
The data gained from these excursions was valuable, but the symbolic importance
much more so. The Auto Club of Southern California’s scout cars, so active along the
All-Year Highway and the Wawona Road, fed road conditions to the Los Angeles Times.
By naming and assessing the sporting conditions in the Owens Valley, as well, the
Southland’s promoters laid claim to an even larger tourist territory. In 1921 an ACSC
scout car reported on the conditions at Tioga Pass, but also the sporting scene throughout
the eastern Sierra in general:
In addition to navigating the pass, the club crews have just completed a
survey of all fishing lakes and streams in the Sierras between Mojave and
the great Feather River region above Tahoe.
Fishing, roads, streams and lakes are in better condition this year than
every before in history, reports the touring bureau. Never have roads to the
streams where the big fellows hang out been better and never has fishing
been better in California.246
The Auto Club’s advocacy did not stop at roads. If a big fish jumped in a roadless
wilderness, did it make a sound? To truly access the “big fellows,” Los Angelenos would
need a consistent and direct route northward into the mountains.
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Early Opening Is Forecast for Tioga Pass, World's Most Spectacular Mountain Road
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Figure 22: An artist's rendering of the eastern approach to Tioga Pass and
Yosemite Valley. "Early Opening is Forecast for Tioga Pass, World's Most
Spectacular Mountain Road." Los Angeles Times, 1 June 1924
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Figure 23: Auto Club of Southern California members celebrating their passage over Tioga Pass, c.
1920. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Now beloved by mountaineers and Burning Man attendees alike, U.S. Route 395
began humbly in 1910 as the brainchild of the Inyo Good Road Club (named for Inyo
County, abutting the southern third of the Sierra Nevada).247 During a visit that same
year, governor James Gillette—the first California governor to set foot in Inyo County—
proposed a highway stretching from Mojave (located in the eponymous desert to the
south) to Bridgeport (a famous fishing destination north of Tioga Pass).248 Citizens
thanked him with a massive key (more than a foot long) engraved to look like the
pinnacles of Mount Whitney—the highest summit in the continental United States and
one of Inyo County’s biggest claims to fame.249 In 1913 the ACSC volunteered to sign
the entire length of road from Los Angeles to Lake Tahoe, using over 800 signs over 400plus miles.250 Unfortunately, any Angeleno driving to Lake Tahoe would likely find the
pavement’s end at Mojave—too far south to bring tourist traffic into Inyo County.251
Road-wise the 1920s saw little change, except for the expansion of Los Angeles’s urban
watershed via Mulholland’s aqueduct.
In 1931 crews completed an otherwise unremarkable stretch of state highway
between Cinco and a point seven miles north of Ricardo, east of Bakersfield at the
southern tip of the Owens Valley. On paper, it looked like the opposite of a big deal. But
in a spatial sense, this stretch of rural highway finally connected Inyo County—and the
wealth of natural treasures to its north—with the Los Angeles metropolitan area via “a
solid ribbon of hard surfaced highway.”252 The Inyo Register, the eastern Sierra’s paper
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of record, called the highway completion “as great a success as the most sanguine could
anticipate.”253 The Los Angeles Times touted “an entirely paved, glass-like, high-speed
road surface…from Los Angeles to a point beyond Bishop, more than 290 miles north.”
Formerly a fourteen-hour odyssey, the journey from L.A. to Bishop shrunk to six. And, in
the fashion of the times, the road earned the coveted “all-year” distinction.254 High winds
and flying sand gave way to clear blue skies for the celebratory picnic in Kern County’s
Red Rock Canyon. C. E. McStay of the Auto Club of Southern California gave a speech;
even Horace Albright, director the National Park Service, greeted visitors briefly.255 More
state-funded road improvements in Inyo and Mono counties followed in 1935.256 No one
really knew where Los Angeles stopped and the mountains began.
The roads to the Sierra ran two ways, and the Auto Club of Southern California
devised a clever way to bring the mountains to the city. In the mid-1930s the ACSC
began hosting an annual Outing Show, a smorgasbord of gear vendors and promotional
stunts to whet Los Angelenos’s outdoor appetites. Inside the Club’s off-street parking,
just yards from one of the nation’s busiest intersections, attendees thrilled to woodchopping contests, frog-jumping trials, and homing pigeon races.257 Father Crowley, one
of the Owens Valley’s foremost promoters, watched mule packers “transform a bare
asphalt-paved plaza into a tree-shaded Sierra rendezvous in the most approved
Hollywood manner”:
A plaster model of Mt. Whitney was lifted atop the grub box, and its base
concealed in a screen of pinyons and sugar pine and cedar, with juniper
and manzanita in the faked canyon below. Three or four of the imitation
253

Inyo (Calif.) Register, 22 February 1931; quoted in Hart, The Story of District IX, 98.
“Red Rock Highway Open,” Los Angeles Times, 15 February 1931.
255
Hart, The Story of District IX, 99.
256
Morning, Tracks of Passion, 79.
257
“Outing Show Lures 50,000,” Los Angeles Times, 20 April 1935.
254

114
rocks left by a movie company at Lone Pine had been brought down in the
truck, too, and about their base sagebrush instantly sprang up. Tents rose
in a semicircle around the campfire, a log cabin faced the audience and
acted as a display rack for photographs of the sportsman's paradise
reached by the pack train….Between the tents tall birches grew
miraculously out of the bitumen, owing to the digging of Bruce Morgan
and Jack Hopkins, who had chopped them from the banks of Lone Pine
Creek.258
The new highway to the eastern Sierra carried more than tourists; it also transmitted
images, exposing Los Angelenos to the peaks, watersheds, and ecosystems claimed by
their city’s promotional class. The Auto Club of Southern California played host,
solidifying their claim to the mountains that seemed to be inching closer to Adams and
Figueroa.
--Amidst the hubbub at the 1935 Outing Show, a ranger from Yosemite imitated
birdcalls.259 The Wawona Road and U.S. Route 395 gave Los Angelenos direct routes to
the park’s “front” and “back” doors, respectively; however, a bureaucratic quirk of
geography brought the Southland even closer to Yosemite. A government realignment in
1933 left the park superintendent responsible for Devils Postpile, a wondrous tableau of
columnar basalt surrounded by beautiful backcountry just west of the nascent ski
destination of Mammoth Lakes.260 The Park Service’s control of not one but two vitally
important sites for eastern Sierra tourists—Tioga Pass and Devils Postpile—meant that,
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more than ever, the superintendent’s decisions would affect the tourist trade outside
Yosemite. Boosters along Highway 395 took notice. Previously, promoters in the Owens
Valley lobbied for better roads, but the Inyo-Mono Club (IMC) took a new tack.
The IMC was the most professional and aggressive promotional organization in
the Owens Valley to date. Formed in 1937, the Inyo-Mono set aside infrastructure in
favor of a more aesthetic strategy. With support from Father Crowley, the organization
had raised enough money by 1938 to hire Robert “Bob” Brown, a former newspaper
reporter with considerable public relations experience. The Inyo-Mono Club succeeded in
publicizing attractions like Mono Lake, Yosemite, and Death Valley, using the Los
Angeles Times as well as the ACSC’s monthly magazine Westways to bombard Los
Angelenos with beautiful images. In just a few months, fifty-one newspapers nationwide
published over three thousand articles on Inyo and Mono counties.261 Brown’s methods
were nothing if not eye-catching; he built elaborate displays for storefronts, like a sixtyinch by forty-inch photographic display featured by at least twelve retail outlets in the
L.A. area.262
Brown found a willing partner in Yosemite’s superintendent, Lawrence Merriam,
who became a crucial source of promotional images of Devils Postpile National
Monument. While demand for Yosemite’s scenic beauty remained inelastic (some would
say problematic), Devils Postpile remained somewhat undiscovered. In 1939 Merriam
told his boss that it would not even be worth the effort to collect an admission fee as only
two thousand cars came each summer; if prompted to pay, visitors would just camp down
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the road at the nicely-developed free campgrounds offered by the Forest Service.263 Thus
Bob Brown’s constant requests for photographs of the Postpile paid dividends for each
side: Yosemite’s underdeveloped satellite got more attention, and the Inyo-Mono Club
got more ammunition for their ad campaigns.
Unsurprisingly, Brown’s advertising strategy also depended heavily on the Auto
Club of Southern California. He shunted one batch of Merriam’s Devils Postpile
photographs to LIFE magazine, making sure to route them through the ACSC’s publicity
department to “give some added weight in trying for the cover spot.” Brown had a
publicist’s knack for driving hard bargain, using his best photographs to bargain for more
space inside LIFE; since he could always make the cover of western magazines like the
Auto Club’s Westways, Brown was free to swing for the fences when dealing with
national publications.264 Ever ambitious, Brown crowed triumphantly when the Postpile
material received big exposure through Travel—or, failing that, Ripley’s Believe It or Not
(the basalt formations do look strange).265 The newfound highway connections between
Los Angeles and Yosemite gave the Inyo-Mono Club a fair amount of leverage. With
local contacts like Westways already spreading his message, Brown could aim even
higher.
Brown milked his Yosemite connection for other perks. Merriam sometimes
dropped hints regarding Tioga Pass, though he offered a disclaimer that “[w]e have no

263

Lawrence Merriam, Memorandum for the Director, 26 August 1939. Yosemite National Park archives,
Old Central Files, Series 1/2, Subseries 4/1, Box 2.
264
Bob Brown to Lawrence Merriam, 29 January 1940. Yosemite National Park archives, Old Central
Files, Series 1/2, Subseries 4/1, Box 2.
265
Bob Brown to Lawrence Merriam, 10 May 1940 and 28 May 1940; Yosemite National Park archives,
Old Central Files, Series 1/2, Subseries 4/1, Box 2.

117
way of predicting when it will be open.”266 Referring to 1941’s early opening as “manna
from heaven,” Brown let Merriam know that the superintendent’s efforts to clear the road
were “highly respected by all [his] ‘east-side’ friends.”267 Countless business letters back
and forth gradually turned into a more convivial relationship. Tioga Pass, the switch that
turned winter to summer, remained the Park Service’s purview. However, the InyoMono’s Bob Brown—and all his “’east-side’ friends”—often applied some friendly
pressure in order to get a jump on the seasonal travel swing.
The more Bob Brown knew about the changing of the seasons, the more he could
tailor his media offerings to popular demand. Like the Auto Club of Southern California,
the Inyo-Mono Club used informational bulletins to promote kinds of tourism. By the end
of the 1930s, Brown was sending weekly snow reports (complete with the locations of
rope tows) to “all major department stores, all major sporting good stores, all oil
companies, all recognized travel agencies, all major newspapers and all automobile
clubs.”268 Ski media was rapidly becoming big business in the Southland; both the Los
Angeles Times and News had dedicated ski columnists, as well. The ski fever that began
with Badger Pass’s failed Olympic bid had spread to parts of the state without any
consistent snow. New highways bridged the gaps between winter and summer, slopes and
suburbs, parks and cities. Together, growth entrepreneurs in Los Angeles and Yosemite
brought the Sierras to the metropolis—or was it the other way around?
---
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It took almost thirty years, but the Auto Club of Southern California succeeded in
opening Yosemite to the automobile. Along the way, however, the project acquired a life
of its own, becoming a battlefield in the Southland’s struggle to step out of San
Francisco’s shadow. The ACSC’s efforts to “open” Yosemite, duly reported by the
Times, gave Los Angeles legitimacy on a regional and national scale; after all, the Club
had the ear of the Department of the Interior and the National Park Service. But the real
victor in the battle was not a city, a region, or a person. By the end of the 1930s,
Yosemite did not belong to either northern or southern California—it belonged to the
automobile. More importantly, it belonged to automobiles all year.
Highway 395, the Wawona Road, and the All-Year Highway through the Merced
River canyon all underwent colossal improvements during the 1920s and ‘30s. The Auto
Club of Southern California manifested all these projects, leaving a lasting asphalt legacy
in and around Yosemite. This led to the Club’s most important accomplishment: blurring
the lines between park and city. People like Mark Daniels had already dubbed Yosemite
Valley a self-contained city; the ACSC, however, enlisted the entire park as part of the
greater Los Angeles area. The Valley remained an important draw, but the Auto Club and
its constituents used more of the park—especially high-elevation areas like Badger Pass
and Tioga Pass, which offered Southern Californians a rare glimpse of winter. Over a
span of roughly two decades, Yosemite became the northernmost link in Los Angeles’s
system of city parks.
Although Yosemite Valley has always resembled a sort of city, it is not the only
barometer of the park’s urbanization. Yosemite’s significance extends beyond its Rhode
Island-sized footprint. Its sheer fame motivated boosters from around California to claim
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the park as their own, tethering it to their cities in hopes of capitalizing even further on its
sheer economic and cultural gravity. Just as Berkeley associates sought to re-create the
University of California in the Valley, ACSC officials enlisted the entire park in a new
geographic imagining of Los Angeles’s recreational assets. The distance Yosemite and
the intersection of Figueroa and Adams shrunk of seemingly overnight. The next chapter,
too, details how the park’s impact transcended its physical boundaries.
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Chapter 3
“The Ultimate Motor Car By-Passing of Merced”: The Case of the Gateway Community,
1913–1945

The metropolitan areas discussed thus far lie hundreds of miles from Yosemite.
Many smaller cities orbit the park, providing food, lodging, and gas to Yosemite-bound
tourists. These “gateway communities” are thus inextricably tied to the park, regardless
of how their leading citizens may feel about federal control of their backyard. Gateway
communities have existed for well over a century, but recently they organized into a more
official entity. Since 2003 the communities bordering the park have met as the Yosemite
Gateway Partners to discuss shared issues like traffic, housing, and—more recently—
government shutdowns.269
The relatively recent notion of cooperating gateway communities obscures the
formerly stiff competition for the title of “the Gateway to Yosemite.” Merced, one of the
earliest adopters of this moniker, sits roughly seventy miles west of Yosemite’s gates.
Although it now possesses the newest branch of the University of California system,
Merced still remains deeply tied to its roots in agriculture and ranching. The city offers an
ideal case study of the highs and lows of life as a gateway. Gateway communities tend to
urbanize in tandem with the park they orbit, and Merced is no different. Connections to
the Yosemite indelibly shaped the city’s economy, architecture, and its self-image in the
first half of the twentieth century. Merced facilitated Yosemite’s growth by funneling
269
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large numbers of tourists directly to the park; Yosemite, in turn, provided Merced with an
identity. Merced also enjoyed virtual monopolies over train and auto travel into the
park—at least, until the reconstruction of the Wawona Road in the early 1930s. Yosemite
essentially fueled the urban development of its downstream neighbor.
In the 1920s and ‘30s, improved auto access to Yosemite from all directions
began to threaten Merced’s gateway status. Yosemite superintendent Frank Kittredge
confronted some threats of his own after the horrific events of December 7, 1941.
Pressured to prove that Park Service preservation efforts would not impede full military
mobilization, Kittredge also faced requests from gateway communities—particularly
Merced—to resume logging on Yosemite’s western boundary. Naturally, he refused to
compromise his agency’s priorities; however, his decision essentially sealed the demise
of Merced’s Yosemite Valley Railroad (which used timber to compensate for dropping
tourist revenues). Kittredge thus unwittingly changed the course of the park’s
urbanization, removing the last obstacle to the automotive takeover of Yosemite. Thus
the rapid decline in Merced’s influence paved the way—quite literally—for a new vision
of Yosemite, one glimpsed exclusively through a windshield.
--The relationship between Yosemite and Merced starts with a river. Originally
dubbed El Rio de Nuestra Señora de la Merced (the River of our Lady of Mercy), the
Merced River was named by Spanish explorer Gabriel Moraga in 1806; his party was
parched from a forty-mile trek through arid country, and thus relieved by the “mercy” of
the river’s cold, clear water.270 The Merced River flows from Yosemite’s highest peaks,
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making its way westward until it becomes one of the most recognizable features of
Yosemite Valley. West of the Valley the South Fork joins, followed by the North Fork. A
zig northward and a zag southward brings us to Merced Falls, considerably less majestic
than Vernal and Nevada Falls farther upstream but crucial to the river’s industrial history.
The river then reaches the broad floodplain of the San Joaquin Valley, one of
California’s three great inland valleys and home to the San Joaquin River. Merced
County was founded in 1855, almost fifty years after the naming of the river itself. Early
settlers practiced agriculture and ranching, made difficult by alternating flood and
drought conditions that plagued the entire San Joaquin Valley during the 1860s and
1870s.271 While many of the county’s residents struggled mightily, federal actions
affecting the Sierra Nevada promised a more consistent crop: tourist dollars. President
Abraham Lincoln signed the Yosemite Grant in 1864, preserving Yosemite Valley and
the Mariposa Grove of Giant Sequoias; shrewd lobbying by John Muir and others
resulted in the creation of a much larger Yosemite National Park in 1890. The park
remained unreachable by railroad, but Merced, Stockton, and Madera—three of the San
Joaquin Valley’s biggest towns, all connected by the Southern Pacific Railroad—offered
the most convenient changeover points to the three separate wagon stage lines into
Yosemite Valley.272 No one would have called any of these routes ‘easy,’ but they
offered potential visitors an array of options.
From the beginning, Merced’s built environment indicated a particular obsession
with Yosemite. Lake Yosemite, a reservoir for irrigation built just east of the city in the
late 1880s, was said to contain “crystal snow waters, fresh from the Yosemite Falls.” On
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the lake’s edge lay the Yosemite Colony, a 5,000-acre subdivision containing a large
irrigation ditch to feed “Young Orange Groves, Almonds, Prunes and Apricots, Figs,
Pomegranates, Peaches, etc.”273 Many of the town’s leading citizens joined the local
Masonic Lodge, which was dubbed the Yosemite Lodge.274 After a change of ownership
in the early 1900s, the Merced Livery Stables became the Yosemite Stables.275 While
Merced had many benefits—lots of land, advanced irrigation, great soil—proximity to
Yosemite became another of the area’s prime geographic advantages.
The town’s symbolic dependence on Yosemite deepened with the advent of the
first—and only—railroad into Yosemite. The Yosemite Valley Railroad (YV), first
organized in 1902 by businessmen from San Francisco and Oakland, represented a
colossal opportunity for whichever small town was chosen to host the depot; despite
competition from Fresno and Modesto, Merced won the chance to carry tourists and
freight to Yosemite. The eastern terminus was located at the small town of El Portal,
where stages would carry disembarking passengers the final ten miles to Yosemite
Valley. Surveying began in 1905, and was completed in 1907.276 Merced became quite a
bustling place during this period, reportedly housing twenty-three different saloons.277
During their fight for automotive access to Yosemite, the Auto Club of Southern
California (covered in the previous chapter) unwittingly gave Merced a major
competitive advantage. After automobiles were officially admitted to Yosemite in 1913,
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Figure 24: The Yosemite Valley Railroad from Merced to Yosemite, including connections to the
Santa Fe, Central Pacific, and Southern Pacific. Note the convergence of all these lines in Merced.
Yosemite National Park archives, Old Central Files, Series 9, Subseries 4-6, Box 60
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Figure 25: An overhead view of the Yosemite Valley Railroad depot in El Portal (c.
1908) looking east up the Merced River towards Yosemite Valley. Courtesy
Pillsbury Picture Co. and Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division
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Merced became important for park-bound motorists, as well; one promotional pamphlet
touted Merced as possessing “[t]he only railroad in the state, as well as the best
automobile or carriage route, to the grand and inspiring Yosemite Valley.”278 No other
towns could claim this two-pronged superiority. Although the masthead of the Madera
Mercury (another city hosting a stagecoach line) advertised Madera as “the Gateway to
Yosemite” as late as 1915, Merced gradually looked to be pulling ahead in the race.279 In
1916 the Yosemite Stage and Turnpike Company, one of the largest providers of auto
access to Yosemite, saw four-fifths of its traffic emanate from its Merced depot and only
one fifth from its Fresno depot. Additionally, a direct highway from Merced to Mariposa
promised to reduce travel time to Yosemite Valley (via Wawona) by almost two hours.280
By 1917 even the Madera Mercury had to concede “Merced’s superior location
with respect to Yosemite.” Anticipation of a state highway from Mariposa to El Portal,
the YV’s eastern terminus, further highlighted Merced’s ideal placement; in 1917 the
Yosemite Stage and Turnpike Company ceased trips from Fresno altogether to focus on
its Merced depot.281 The combination of a rail monopoly and a booming motor stage
connection solidified the town’s reputation as the most geographically favored of the San
Joaquin Valley—at least, with regards to Yosemite.282
---
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Figure 26: A motor stage departing El Portal en route to Yosemite Valley, 1927. Courtesy
NPGallery Digital Archive
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Although tied to Yosemite Valley’s natural beauty, much of Merced’s economy
relied on bringing natural resources to market. The Yosemite Valley Railroad carried
tourists, but timber—much of it from Yosemite’s western boundary—provided much of
the railroad’s revenue. Like much of the San Joaquin Valley, Merced County itself had
little timber; cattle and wheat reigned supreme. Whereas forests had provided food
(chiefly acorns) for indigenous Yokuts communities, trees quickly became fodder for
waves of settlers seeking arable river-bottom land. Beginning in the 1850s, county
residents began thinning forests to heat their homes or build fences; steamships along the
Sacramento and San Joaquin rivers also consumed lumber for fuel.283 A brochure for the
YV written in 1905 explains as much, noting that the immense supply of timber around
El Portal would provide an important source of revenue.284
Hot on the heels of the YV, the Yosemite Lumber Company (YLC) incorporated
in 1910. As the Merced Sun-Star remarked, it was “the most important enterprise
affecting the city of Merced…since the welcome news was circulated here about six
years ago that a railroad would be built from Merced to Yosemite Valley.” As their first
order of business, the YLC’s agents purchased the so-called “Minor Tract”: 10,000 acres
of prime sugar pine land high above El Portal—which, as the railroad’s eastern terminus,
would be the primary shipping point for lumber traveling westward. The company also
announced plans to build a mill on the Minor Tract, meaning that finished boards would
be lowered thousands of feet down the canyon walls via incline rail; trains waiting at El
Portal would get the lumber to market. Although the railroad’s tourist appeal was
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obvious, its managers foresaw that—“if the timber possibilities could be developed”—
they could derive “considerable tonnage” from the Merced’s watershed.285
The new lumber concern meant portended big things for the largely agricultural
town of Merced. Indeed, the new lumber company promised employment for hundreds of
men; moreover, it ensured that “people employed there will make Merced their trading
point, and ‘coming to town’ will mean coming to this city [Merced].”286 Taken together,
the railroad and the lumber company represented a massive change of fortune for a small
town in central California. For at least a few hundred rural workers, Merced would
represent civilization—a place to spend their cash earned high in the hills.
After being absorbed by a larger conglomerate in 1913, the new Yosemite
Lumber Company became—in the words of a breathless editorial in the Merced Sun—
“one of the biggest and most important enterprises on the Pacific coast.”287 A large mill
and mill town at Merced Falls, some twenty miles northeast of Merced, followed soon
after; construction costs totaled roughly $1 million (in today’s dollars). Here, where the
majestic Merced River eased into the San Joaquin Valley, logs awaited their fate in a
pond. Lumber traffic paid most of the railroad’s operating expenses all the way through
the Great Depression, stimulating Merced’s economy in the process; one historian
estimates that, during peak milling season, the camps and dining room used over 1,200
pounds of beef, 750 pounds of butter, and 1,200 eggs each week. The mill’s annual
operating budget was roughly $1,500,000, a significant contribution to the largely

285

$100,000.00 Lumber Deal,” Merced County (Calif.) Sun, 2 September 1910.
Ibid.
287
“Yosemite Lumber Company Acquires 20,000 Acres of Choice Timber Land,” Merced Evening Sun, 2
May 1913.
286

130

Figure 27: Logs in the Yosemite Lumber Company’s pond with its mill at Merced Falls
smoking in the background, 1921. Courtesy Merced County Historical Society and
Courthouse Museum/Calisphere
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Figure 28: Looking down the Yosemite Lumber Company’s incline rail into the Merced River
Canyon (the site of the All-Year Highway), 1926. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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agricultural county.288 Lumber from Yosemite’s western boundary fed a massive
economic system based not on tourism but on extraction. The YV and the YLC benefited
tremendously from the geography of energy bridging the Sierra Nevada and the San
Joaquin Valley.289
World War I provided one of the first tests of the symbiotic relationship between
Yosemite and Merced. Cattle thrived in the dry grasslands of the San Joaquin Valley;
however, the intense demand for meat to feed soldiers—coupled with a serious drought—
led the region’s ranchers to question Park Service anti-grazing policy. Resolutions drafted
by the Live Stock Commission of the Federal Food Administration for Merced and
Mariposa counties declared “a grave situation” challenging stockmen “to determine how
best to prevent their stock from starving and thus diminishing, to that extent, the supply
of food for America and her allies, in the present world crisis.” Acknowledging the Park
Service’s mandate to “preserve unimpaired,” the resolution concluded that “the
consideration of tourists, sightseeing, wild animals, or flowers” should be “secondary…in
the present emergency.”290 In June of 1918, Park Service director Stephen Mather met
with California’s Food Administrator and members of the California Cattlemen’s
Association to officially declare Yosemite open to grazing until the war’s end.291
Although Merced’s stockmen proved crucial in the lobbying efforts, they found their
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lands still full of feed and therefore did not move their cattle to the park.292 The National
Park Service under Mather was not known for its strict adherence to preservationist
doctrine. Nonetheless, the compromise showed that conservationism—the greatest good
for the greatest number—held immense potential for reconciling national parks with their
more extraction-oriented neighbors.293
Under Mather, the National Park Service continued to cooperate with Merced’s
rail and timber interests. The Yosemite Lumber Company’s immense impact became
obvious by the early 1920s, especially given its continued acquisition of land and
development of logging roads in Yosemite’s southwestern quadrant. Many parks, even
early ones like Yosemite, faced dilemmas with private land claims that predated federal
protection efforts—especially logging claims; to combat this, the Park Service offered
landowners a trade of “less valuable” park land to preserve scenic vistas in high-traffic
areas.294 This was the case in 1921, when Mather proposed a land exchange with the
Yosemite Lumber Company to maintain “an effective timber screen along the Wawona
Road.”295 The YLC and the YV retained rights to the park’s massive stands of sugar
pine—provided they cut only in areas deemed scenically uninspiring.
---
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Figure 29: The Yosemite Lumber Company’s holdings in Yosemite, 1923. Notice that the Carl Inn
tract lies outside the park boundaries (the thick black line) at this point. Courtesy Linda W.
Greene, Yosemite: The Park and Its Resources, 2-679
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Lumber would become even more important for the Yosemite Valley Railroad as
auto traffic to the park boomed in the 1920s. The Auto Club of Southern California’s
forceful support had produced an all-season road into Yosemite Valley—a historic event,
to be sure. It threatened traditional patterns of visitation, calling into question whether
Merced was still the unquestioned “Gateway to Yosemite.” Nonetheless, citizens
welcomed the opening of the All-Year Highway in 1926. Once again, Merced really did
boast the only railroad connection to Yosemite and the best automobile route; not only
was the All-Year Highway passable in winter, but it also shaved precious time off the
drive—even San Franciscans could reach Yosemite Valley in one day’s time.296 The new
highway also coincided with a major building boom in Merced. In 1927 the city issued a
four times its average number of building permits. One of these new structures, the Hotel
Tioga, was built specifically to house Yosemite-bound tourists. Nearby lay Sixteenth
Street, which connected directly to the All-Year Highway; thus, two “Gateway to
Yosemite” signs emerged along the busy thoroughfare—one at either end of the city.297
The park remained enmeshed in the city’s built environment.
The All-Year Highway threatened the Yosemite Valley Railroad—and, by proxy,
the Yosemite Lumber Company. Between 1925 and 1926 the number of visitors entering
Yosemite in automobiles jumped from 155,745 to 234,461; in that same period, the
number of travelers on the YV fell from 25,614 to 19,281.298 Yet the Merced Sun-Star
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Figure 30: One of two "Gateway to Yosemite" signs along Merced's Sixteenth Street
corridor. Sarah Lim,"A Look Back at Merced's Building Boom of 1927," Merced Sun-Star,
11 December 2015. Courtesy Merced County Historical Society and Courthouse Museum
Collection, Merced, CA
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continued to be optimistic about its hometown enterprise, trumpeting the line-up of
“special trains”—group trips to Yosemite for the likes of the Camp Fire Girls of America,
Fraternal Order of Eagles, and the Motion Picture Owners Association—the railroad had
scheduled for the summer travel season.299 In the years following the highway’s opening,
the YV gained fame not from the sheer amount of passengers it carried but from famous
ones (Winston Churchill) or extravagant ones (a “land cruise” from Los Angeles in 1927
had cars reserved for “gymnastics, dancing, motion pictures and lectures”).300 Rail travel
to the park was rapidly becoming a novelty. These pre-planned trips for large groups,
though good for business, demonstrated the true appeal of an auto trip to Yosemite: there
was no advance booking and no schedule.301
Looking to recoup some of its losses, the YV successfully petitioned California’s
railroad commission for rights to operate auto stages between Merced and El Portal.302
Further cracks appeared as the Great Depression deepened. H.L. White, the YV’s
manager, blamed federal legislation for the railroad’s struggles. The Transportation Act
of 1920, which returned railroads to private operation after World War I, contained a
“recapture clause” dictating that one half of any railway profits over six percent would be
returned to the federal government; White argued that this unfairly handicapped shortline railroads like the YV.303 In October 1932, the railroad applied to run “mixed
service,” mixing passenger cars and freight cars on the same train (ostensibly due to a
299
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lack of the former).304 In early 1933 the YV sued the Yosemite Park & Curry Company
for lowering its motor stage rates between Merced and El Portal, thus undercutting the
YV’s nascent motor stage business.305 Acting with the American Short Line Railroad
Association in 1934, White urged Congress to consider federal regulation of motor
carriers; unlike larger railroads, he argued, short lines simply could not recover revenue
lost due to increasing highway traffic.306 Later that year the YV board asked the Interstate
Commerce Commission for refinancing, citing increasing auto travel along the All-Year
Highway and the closure of the Yosemite Lumber Company’s Merced Falls plant as
reasons for its dire straits.307 The railroad went up for auction in 1935 and was bought by
its bondholders, who renamed it the Yosemite Valley Railway Company. The Sun-Star
speculated it would be used mostly for shipping lumber and cement.308 By 1938 only
2,328 visitors entered the park via train, as opposed to 422,860 by private cars.309
The mill at Merced Falls reopened in 1935 under the newly organized Yosemite
Sugar Pine Lumber Company, resuming the consistent flow of sugar pine from
Yosemite’s western boundary down the Merced.310 However, the new owners of both the
railroad and the mill soon encountered a major stumbling block. In 1939 the NPS
acquired a chunk of fine sugar pine land on Yosemite’s western slopes; after its exclusion
from park boundaries in 1902, the Carl Inn tract represented a second to chance to save
the prized conifer. Conservationists—including the bill’s biggest champion, the
Emergency Conservation Committee of New York—hailed the purchase as a major
304
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Figure 31: Congressman Charles Kramer and Los Angeles County Supervisor Gordon
McDonough underneath a sugar pine. 1937. Notice the immensity of the tree in relation to the
photo’s human subjects. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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victory. The Yosemite Sugar Pine Lumber Company, sensing a threat to its existence,
engaged in some last-minute cutting as a middle finger to the NPS.311 It was only fitting
that the California Garden Club, appealing to garden clubs across the nation for support,
published a description of sugar pines written by none other than John Muir.312 After
years of amicable coexistence between the park and the railroad’s contributing industries,
trouble appeared to be brewing.
The acquisition revealed a state divided in its economic allegiances.313 Rep. John
S. McGroarty (of the Los Angeles area) and Sen. William G. McAdoo introduced bills to
the save the trees; the California State Chamber of Commerce, however, opposed the
transfer.314 California representative H. L. Englebright, speaking for his rural
constituents, argued that the loss of sugar pine lands would prove “detrimental to
industries in Merced, Mariposa, Tuolumne counties, lose the $100,000 annual payroll of
the Yosemite Sugar Pine Lumber company and cripple operations of the Yosemite valley
railway [sic].”315
Even then, California’s population was concentrated on the coast. It is not
surprising, then, that McGroarty and McAdoo favored the expansion of a preserve that
many of their constituents could now reach in a day. The Carl Inn debate revealed a deep
divide between Yosemite’s geographic neighbors (like Merced) and its symbolic
311
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neighbors (like Los Angeles). For over thirty years, Merced’s railroad interests had
profited from Yosemite’s natural resources both in situ and at market; now neither was a
sure bet. The loss of Carl Inn pointed to a tough reality: without lumber and tourists, what
exactly would the Yosemite Valley Railway carry?
--Anger at the Carl Inn purchase did not hinder Superintendent Frank Kittredge’s
diplomatic duties—at least, not immediately. Like many superintendents, Kittredge made
sure to court allies in Yosemite’s neighboring towns, unlike others, however, he came to
power on the eve of a world war. From his first day of work in August 1941 Kittredge
made public relations a priority. He attended both of the San Joaquin Valley Council of
the California Chamber of Commerce and the Merced County Fair (where he received
compliments on “park participation”) in his first month on the job.318 The following
month, he returned to the San Joaquin Valley Council to trumpet “the benefit to
surrounding areas arising from business conducted within the park”; soon after, he was
named “guest of honor” at a banquet in Mariposa attended by a state senator, a local
assemblyman, a columnist for the Merced Sun-Star, and a local district attorney.319
The Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, drawing the United
States into a multi-front conflict. Despite his public relations efforts, Kittredge worried of
an “invasion of park ideals or objectives” that could bring “public crusades in the name
of national defense, misguided as they may be.” He was especially nervous about the
recent Carl Inn addition but, mindful of World War I, he also fretted about local efforts to
318
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Figure 32: Frank Kittredge in his office. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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“break down the national park program of non-grazing.” Kittredge counted on his
schmoozing to pay dividends. Kittredge expressed confidence that newspaper editors in
Visalia, Fresno, and Merced were “personally very friendly,” just the type of “key men”
to “squelch any plan of invasion of park ideals.”320
Despite its international scale, World War II embroiled Kittredge in local
issues.321 Almost immediately after the bombing of Pearl Harbor the superintendent was
already steeling himself against neighboring communities that might use “the plea of
patriotism” to enhance their own economies.322 In March 1942 Merced’s chamber of
commerce confirmed Kittredge’s suspicions by making the “first attempted raid on
Yosemite…in the name of defense.” At a meeting of the San Joaquin Valley Chamber of
Commerce, a representative from Merced County proposed “selected logging” of the Carl
Inn tract.323 Here was the “plea of patriotism” Kittredge had foreseen: sugar pine fetched
high prices, and Merced’s merchants—eager to strengthen their economy—used the war
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as pretense.324 Kittredge rejected the proposal on the grounds that Merced’s business
leaders could produce “no evidence” proving “an actual shortage of lumber for military
purposes.”325 This refusal, combined with the prewar Carl Inn purchase, effectively
sealed the fate of the Yosemite Valley Railway.326
Kittredge continued to keep his close neighbors in mind. Even fuel and rubber
rationing, which threatened the two commodities most central to the automobile, did little
to shake his neighborly determination. Throughout the war, Kittredge visited Merced and
Fresno almost twice as frequently as San Francisco—home of the Park Service’s regional
offices.329 Scarce fuel and rubber, he wrote, would not prevent him from being “closely
in touch” so that “the park and the local communities” could have a “closer working
relationship.”330 Shortly after rejecting Merced’s “plea of patriotism,” the city invited
park rangers to participate in its Army Day Parade. Yosemite personnel prepared an
extravagant float, complete with pine boughs and a banner reading ‘Work for Victory—
Revitalize in the High Sierra.’ Perhaps this was a gesture of reconciliation, a recognition
that the park and its nearest urban neighbor had a shared purpose: helping tired war
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workers achieve some rest and relaxation in Yosemite. Or maybe the pine boughs were
cut from sugar pines, thus reminding the citizens of Merced what they—and their
railroad—could not have. Either way, it was a rousing success; Kittredge reported to his
superiors that “the float brought more congratulation and pleasure than did any others
excepting the soldiers and the military equipment and riders.”331
Whatever the float’s symbolism, rationing bestowed renewed importance on
Merced’s transportation facilities. Despite the failure to regain logging rights, Merced
enjoyed the collateral wartime benefits of being Yosemite’s neighbor. The Yosemite
Transportation Service, eager to take full advantage of rationing, began offering twice
daily stage service from Merced’s Southern Pacific Depot to Yosemite Valley in the
summer of 1942.332 Once nationwide fuel rationing began in December 1942, the
California Department of Highways stopped plowing the roads leading from Fresno to
Yosemite’s southern entrance—shunting all winter tourist traffic through Merced.333 The
following summer, the Yosemite Park & Curry Company shuttered the Glacier Point
Hotel, Wawona Hotel, and Big Trees Lodge—the most important lodging establishments
in the park’s southern sector—due to “war restrictions and conditions.” The YPCC also
announced that motor stages from Fresno to Yosemite Valley would cease, granting
Merced a (temporary) monopoly over rail and bus traffic during the busy summer
season.334 Although rail travel continued to drop through the war, stages—many of them
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Figure 33: The float for Merced’s Army Day Parade, 1942. Memo to the Regional Director, April 9, 1942.
Yosemite National Park archives, Old Central Files, Series 6, Subseries 3-4, Box 18
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leaving from Merced—became increasingly popular; in fact, they carried over a quarter
of all Yosemite’s visitors in 1944.335 World War II, and rationing in particular,
temporarily revived Merced’s reputation as “the Gateway to Yosemite.”
--Superintendent Kittredge was not the only Park Service employee concerned with
his agency’s wartime image. Military mobilization presented public relations problems at
a much larger scale. Because the war effort demanded every ounce of the country’s
resources, Director Newton B. Drury—an ardent supporter of conservation—knew that
his agency would face requests to use parks for defense work.340 Even before the attack
on Pearl Harbor, Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes complained to President Franklin
D. Roosevelt that his branch’s control over public lands was “rapidly being restricted to a
futile ex post facto protest as far as the Army is concerned.” He continued with a
trenchant military metaphor, noting the military’s tendency to “march in and take
possession just as Hitler marched in and took possession of the small democracies of
Europe.”341
The basis of this military takeover lay in a presumption that Park Service policies
were “not entirely in sympathy with the all-out war effort.”342 After all, what good were
preserved natural resources if they could not be used when American needed them most?
NPS officials faced immense pressure to prove that tourism—or, “travel for essential rest
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and recreation”—was vital for the nation and its citizens. 343 Drury acted quickly, waiving
soldiers’ entrance fees to all parks before America even entered the war. By preemptively
promoting military tourism, the Park Service would “enhance the pride in this national
heritage which it may be necessary for members of the armed forces and trainees
sometime to defend.”344
Defense workers also formed a crucial part of the Park Service’s strategy. Shortly
after Pearl Harbor, Secretary Ickes argued that the country “should profit by experience
of her allies,” many of whom “learned early in war that too long hours at high pressure
work resulted in decreased production.”345 Partners in park tourism reinforced the
message, as well. Echoing Ickes, the director of the All-Year Club of Southern California
reminded attendees at a travel conference that “[t]ravel is an automatic stimulant to
morale”; in order to reach the “highest production levels,” workers needed the “rest and
change” brought by travel.346 Indeed, defense manufacturers around California organized
tours to the state’s national parks. Lockheed and Consolidated Aircraft, for example, sent
employees on two-week trips to Yosemite.347
The National Park Service still courted civilian visitors, but fuel and rubber
rationing made it difficult for many to travel.348 This was especially true in California, as
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the state’s biggest cities all lay hundreds of miles from Yosemite. By October 1941, two
months before America even entered the war, military travel made up roughly ten percent
of the park’s visitation.349 Yosemite received half as many visitors in December 1942 (the
beginning of fuel rationing) as it did in December 1941, despite a threefold increase in
military visitation.350 Out of state visitation ground to a halt.351 Twenty-one percent of all
visitors for the 1943 travel year were from the military, rising to thirty-one percent in
1944.352 This sharp decrease in overall travel—and the corresponding increase in military
travel—epitomized Yosemite’s wartime experience, and other national parks’ too; by
1943, roughly one in four visitors nationwide were from the military.353
Over Memorial Day 1943, investigators from the Office of Price Administration
(the government agency overseeing rationing protocol) staged a “raid” in Yosemite.
Agents found more than 200 motorists from Central California and the Bay Area in
possession of illegally obtained gasoline.354 Later that summer Park Service brass began
explicitly discouraging civilian travel. An early supporter of wartime tourism, Secretary
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Ickes changed his tune and asked Americans to vacation closer to home in order to
reduce strain on gas, rubber, and trains.355 In fact, that Fourth of July, he implored
Americans to stay away from parks “unless they are lucky enough to live within close
proximity to one of them.”356 Civilian travel became simply too wasteful; military travel
to the parks, however, remained of national importance. Merced offered Yosemite some
much-needed help in this regard.
--Wartime added a new dimension to this neighborly partnership. It was generally
expected that parks collaborate with the military bases nearest them. The Office of
Defense Transportation permitted both the Army and the Navy to use “automotive
equipment” to give servicemen organized tours—in essence granting a reprieve from fuel
and rubber rationing. At a meeting in early December 1942, military personnel agreed
that regional directors and park superintendents should contact local Army and Navy
units to schedule regular visits.357
Contrary to Secretary Ickes’ Hitler analogy, Yosemite’s top brass seemed to enjoy
having servicemen in the park. Beginning even before the war, soldiers from nearby
cities like Stockton, Fresno, and Merced arrived in Yosemite in groups of a thousand (or
more).358 Many came for drilling. One summer day, soldiers tested an amphibious vehicle
which one visitor deemed it “a cross between a Ford and a landing barge.”359 Soldiers
also practiced digging foxholes in Tecoya Meadows, close to the busy Yosemite Village
355
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complex.360 These special groups often received customized sightseeing trips. A group of
approximately 500 men from Fresno’s Hammer Field descended upon Camp 4 in late
December 1942, immediately receiving an orientation at the east end of the Wawona
Tunnel—one of the park’s signature vistas. The next morning, they received special
museum tours (in groups of one hundred or more) and hiked to Vernal Fall afterward.361
As Kittredge remarked, it “would instill pride in the heart of any American” to see these
“fine young men” in the park, “reveling in the beauties of Nature at her best.”362
Attempting to link preservation to patriotism, Superintendent Kittredge courted
military tourists from bases around California. Some military tourists meant more than
others—especially those from Merced, who offered Kittredge an opportunity to kill two
birds with one stone. Allowing soldiers to rest and recuperate within Yosemite showed
the National Park Service’s willingness to assist in the war effort; hosting Merced’s
soldiers, in particular, could constitute an olive branch to a city with plenty of reasons to
resent their federal neighbors.
In November of 1942, the director of Merced’s United Service Organizations
(USO) Club approached Superintendent Kittredge with an unusual request.
“Remembering the wonderful times they had in the Park during the summer,” she wrote,
“some of the boys…are asking to spend Christmas in your Valley.” Since it would be too
cold to camp, she asked instead if park residents could offer “home hospitality” for
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soldiers missing their own families.363 Employees jumped at the chance. Dr. Donald
Tressider, president of the Yosemite Park & Curry Company, announced their arrival:
Service men, many of them far from home and likewise
dreaming of a ‘White Christmas’ will find here the peace,
beauty, and spiritual revival that we associated with the
Christmas season. All of us will strive to make this
Christmas a memorable one for our guests, that they may
go back to Army camps, battlefronts and war factories with
renewed spirits. We see in this an important assignment and
we guarantee our best.364
After the holidays, the commanding officer at the Merced Army Flying School wrote to
express his soldiers’ “gratitude for their Christmas gift of the hours spent at your
home.”365 The park—and, in particular, its employees’ firesides—provided a kind of
temporary home for servicemen stationed in Merced.
Not long after war broke out, the Navy decided that men who had experienced
combat needed places to recuperate on land. In April 1942 Congress passed Public Law
528, dictating that the Navy’s “Welfare and Recreation” funds could be used to rent
buildings, facilities, and services to help Naval officers recuperate from their overseas
tours. The Navy thus began looking for isolated areas that would discourage families
from visiting.366 Yosemite fit the bill, and in the summer of 1943 the Curry Company
transformed the luxurious Ahwahnee Hotel into a convalescent hospital for the Navy.
Although technically the concessioners’ call, NPS officials tried to take some credit for it.
Park Service Director Arthur Demaray gave simple instructions to his regional director:
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Figure 34: Sailors at Tunnel View, 1944. Due to fuel and rubber rationing bicycles became
an increasingly popular way to see Yosemite. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Figure 35: Soldiers on the Mist Trail to Vernal and Nevada Falls (at the eastern end of Yosemite
Valley), c. 1944. Notice the ranger assigned to lead the hike in the foreground. Courtesy
NPGallery Digital Archive.
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when talking about the convalescent hospital, he should “[s]tress contribution to the war
effort.”367
Once again Merced would prove essential to securing great press for the National
Park Service. “Navy men assigned to Yosemite's de luxe [sic] hotel Ahwahnee for rest
and recuperation need have never a dull moment,” a press release announced. Patients
could fish with rangers “who know many of the trout by their first names”; they could
also hike with rangers skilled in botany, zoology, and geology, and—if they wished—
they could even climb mountains.368 But not all patients enjoyed the outdoors.
Fortunately, neighbors in the San Joaquin Valley rushed to help. In its early days, the
hospital was “literally saved” by nearby political and civic entities—Army bases at
Merced and Fresno, the San Joaquin Valley Elks Club, the Navy Club and War Dads of
Fresno, and different chapters of Navy Mothers’ Clubs and Veterans of Foreign Wars—
which donated ping pong tables, games, radios, phonographs, and magazines.369 The
Army airfield at Merced partnered with the War Dads of Fresno to host dances every
other Saturday night at the hospital.370 The commander of the Merced airfield also
provided weekend visits by an Army orchestra and a local detachment of the Women’s
Army Corps.371 Around Christmas time, nearby communities sent candy and cookies.372
The Ahwahnee’s location may have been scenic, but it was not particularly
convenient. With San Francisco over 200 miles away and “the nearest town of any size”
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(Merced) over eighty miles away, the hospital needed to be “self-sustaining in every way
possible.” While initially conceived as a home for psychiatric patients, the Ahwahnee
proved “unsuitable” for them; the high surrounding walls fostered claustrophobia, and the
lack of diversions led to boredom. Non-psychiatric patients, as well, chafed at the dearth
of entertainment options. Despite their service, they were “isolated in the High Sierras”
instead of sent home. To make matters worse, there were often hefty delays in obtaining
medical discharges; during the hospital’s first year, hundreds of patients arrived in
Yosemite from San Francisco—which was experiencing a dire shortage of medical
beds—in order to wait for their discharges. Only emergency leave was authorized for the
hospital, though, meaning many patients were trapped in paradise.373
World War II showcased a new side to the Merced-Yosemite partnership, one
predicated less on business and more on shared sacrifice. Although the city’s “plea of
patriotism” irked Kittredge, he remained committed to maintaining good neighborly
relations—especially when it helped prove the National Park Service’s contributions to
the war effort. Unlike most Californian cities, Merced was uniquely positioned to profit
from the scarcity of fuel and rubber. Rationing short-circuited the park’s new all-season
highway system, thus allowing Merced to resume its role as the “Gateway to
Yosemite”—a role it had already relinquished, and would again once the war ended.
--The Yosemite Valley Railway struggled as the war ground on. Instead of sugar
pine, its owners had to make do by shipping materials for barite and cement; dwindling
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tourist traffic did not help, either.382 By 1944 the railroad could not even pay interest on
the two million dollars in bonds that it owed. The National Lead Company (which
shipped barite via the railroad) and the Yosemite Portland Cement Company (crushed
stone) leapt to defend the troubled line, as did Mariposa County representatives who
rallied behind their county’s only railroad—and, for that matter, their only public
transportation.383 Theodore Stewart, president of the Yosemite Portland Cement
Company and member of the ‘Save YV’ committee, pointed out the railroad’s
importance to every community it served.384 The Merced County Chamber of Commerce,
with its financial future seemingly on the line, suggested that another company take over
the railroad.385 But these protests accomplished little and, late in the summer of 1945, the
YV’s owners petitioned the Interstate Commerce Commission for abandonment.386 The
YV became the first railroad with a national park connection to be “scuttled”—a dubious
honor.387
One rail advocate made a particularly interesting case, speculating that “[a]
national park without a railroad leading into it is a second rate park in the eyes of…the
wealthier class of tourist.”388 The equation of rail and “the wealthier class” leaned on an
outdated stereotype of park tourism, and thus this protest against the YV’s abandonment
actually made a convincing case for it. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, the golden age of rail tourism, Western national parks proved so expensive to
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access that tourists were basically assured “the company of wealthy and cultured
Englishmen and Easterners in Colorado.”389 National park tourists in the postwar United
States, however, would be defined by a different kind of wealth—one characterized by
unlimited mobility and a bold new variety of consumer choices. Californians, in
particular, had tasted the fruits of all-season access to Yosemite throughout the 1930s;
World War II would prove only a brief hiccup in their love affair with their cars and their
favorite national park.
National Park Service and concessioner personnel stood up for the YV, but they
had less at stake. Superintendent Kittredge and Donald Tressider, head of the Yosemite
Park & Curry Company, both guaranteed they would support “any feasible plan” to
ensure the railroad’s survival; although little-used by tourists, the YV still carried
commercial freight into and out of the park.390 Regional Director Owen Tomlinson also
supported the railroad, but only because—without it—congestion on the All Year
Highway would increase dramatically.391 Both the NPS and the YPCC saw the railroad’s
future through an automotive prism. When rationing ended and tourism resumed, the
Yosemite Valley Railway’s only purpose would be to keep traffic running smoothly by
keeping semi-trucks off the road.
The railroad’s abandonment had major implications for Merced. Former YV
employees warned that a proposed highway from Modesto to Yosemite Valley—together
with the all-year road from Fresno—threatened to “practically eliminate Merced from

389

Earl S Pomeroy, In Search of the Golden West, 9.
“Merced and Mariposa County Men Discuss Future Status of Yosemite Valley Railroad Line,” Merced
Sun-Star, 4 April 1944.
391
“Hearing Opens on Railroad Abandonment,” Merced Sun-Star, 1 December 1944.
390

159
tourist business.”392 The Modesto highway, which would create a thirty-three mile
shortcut for northern travelers, would lead to “the ultimate motor car by-passing of
Merced”; it was, in no uncertain terms, the “death of a historical era.” In an era of
unprecedented automotive mobility, the town once “proudly lauded as the Gateway to
Yosemite” would no longer enjoy an exclusive geographic advantage.393
--The Ahwahnee Hotel reopened in December 1945, relieved of its duties as a
hospital.394 Not surprisingly, travel for the 1945 travel year (October 1–September 30,
inclusive) increased one hundred and fifty-five percent over the previous travel year, and
eight percent over the previous record travel year (1941); travel from outside the state of
California surged, as well.395 But 1946, the first year completely free of rationing,
belonged to Californians. Ninety percent of park visitors that year came from within the
state.396
That summer, Kittredge proudly reflected on some of his wartime
accomplishments. “The park’s natural values were safeguarded from the threat of
grazing,” he boasted. “The forests of the park were not invaded for timber,” he continued,
“and the careful use of camping areas by military convoys had no visible effect on the
vegetation of the park.” In other words, World War II had left Yosemite’s natural
resources intact. The park’s traffic situation, however, was another matter. “No sooner
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had the atomic bomb smoke cleared over Hiroshima,” Kittredge exclaimed, than
“[a]utomobiles started rolling into the park from all directions.”397
Changes in California’s highway system in the 1920s and 1930s democratized
access to the park, meaning that more cities had legitimate claims as gateways to
Yosemite. Merced’s leading citizens paved the way for this moment, even if it meant they
could no longer claim the park as their own. Yet these hotel and railroad magnates had
played a pivotal role in promoting Yosemite, funneling people from California (and
beyond) into the formerly remote park. Ironically, though, the abandoned Yosemite
Valley Railroad proved to be Merced’s biggest contribution to the park’s urbanization.
With the YV dismantled and cars coming “from all directions,” Yosemite National Park
became yet another Californian attraction dedicated entirely to the automobile.
No place epitomized this transformation better than El Portal. Once the YV’s
eastern terminus, the small town in the lower Merced River canyon would become a
planned community boasting single family homes, two-car garages, and a new class of
commuting employees. From the ashes of the railroad era emerged a more complex
version of Yosemite, an auto-oriented commercial landscape in lockstep with the rapidly
suburbanizing state around it.
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Chapter 4
“Less Perishable Areas”: Mission 66 and the Fight to Decentralize Yosemite Valley,
1945–1966398

By early September 1945—shortly after the end of World War II—travel to
Yosemite resumed in force. Despite some notable exceptions (like the ski area at Badger
Pass) Yosemite Valley remained the main draw. As its visitor facilities grew more and
more overloaded nationwide, the National Park Service’s budget stagnated. Thus the
contrast between the nation’s postwar wealth and its impoverished parks became evident
to bureaucrats, journalists, and visitors alike.399
Thrust into serving postwar crowds on prewar budgets, Park Service brass had to
make some urgent decisions regarding the shape of Yosemite. The lack of a train,
combined with California’s rising auto registrations, made it abundantly clear that cars
would dominate the park’s future—but in what way? Would they carry tourists straight to
Yosemite Valley, thus reinforcing the centralized nature of the park’s development? Or
398
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would they distribute visitors over a wider ranger of park attractions to give the Valley a
break? Mission 66, a funding boost approved in 1956, offered the Park Service a chance
at decentralizing Yosemite Valley by removing both visitor and employee services to
outlying areas within the park (or outside the park altogether).400
The Yosemite Park and Curry Company (hereafter ‘the Curry Company,’ ‘the
Company,’ or simply ‘the concessioner’) had other ideas. Party to the park’s development
since the 1920s, the Company held a monopoly on visitor services in Yosemite Valley:
lodging, meals, groceries, and even haircuts. Thus the concessioner doubled down on
their strategy, adding a motel and a retail complex that transformed the Valley into an
auto-oriented commercial landscape befitting the rapidly suburbanizing nation.401
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The Sierra Club also weighed in on the Park Service’s plans to spread visitors
more evenly throughout Yosemite. Club leaders vehemently opposed the modernization
of the Tioga Road, a trans-Sierra highway offering access to the park’s scenic high
country; while these new recreational opportunities would help decentralize the Valley,
they would also bring more traffic to one of the Sierra Club’s most beloved places. Three
of the dominant forces in postwar American life—the federal government, conservation
organizations, and private industry—collided during the Mission 66 era, conflicted over
Yosemite’s future form but unanimous on the importance of cars.402
--Postwar auto tourism boomed. As the Curry Company newsletter noted, “[m]any
local residents had different cars parked in front of their houses over the weekend, and
many new faces were seen in the residential area as our friends and relatives came in for
a visit.”403 Travel for June 1946 showed a gain of two hundred and fifty percent over the
previous June, as well as a fifty percent drop in bus traffic; it eclipsed the previous record
(June 1941) by eleven percent.404 Visitors from the San Francisco Bay Area and Southern
California returned in particularly large numbers.405
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Few parks were prepared for the postwar travel explosion, but Yosemite’s unique
situation—close to major metropolitan centers, accessible by four highways, and with
visitation concentrated in one seven mile by half mile chasm—prompted some serious
conversations. Park Service officials looked to Yosemite’s Board of Experts for advice
on how to proceed. Since 1928 the Board—essentially a think tank composed of
planners, architects, natural scientists, and other public intellectuals—had served as a sort
of advisory council to park superintendents. Shortly after V-J Day, Park Service director
Newton B. Drury challenged the Board to consider an especially provocative suggestion
from Thomas C. Vint, the agency's chief planner. Looking to manage the returning tourist
hordes, Vint had recommended removing as much development as possible from
Yosemite Valley—Park Service and Curry Company facilities alike. To compensate,
Drury suggested “build[ing] up the facilities at Wawona, or at Big Meadow”— rural
areas to the south and west of Yosemite Valley, respectively. He reassured them that the
plan “was not as radical as it might appear,” and that it did not “preclude overnight
accommodations or campgrounds.” Vint’s plan would, however, “shift the emphasis so
far as resort activities and Government operations…to less perishable areas”—an idea
that Drury deemed “a trend in the right direction.”406
The Board proved unsympathetic to the Vint plan. In 1946 their reply came:
although they were “wholly in sympathy” with Director Drury's wishes, removing the
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“heart of the park” was “too great a sacrifice to make.”407 As a compromise, they
proposed limiting the overnight population of the Valley. Pushing past the ideal overnight
carrying capacity, they argued, would result in a reduction of each visitors’ “individual
pleasure” to “a quarter or a third of that under favorable conditions.”408 They reasoned
mostly in mathematical terms; after all, many of the Board’s members were academics.
Board member John P. Buwalda, a geology profesor at the California Institute of
Technology, decried Vint’s plan as too expensive and inconvenient. Its biggest flaw,
though, was “not being able to see the Valley in its different moods from early morning
to late at night.”409 In one version of Vint’s plan, Yosemite’s administrative facilities—as
well as that of Sequoia and Kings Canyon—would be removed to nearby Fresno. The
Board especially disliked this idea, pointing out that removing park headquarters to an
outlying area would be as inefficient as “the removal of the mayor of New York City to a
suburb.”410
Superintendent Frank Kittredge took a more moderate approach to Vint’s plan.
Writing to the chairman of the Board, he expressed the central dilemma of the postwar
park experience:
We have recognized the advisability of gathering together of necessary
public services in order to protect other areas from people, and yet this
very gathering together has served to get away from the camp mood and to
get into the town or city mood with the...necessity for the city services and
entertainments.411
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In other words, centralization was not working. “City services and entertainments”
dominated the Valley floor because the National Park Service had let them “in order to
protect other areas from people.” The resulting crowds irreparably changed the Valley’s
“mood”—one Kittredge’s favorite barometers of the park experience. He believed it was
in the Park Service’s best interest to “substitute a simple camp atmosphere for the present
urban conditions”; those in search of “jazz or city type” activities would eventually “label
the park as ‘dead’” and seek entertainment elsewhere.412
Unsurprisingly, higher-ups at the concessioner thought little of Kittredge’s desire
to remove “city type” activities that bolstered the Company’s bottom line. The Yosemite
Park & Curry Company was baked into Yosemite’s history. It operated the Ahwahnee
Hotel, Wawona Hotel, Camp Curry, and the ski facilities at Badger Pass; aside from
lodgings and food, it also offered dancing, golfing, tennis, swimming, and other
diversions.413 The Company essentially invented winter recreation in Yosemite.414 More
to the point, it oversaw a massive economic system predicated upon overnight
accommodations in Yosemite Valley. Related concessioner businesses like restaurants
and gift shops flourished across the national park system; gift sales, in particular, helped
businesses like the Curry Company ensure a profit for their overall operation. Any visitor
that could afford a stay at the Ahwahnee, for example, likely had enough disposable
income to spring for some kind of souvenir. Thus, the Company had a vested interest in
maintaining a concentration of services and, more importantly, people in Yosemite
Valley.415
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Figure 36: Crowds assembled outside the cafeteria in Camp Curry, 1946. Camp Curry is one
of the concessioner’s biggest concentrations of lodging and services. This photo displays the
reason that the Curry Company could never abide by decentralization: there was simply too
much money to make. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Figure 37: Japanese Olympians in the Camp Curry pool, 1932. Courtesy NPGallery Digital
Archive
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Agents of the Curry Company interpreted the Vint plan as an attack on their very
existence. The general manager, Hilmer Oehlmann, bristled at the notion that he and his
fellow concessioners “would subscribe to any form of desecration of these areas for the
sake of additional profit.” It was absurd to blame the Curry Company for crowds, he
continued, when “for every swimmer in the pools there are a hundred in the river.”
Knowing the Park Service’s postwar budget woes, he drily remarked that “it is not to be
expected that the Park Service itself will aspire to confront the Appropriations
Committees with statistics of declining travel.”416 Oehlmann’s words foreshadow the role
that massive concessioner investments would play in determining the shape of Yosemite.
Oehlmann sounded confident, but he had other reasons to worry. The political
climate had grown hostile to national park concessioners. In 1946 Rep. John J. Rooney
(D-NY) criticized the contract—signed in 1932—that required the Yosemite Park and
Curry Company to pay the government only $5,000 of its nearly $3 million in gross
income. Yosemite was “run for the benefit of a concessionaire,” he argued.417 In the years
following World War II, some members of Congress began a movement for government
ownership of national park concessions; unsurprisingly, other senators and
representatives bucked at this perceived move towards socialization of private assets.418
A Los Angeles Times reporter opined that, without the Curry Company’s numerous (and
lucrative) distractions, Yosemite Valley “might become once again the most beautiful

416

Quoted in Runte, Embattled Wilderness, 191–192.
“Yosemite Park Concession Hit,” Los Angeles Times, 9 May 1946.
418
“U.S. Ownership of Park Concessions Sought,” Chicago Daily Tribune 11 June 1948; “Funds Asked to
Meet National Park Boom,” Christian Science Monitor, 7 April 1950.
417

170
place in the world.”419 Legislators, Park Service personnel, and even the media had begun
to question the Curry Company’s influence over federal preservation policy.
--By the early 1950s, other problems supplanted Park Service concessions policy.
Conditions were so bad system-wide that pundits like Bernard DeVoto actually
advocated closing the nation's parks until they could be adequately funded. 420 After
seeing National Park Service facilities decay—first due to nonuse during World War II,
and then due to extreme use afterwards—Director Wirth pressed for a new emphasis on
comprehensive and well-funded master plans. These were not simply vague vision
statements; in Wirth’s words, they were meant to “insure [sic] a sound, economical, and
orderly development of each area.”421 Yosemite’s master planning process revived the
Vint plan. Contributors to the park’s 1952 Master Plan insisted on “gradual
decentral[ization]” of the Valley, which was “rapidly approaching the saturation point.”
By 1952, 700 cars and 2,300 people entered the Valley each day; from May to
September, those numbers more than doubled. Some campgrounds were given “rest
period[s]” to allow partial recovery.422 Yet Yosemite’s operating budget actually
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decreased four percent between 1953 and 1954, leaving little funding for such an
ambitious idea.423
Predictably, Curry Company representatives defended their role in the Valley’s
crowding. As one official put it, “[w]e try to spread them out by encouraging the use of
facilities outside the Valley itself, such as those at Wawona, Glacier Point, and Tuolumne
Meadows”; ultimately, though, “most of the people who apply for reservations insist on
going ‘where all the people are.’” The official also noted that the Company’s advertising
focused on the off-seasons (spring and fall) so as to not to contribute to summer
crowding.424 This excuse did not necessarily hold water, as increasing off-season
visitation had long been a successful joint venture of the Park Service and the Curry
Company.425
The new superintendent, Carl P. Russell—a former Yosemite park naturalist that
succeeded Kittredge in 1947—moved to thaw the once-chilly relationship between the
Park Service and concessioner. He invited anyone unhappy with the “the roads crossing
the meadows, [or] the meadows that are blacktopped to provide extra parking space” to
blame the National Park Service; Russell also criticized “changing administrative
views…that have kept the service from knowing just where it is heading.”426 Was the
Park Service to blame for allowing Yosemite Valley to become so developed? Or was the
Curry Company to blame for taking advantage of federal policy? Either way, Russell’s
words—published in the Los Angeles Times—showed the American public that his
agency’s insecure finances and changing priorities had taken their toll.
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The 1950s continued auspiciously for businesses like the Curry Company. At a
superintendents’ meeting in Yosemite in 1953, the Park Service’s leadership addressed
the future of concessioners. In his memoirs, Director Conrad Wirth (appointed in 1951)
recalls a collective attempt at “mending the bad feeling that had developed” between
private enterprises and their federal hosts. Criticisms of parks run “for the benefit of
concessionaire” explained much of the bad blood; so did a suggestion in the 1940s that
concessioners sell their facilities to the federal government. In response, the House
Committee on Public Lands introduced the idea of ‘possessory interest,’ pledging that
any concessioner improvements would be treated the same as those made on private land.
If corporations were assured that their facilities would remain theirs, they might be more
willing to help the Park Service finance its sorely-needed “reconstruction program.” The
meeting, Worth remembers, “brought out the importance of the concessionaires as part of
the team.”427
Even with concessioners back in the fold, the Park Service would need more
money to deal with problems emerging in Yosemite and across the national park system.
A solution emerged when Congress authorized funding for Mission 66 (1956–1966), a
new program designed to facilitate public access through modernization of the national
park system. Relationships with concessioners like the Curry Company proved crucial to
the plan. As Wirth convinced President Dwight D. Eisenhower, “the best encouragement
the National Park Service can give is to go forward with its own part of park
development.” If a concessioner was willing to build new lodging, for example, the Park
Service needed to make sure that its portion of the work—utilities, road, parking areas—
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was completed promptly. “We have to do our part before the concessioners can go
ahead,” Worth concluded.428
As Wirth’s pitch indicates, the National Park Service had to provide the basic
infrastructure for concessioner investments (mainly lodging) to flourish. Thus, much of
Mission 66 funding went to new roads, parking lots, and campgrounds—all of which
would provided a steady clientele for concessioner facilities. Yet one part of Wirth’s plan
remained patently unrealistic. Despite the importance of concessioner development
within parks, Wirth also pledged to “encourage private business to build more
accommodations in the gateway communities near the parks.”429 Even more boldly, he
trumpeted the removal of overnight facilities from “major park features.”430 Once again,
the Vint plan had resurfaced; this time, however, it was not confined to Yosemite.
Park Service officials eventually softened their stance on lodging, requiring only
four of the nation’s thirty “large parks” to phase out overnight accommodations within
their boundaries. New concessioner lodging facilities thus became a signature part of the
Mission 66 program.431 A meeting of the Western Conference of National Park
Concessioners and Park Service officials in 1957 produced the conclusion that
“concessioners operating in the large national parks of the western states and Hawaii”
would “cooperate as fully as possible in providing the thousands of new lodgings and
related facilities now needed.” The Curry Company and other concessioners balked,
however, at the potential cost of construction and labor; to raise the Park Service’s
428
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lodging capacity from 24,000 to 52,000 (the projected goal), it would cost $50 million—
with concessioners providing three quarters of that amount.432 For Mission 66 to move
forward, concessioners would have to double down on their already-impressive
investments in “central places” across the national park system. Wirth’s plan to
decentralize concessioner facilities eventually had the opposite effect. Private enterprise
had become inextricably bound to the nation’s parks.
--Even if the system-wide goals of Mission 66 had abandoned decentralization,
Yosemite’s superintendent John Preston ultimately controlled the allocation of new
funding in his park. Knowing that the Curry Company would not budge from the Valley,
Preston tried more subtle tactics to disperse visitation. Acquiring the remaining private
lands within the park constituted the least controversial part of his Mission 66 to-do
list.433 Throughout the twentieth century, many American cities grew by annexing land,
ensuring a larger tax base and more room to grow. Since the early 1900s, a similar
process for acquiring private lands within Yosemite allowed Park Service officials to
mitigate the negative effects of the park’s patchwork property lines; after World War II,
however, private land purchases became an integral part of the plan to save the Valley. 434
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Mere months before leaving Yosemite in 1947, Frank Kittredge had expressed a desire to
“more fully utilise [sic] Wawona.”435 Kittredge, so attuned to the needs and functions of
gateway communities, saw similar opportunities to spread out visitors within park
boundaries. Like neighboring towns serving the park’s tourist overflow, areas like
Wawona would take pressure off Yosemite Valley.
Yet Wawona was also dotted with private lands, many owned by longtime
Californians with a deep attachment to their vacation homes in Yosemite. The Mariposa
Grove of Giant Sequoias was included in the Yosemite Grant back in 1864, but the Park
Service did not acquire Wawona’s primary residential development near the grove until
1932. The basin’s private inholdings had been subdivided in the intervening seven
decades, chiseled into smaller and smaller parcels. A circuitous network of dirt roads
crisscrossed the basin.436
Thus Preston, like others before him, found Wawona difficult to manage. Shortly
after Mission 66’s introduction to the public in 1956, Superintendent Preston stressed the
urgency of land acquisition to Director Drury. “Costly improvements are being made
daily on these active subdivision areas of Foresta and Wawona,” he wrote, referring to
residential developments to the west and south of Yosemite Valley, respectively. “Each
day adds to the physical improvement and consequent valuation of the properties in
Wawona and Foresta making acquisition increasingly difficult.”437 By 1958
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Superintendent Preston reiterated that the acquisition program was “making rather slow
progress.”438
There was reason to persevere. With some added visitor services, Wawona could
offer an alternative to the Valley. Its short distance from Yosemite Valley, along with
established attractions like the Mariposa Grove and a historic hotel, made it a logical
candidate for decentralization. If Yosemite Valley was indeed a city, then Wawona was
its country cousin. The Wawona Hotel, acquired by the Curry Company in 1923, offered
large doses of rural charm:
One of the best nine-hole mountain golf courses in the United States is
included in the property…. Facilities also include tennis courts, a riding
stables, volleyball courts, and a new swimming pool, added this year.
Close by are a store, gas station, groves of Big Trees, and numerous other
Yosemite National Park attractions…. A total of 27 miles from the floor of
Yosemite Valley, life at Wawona is unhurried and uncrowded. ‘We came
here for the quiet, peaceful life of Wawona,’ one couple, yearly visitors
since 1932, said. ‘The people are genial.’439
In contrast to the Valley’s auto-oriented layout, Wawona became a tableau of olden days.
Other historic structures arrive, cultivating the powerful pull of nostalgia and
uncluttering the Valley floor in the process. In addition to its existing historic sites—a
covered bridge, wagon shop, and the Wawona Hotel—Wawona received eight more
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Figure 38: The Wawona Barn near the Pioneer History Center, undated. Notice the
rural character of the scene. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive

178

Figure 39: The Wawona area, c. 1965. Notice the juxtaposition of features conveying the area’s historical
significance (the Pioneer History Center, a graveyard) with more modern conveniences (like a golf
course). Greene, Yosemite: The Park and its Resources, 889
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historic buildings in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Two of them (the Wells Fargo
building and the powder house) came from the Old Village; they would have otherwise
been razed to make space on the Valley floor.440 Walking down “Main Street” became a
sort of time travel; visitors could see log cabins, stagecoaches, and a even a covered
bridge.441 Each represented a different stage of Yosemite's development: pioneering,
homesteading, rail transport, early hotels, the Army administration, and the nascent
national park years. Crews spent six years moving and refurnishing these structures,
which would officially open as the Pioneer History Center in 1961.442 A dedication of the
center, featuring some 300 “pioneers, or sons and daughters of pioneers,” occurred as part
of the Yosemite Grant centennial in 1964—yet another attempt to link Wawona to the
park’s origins, rather than its modernization.443
Even though development at Wawona technically furthered the Vint plan, it was
anything but controversial. The Curry Company surely did not mind, as the Pioneer
History Center funneled more visitors towards its historic Wawona Hotel. But when it
came to the greatest question of Mission 66, the Wawona area fell short. Preston, ever
cost-conscious, noted pessimistically in 1956 that “a new central headquarters” at
Wawona would “complicate” its acquisition “by placing increased valuation on the land.”
To make matters worse, the best lands for a potential campground lay in private hands, as
well. Even a relocation of entertainment options (like the dance pavilion) to Wawona
from the Valley seemed problematic; Preston lamented the potential danger to “the
carefree seasonal employee of the concessioners” on their return trip to the Valley “late at

440

Fitzsimmons, “Effect,” 72–73.
“Wawona Pioneer Village,” Yosemite Sentinel, 4 April 1958.
442
Greene, Yosemite: The Park and Its Resources, 882.
443
“300 Pioneers Dedicate Yosemite,” Madera (Calif.) Tribune, 14 September 1964.
441

180
night over this winding road.”444 Wawona could never become “a new central
headquarters,” but it was a nice walk down memory lane nonetheless.
--Preston’s concern about the road to Wawona underscored a crucial facet of his
Mission 66 strategy: assuming that visitors would experience the park from behind a
windshield. The average tourist was more mobile than ever. By the start of the 1950s
roughly ninety-nine percent of visitors to the national park system arrived in cars, either
their own private autos or rented ones.445 In 1952 Carl P. Russell—a former park
naturalist and Kittredge’s replacement as superintendent—estimated that ninety percent
of the park’s visitors were from California, most of them “repeaters.”446 This
phenomenon would only intensify as the state’s auto registrations doubled between 1950
and 1966.447
Any time a Californian got in their car, there was a good chance they were going
to Yosemite. In-state tourists became so numerous that some proposed limiting
Californian visitation to give visitors from elsewhere “a better chance at getting past park
gates.” One scheme even proposed a staggered school schedule within the state
redistribute heavy summer crowds.448 The context of California is doubly important given
the state was changing in similar ways to Yosemite. The harbingers of decentralization—
especially highways, planned communities, and guaranteed Federal Housing Authority
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loans—reshaped the state, transforming rural land into urban land at an alarming rate.449
Yosemite’s Mission 66 agenda created a similar dynamic in the park, shunting
development to areas previously considered peripheral to the visitor—and employee—
experience.
Preston’s refusal to locate a new headquarters at Wawona showed his sensitivity
to his employees’ commuting patterns. In the early Mission 66 period, Preston eyed El
Portal and Big Meadow—two communities west of the Valley—as potential places to
relocate “housekeeping” functions (things like a garbage dump and an incinerator that
were not essential for visitor enjoyment) from the Valley. A daily drive from El Portal to
the Valley seemed dangerous, though; Highway 140 ran right next to the Merced River
for multiple miles, causing frequent flooding; the amount of traffic through the Arch
Rock entrance also seemed problematic. Preston initially favored Big Meadow for its
higher elevation and thus milder summer climate.450 Eventually, though, Big Meadow’s
patchwork of private land claims proved impractical, and El Portal became Preston’s next
target.451
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Figure 40: Yosemite in the 1960s. Note El Portal on the southwestern side, next to the big ’31.’ From
Douglas Hubbard, This is Yosemite (San Francisco: 5 Associates, 1962).

183
As the former terminus of the Yosemite Valley Railroad, El Portal had always
been functionally (if not legally) part of Yosemite.452 After the Yosemite Valley Railroad
was abandoned in 1945, the El Portal Mining Company—a branch of the National Lead
Company—acquired title to El Portal. The Park Service purchased the town in 1958.453
The park’s Mission 66 plans to remove “supporting facilities” (another word for
“housekeeping” functions) would hinge upon this acquisition.454
The site’s geography had a lot to recommend it, especially in comparison to
Wawona. El Portal sat directly on the All-Year Highway, which remained open more
consistently than the roads leading to Wawona and Big Meadow. Removing the
incinerator—or other heavy materials like cement, lumber, gravel, and steel—from the
Valley to El Portal (one of Preston’s Mission 66 goals) would require a “downhill haul”
along a relatively straight roadway; placing utilities at Wawona, on the other hand, would
“increase greatly the congestion on this slow, tortuous two-lane road.” Even better, most
of the land at El Portal was under a single ownership. By controlling the site—adjacent to
a heavily-used park entrance—Preston argued that the Park Service could prevent
“‘shoestring’ development of motels, bars, etc.,” that “characterize[d] the ‘front door’ to
many of our national parks.”455 Perhaps the only downside of the site was its elevation
(roughly 2,000 feet lower than Yosemite Valley), which meant scorching summer heat.
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The community would thus require “refrigerated housing necessary for comfortable
summer living.”456
As the mention of air conditioning implies, Preston was also weighing El Portal as
a residential area. Like many places across America, Yosemite lacked housing in the
years following World War II. This is one of many reasons why the Park Service’s
system-wide Mission 66 plans prized the mobile nuclear family. At a Superintendents’
Conference in 1952, wives of Park Service employees formed the National Park Service
Women’s Organization (NPSWO). When newly-installed director Conrad Wirth asked
what Mission 66 could do for them, they responded unanimously: better employee
housing. A study revealed that half of the Park Service’s employee housing lacked
running water, electricity, or indoor toilets. Many NPS families lived in “former forts,
CCC barracks, bunkhouses, barns, stables, or summer homes.” In addition to increased
living standards, members of the NPSWO also cried out for privacy—specifically,
housing areas separated from major tourist attractions. The Organization also agitated for
standard housing plans across the Service; that way, furniture and fixtures would
continue to fit even as families moved from park to park.457
New single-family homes at El Portal would address all of these needs. In the late
1950s many employees housed in Yosemite Valley lived in “old substandard residences”
around Yosemite Valley, housing stock that had fallen into disrepair. Others occupied
“trailer camps,” usually sited between the Merced River and the main loop road. Others
occupied. Somewhat ironically, trailers represented a solution to this ramshackle
situation. Contractors completed sixty-two trailer units in El Portal by December 1960,
456
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with seventy-eight more planned just down the river. While not exactly the stereotypical
single-family home, these sites offered “window boxes full of blooming flowers,” plus
“an attractive utility building containing two automatic washers and two dryers” and a
play area for children. Up a draw to the west, workers laid twenty foundations for
permanent government homes—for Park Service and Curry Company employees alike—
by December 1960.458 Paraphrasing Assistant Superintendent Keith Neilson, a writer for
the Madera Tribune noted that the homes constituted an important step in establishing El
Portal as an “operating base” that would also become “a model community with
appropriate zoning.”459
It is safe to assume that “appropriate zoning” simply meant that the town’s
industrial functions would remain separate from its residential neighborhoods. Building a
“modern incinerator and land fill” represented an especially “high priority,” since the
presence of these facilities at outlying areas would “make it possible to eliminate the
present smoky incinerator and public dump from the Valley floor”—which had “long
been conspicuous eyesores.”460 Workers finished a new sewage disposal facility and
water plant in 1962, further diversifying El Portal’s “housekeeping” functions.
To the east of these essentials, though, a self-sufficient bedroom community
emerged. Shortly after acquiring the land, the Park Service awarded a new contract for
the management of the El Portal Market, a general store with roots in the community’s
mining days.461 Plans for a five-classroom school, as well as a “village center” with a
post office, motel, and church, ensured that residents could remain separate from the
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Valley—unless, of course, they worked there.462 Preston also publicized another
advantage of the town site: a nearby school in Yosemite Valley (and the promise of a new
one in El Portal itself), plus a high school in nearby Mariposa; at Wawona, however,
students would probably have to attend boarding schools.463 This potential for family life
led The Oakland Tribune to prematurely dub El Portal “the biggest little city in
California.”464 The concessioner’s newspaper hyped the town—with its anticipated
population of “1500 to 1800 souls”—as potentially the biggest in Mariposa County.465
Despite its industrial functions, the El Portal area offered few jobs. Thus many
employees (both NPS and concessioner) commuted to work in Yosemite Valley, a
distance of roughly fifteen miles one way. The wet winter of 1955–56 provided a vivid
reminder of Highway 140’s commuting hazards; Carroll Clark, who commuted from El
Portal to the Ahwahee, sent his co-workers a “dawn-early SOS” in order to be
“portaged…up, around, and in to work around another slippery slide.”466 In late 1960,
just after the first batch of housing became available in El Portal, one employee painted a
bleak picture of the commute to work:
Some El Portal to the Valley drivers are grieved by the manner in which
others crowd them from behind. You’ve no doubt had some 3,000 lb. steel
monsters breathing down your back at one time or another too, and on a
crooked road it is a frightful feeling. All employees should adhere to the
general rule which states that drivers are to stay at least one car length
from the car in front for every ten (10) MPH. Avoid accidents!467
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The new planned community cleared space in Yosemite Valley, but not without creating
some new headaches.468 By spending some extra time in their cars, both Park Service and
Curry Company workers were unwittingly contributing to another revival of the Vint plan
in Yosemite.
--New housing opportunities for its employees did not stop the Curry Company
from doubling down on its monopoly in Yosemite Valley. Park Service personnel
responsible for Yosemite’s Mission 66 plans believed that, if visitors could experience
the park in an “efficient” manner, they might “limit [their] stay voluntarily.”469 Like other
versions of the Vint plan, this particular flavor looked to automobiles as agents of
decentralization. The concessioner’s brain trust, however, looked at cars differently. One
journalist estimated that Yosemite Valley hosted 25,000 people some nights, all of them
potential customers.470 Lodging and associated businesses—restaurants, grocery stores,
curio shops—funneled tourist expenditures directly towards the Curry Company. If
visitors could access all these services from one parking spot, then so much the better.
In the first days of auto tourism, the “old” Yosemite Village held the park’s
largest concentration of services: offices, lodging, a butcher shop, and even a dance
pavilion.471 In the mid-1920s, though, NPS director Steven Mather oversaw the
construction of a new administrative building, new museum, and post office complex on
the north side of the Valley. This essentially guaranteed the obsolescence of the Old
468
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Village site; the Park Service and concessioner even signed an agreement in 1925 that
ensured the removal of the Old Village store and a construction of a new one in Yosemite
Village within one year. This new location on the north side promised more warmth and,
more importantly, space to expand.472
Critics of Mission 66 lamented the loss of the Park Service's trademark rustic
architectural style. Architectural historian Ethan Carr describes Mission 66 as an
outgrowth of “contemporary planning ideas,” with familiar forms borrowed from
shopping centers, movie theaters, and motor lodges.473 The concessioner’s first major
success of the Mission 66 era was the Yosemite Lodge. Like others to follow, it
demonstrated the Curry Company’s determination to apply modern auto-centric planning
to a historic landscape.474 Hilmer Oehlmann, the Company’s general manager, secured $1
million in funding for the new Yosemite Lodge—before Yosemite’s managers could
even prepare their first Mission 66 prospectus.475 Completed in 1956, the Lodge—
featuring exposed steel framing, large glass panes, and low-slung pitched roofs—
represented a drastic departure from the NPS's famed rustic style. Rather than mirror the
472
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natural environment, such materials facilitated an openness that maximized the Lodge's
view-shed—especially its prime spot in front of Yosemite Falls. The complex featured a
central reservation area containing a coffee shop, cafeteria, restaurant, souvenir shop,
lounge, and outdoor amphitheater, marking the Lodge as an entertainment area as well as
an overnight destination. Western luminaries like Bill Lane, Jr.—publisher of Sunset
Magazine—hosted cocktail parties in the swank lounge.476 Clusters of one- and two-story
motel units orbited this nucleus. A major arterial road ran straight through the grounds,
separating central services from outlying accommodations; a smaller network of curving
service roads parceled the property into residential neighborhoods. Parking lots scattered
along the singular entrance allowed visitors to leave their cars promptly.477
Like midcentury motor lodges, shopping centers also allowed customers to
abandon their cars easily. The New Village, long the center of the park, became an
outdoor mall thanks to an outpouring of Curry Company capital. A two-story structure
housing a coffee shop, a restaurant, and a grocery store arrived in 1958.478 A monstrous
new structure arrived in 1959, roughly half of it dedicated to the Village Store—a fullservice grocery and souvenir outlet.479 The rest of the building contained a barbershop,
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Figure 41: The Yosemite Lodge, c. 1960. Notice the swooping roofline of the entryway. There is more
parking just left of the frame, allowing guests a short walk from their cars to their rooms. Courtesy
NPGallery Digital Archive
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Figure 42: The new store and restaurant in Yosemite Village, c. 1959. Notice the dominance of glass in the
frontal façade, despite the fact that the pitched roof evokes a more rustic kind of cabin structure. Courtesy
NPgallery Digital Archive
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Figure 43: The entrance to the New Village, 1958. Notice how the commercial functions get top billing, with
information tucked all the way at the bottom of the sign. Before its reinvention as an outdoor shopping mall,
Yosemite Village was a place to register one’s car and learn about the park’s natural wonders.
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beauty shop, and laundry facilities, as well as another coffee shop and restaurant.480
When the dust settled, the concessioner had spent $1.5 million in 1959 alone, the largest
amount in the corporation’s thirty-two year history—and almost two percent of the Park
Service’s total budget that year.481
This spending spree cemented the concessioner’s ascendance from homespun
business to major corporation. It began offering longstanding employees health
insurance—as well as considerable retail discounts and longer vacations—in 1954.482 The
Curry Company also had considerable clout, as evidenced by the food and beverage
giants invited to the store and restaurant dedication in May of 1959: Kraft, Lucky Lager,
and the major dairy concerns Swift & Company and Borden.483
The New Village improvements also showcased more sophisticated methods of
financing projects. Until 1956 the Company had used “current cash flow” for
construction projects; to build the merchandise center and warehouse in the New Village,
however, it had to acquire two five-year loans ($1,450,000 total) and sell 113,400 shares
of unissued stock to the Company’s shareholders. This new shift toward long-term
financing for improvements in the built environment would be useful for company
representatives in the early 1960s, when they would argue for an extension of their
contract from twenty to thirty years (ending in 1982 instead of 1972).484 As all parties
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knew, the Curry Company’s contract with the Park Service enhanced its ability to obtain
financing from external sources.485
The concessioner’s spending spree put the Park Service’s funding struggles in
stark relief. Most Mission 66 funds went to infrastructure instead of personnel; thus,
despite visitor totals doubling between 1941 and 1959, the park employed more
permanent rangers in 1941 (twenty-three) than it did in 1959 (twenty-two). As if an
afterthought, a New York Times article about the concessioner’s building program added,
“[t]he Park Service itself has not been idle….[I]t has added several camp grounds in a
continuing process.”486 Juxtaposed with the Curry Company’s impressive new
complex—which took two percent of its NPS’s total budget to complete—landscaped
patches of dirt seemed trivial by comparison.
Yet the Curry Company’s almost manic activity did aid the Park Service’s
interpretive program. Mission 66 scholars often focus on visitor centers, and justifiably
so; they are prime examples of the agency’s attempts to mesh midcentury architecture
with conservation education.487 Despite criticisms of Mission 66’s excessive modernity,
many—including Ronald F. Lee, the Park Service’s chief of interpretation—touted visitor
centers as part of a larger effort to reconnect Americans to their natural history. In 1956
Lee addressed the nation’s slippage into a “void, symbolized by concrete and asphalt.”
The solution, he explained, lay in “magazines like American Heritage and Life…films
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like Walt Disney’s Beaver Valley and Bear Country…paper-back books like the Golden
Nature Series; but… most of all from the interpretive program of the National Park
Service.”488 Visitor centers made park resources efficient, entertaining, and easily
digestible.
In Beaver Valley (1950) and Bear Country (1953), parts of Disney’s “True Life
Adventures” film series, presented tame visions of nature meant to educate younger
audiences. This vision for Mission 66 visitor interfaces found its ideal expression in
Yosemite Valley, which one writer dubbed “nature’s Disneyland” (“the only tract of
virgin wilderness with a built-in delicatessen and a bakery”).489 All along the New
Village’s promenade, opportunities to eat, shop, and learn abounded. Its buildings,
arranged in a horseshoe shape, rarely exceeded two stories. Parking and roads provided
easy ingress and egress. A new approach road for the Village Store arrived by 1964;
crews completed a new parking lot behind the post office the same year.490 A
semicircular road arched through the Village, with three major parking lots providing
immediate access to the Village Store, Degnan's, and the Visitor Center/Museum
complex—thus allowing visitors to stroll from errand to errand in a self-contained
pedestrian environment.491
The museum building had formerly done double duty as the park’s visitor center.
A revamped visitor center—designed by Eldridge Spencer, architect of the Yosemite
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Lodge—arrived in 1967, complete with two auditoriums.492 This new complex served as
a “focal point of visitor contact,” providing “attractive new exhibits,” “free and for-sale
literature,” and a “self-guiding Wildflower Garden.”493 Like Disney’s nature films,
Yosemite Village blurred the line between retail and education, presenting natural history
as yet another feature of a multipurpose mall environment.494 It acquainted tourists “with
elements of nature that could otherwise be strange and frightening.”495
By the end of the 1950s, Curry Company construction had transformed the New
Village into a new kind of downtown. As Conrad Wirth had indicated, though, Mission
66 was to be a joint effort between a federal agency and its private partners. The case of
Yosemite illustrates how the oft-conflicting goals of the National Park Service and the
concessioner could coexist within a single park. Just as the Park Service scored the first
major victory for the Vint plan with its El Portal project, the Curry Company
revolutionized the park’s urban center. The move from the Old to the New Village in
1920s was prompted by the museum, a monument to the Park Service’s educational
mission; fast forward three decades, and little had changed. Curry Company
improvements paved the way for better interpretive facilities, proving why the National
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Figure 44: Yosemite Village, c. 1972. Note the curvilinear entrance road providing ringside
parking to the shops (further east) and the visitor center/museum complex (further west).
Courtesy Yosemite Online Library
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Park Service could never really abandon the Valley: the agency’s message of
conservation needed the largest crowds possible.
--Push and pull between the NPS and the Company produced a recognizable
postwar landscape: a dense downtown with offices and retail outlets, and a model
residential community positioned a short commute away. These competing landscapes
reflected a deep-seeded conflict over the role of automobiles in Yosemite, particularly for
employees. While many workers lived in trailer camps in the Valley, many Company and
Park Service employees lived in residential neighborhoods around Yosemite Village. In
many suburbs, residential development preceded commercial development; in Yosemite
Village, however, the two had grown side by side. There were close to one thousand
year-round employees orbiting the New Village by 1966; this number swelled to two
thousand during the busy summer months.496 Many residents lived within walking
distance of a school, hospital, barbershop, post office, grocery store, and coffee shop—
and, even more importantly, their job.497 The construction of a school (1955), a fire
department (1957), and garden plots for employees on the western edge of the village
further encouraged this distinct neighborhood identity.498 To borrow a term a term from
architectural historian Richard Longstreth, it was a “total environment.” 499
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Yet there was not nearly enough room for everyone that worked in Yosemite
Yosemite Valley. Like many places in the postwar United States, the park faced a
housing shortage. El Portal offered an obvious solution, but Hilmer Oehlmann perceived
the new planned community as a threat to his labor supply. In 1959 Superintendent
Preston dubbed trailer housing in the Valley, especially concessioner housing just south
of Yosemite Village, “a temporary expedient.” Once again he demanded “the removal of
all non-essential ‘housekeeping’ facilities from Yosemite Valley to a new operating base
at El Portal,” citing the soon-to-be-built trailer village as evidence of his concern about
“the pressing housing problem.”500
Curry Company general manager Hilmer Oehlmann objected vehemently, arguing
that the concessioner could not “render satisfactory service to the public in the absence of
trailer housing on the Valley floor.” Unsurprisingly, Oehlmann favored married
employees, whom he considered “more stable than single ones”; the Company often
staggered couples’ duties, so that one worked a “straight shift” and the other worked a
“split shift.” If any couple on a split schedule moved to El Portal, he contended, they
would be forced to purchase a second automobile—“which they hardly would do.”
Oehlmann insisted on keeping his employees near their jobs, suggesting some kind of
“tall planting” to would screen their trailers from visitors.501 The whole argument ended
up a moot point, though: even by 1962, the trailer village remained incomplete “due to
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lack of funds.” Preston retreated to a new position: once housing in El Portal became
available, Company employees would have to vacate the Valley floor.502 Concerns about
the roles of cars in Yosemite spilled over into debates over employee life, displaying the
degree of control that both employers could exercise over their workers’ movements.503
Oehlmann’s comment about married employees revealed some larger truths about
El Portal. Park Service personnel also viewed married employees as more stable; new
housing assignments continued this conflation of family and reliability. In 1959 Preston
laid out the criteria for determining access to new housing in the El Portal area:
One full point for each $1,000 of salary, with decimals to 3 places.
One full point to families where there are both a boy and a girl – one or
both of whom are over 8 years of age.
One full point for each full year of service which is creditable toward
retirement…
Two points for each member of the family. (This includes all those
dependents on the wage earner whether living at home or away at school).
Employees with no dependents considered in competition up to the level
of one bedroom houses (3 rooms total), but not beyond.
Employees with one dependent considered in competition up to the level
of two bedroom houses, but not beyond.504
Clearly, longer-tenured employees with larger salaries remained a high priority. Preston’s
point system also, however, rewarded larger families—particularly those with children of
both sexes; in a rural area with scattered settlement, perhaps he saw an opportunity to
create a balanced gender profile for the much-anticipated El Portal school. Children
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likely made an employee more likely to stay. As Acting Superintendent Keith Neilson
(Preston’s assistant) stated in 1960, El Portal represented the park’s first attempt at
“adequate family housing or space to provide it”; this allowed the NPS to hire married
personnel instead of itinerant single employees.505 Perhaps many Park Service families,
after moving from substandard housing to substandard housing, would fall in love with El
Portal and its promise of a stable living situation, a relatively short commute, new
housing stock, and services that belied the town’s rural setting.506
All told, Mission 66 created thousands of new housing units across the national
park system, many of which were situated in towns like El Portal. In 1967 three Park
Service wives published a guide for living in these residential communities. The booklet
begins by addressing the (presumably female) reader as “new neighbor” and insuring
them “a new community of friends” and “an especially beautiful or historic or interesting
place in which to live,” which constituted “one of the bonuses of NPS life!" The authors
admonish wives not to “intrude into official duties," and they suggest an alternate way to
help their husbands’ careers: "see that his clothes are ready when needed, clean and
neatly pressed." Mindful of the dynamics of small communities, the authors caution
against letting "coffee chats degenerate into gossip sessions or comparisons of
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Figure 45: New homes El Portal in the early 1960s. Yosemite Resource
Management, El Portal Historic Resource Study (Yosemite, Calif.: National
Park Service, 2011)
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advancements and careers” because “[t]he NPS needs all phases of operation in order to
function properly."507 It was assumed that National Park wives, like many women in
postwar America, were completely fulfilled by their husbands’ careers.508
Before long, El Portal boasted its own social networks. The El Portal Garden Club
began meeting around January 1961, only shortly after the completion of the first plot of
trailer sites. Topics of discussion varied widely: state parks, Christmas gift ideas,
houseplants, and driftwood sculpture headlined some of their agendas. One meeting in
February 1963 featured a Speed-o-knit machine “demonstrated by a representative of the
Taft Sewing Center of Fresno”; attendees were invited to “show or model home made or
hand knitted clothing.”509 Social organizations like the Garden Club highlight the many
varieties of unpaid female labor—sewing, decorating, holiday planning. It made perfect
sense, then, that these women occupied a town designed to move “housekeeping”
functions out of Yosemite Valley. Life on the fringes of a city also ensured plenty of time
in the car, another form of work for women in El Portal.510
Despite the commute, emphasis on nuclear families, and daytime social clubs, a
major aspect of postwar suburbia evaded El Portalians—federal and concessioner
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employees alike. Essential to Yosemite but technically not a part of it, their town lay in a
kind of liminal state. The site’s byzantine land laws meant that, no matter how entrenched
they were, employees could not own their land—only the structures on it.511 As more
permanent units became available, a question remained: if employees could not truly own
their property, then how could they finance it? As early as January 1962, Hilmer
Oehlmann posed a plan to skirt this issue. He would offer employees “assistance in
disposing of their equity in the houses when their employment was terminated,” but
would also allow employees to negotiate a sale by themselves; failing that, Oehlmann
figured that the Company could “purchase the equity and assume payments until a
successor owner could be found.”512
The inability to own property hurt home values in El Portal. Indeed, in 1963, the
nine units available in El Portal averaged roughly a quarter of the median home price in
California.513 By March of 1964, Harold Ouimet—head of housing for the
concessioner—noted his optimism regarding “negotiations between N.P.S., Curry
Company and F.H.A. toward the creation of a family housing development in El Portal.”
He envisioned a plan that would allow employees to build in El Portal through financing
with the Federal Housing Authority; although neither the employee nor the FHA would
own title to the land, the Curry Company would guarantee the loan to the FHA (plus
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guarantee to purchase any outgoing employee’s equity).514 While this particular
arrangement did not materialize, the Senate passed a bill in 1968 that extended leases of
home sites from thirty to fifty-five years; its sponsor, Rep. Harold T. ‘Bizz’ Johnson (DCA), aimed to help employees acquire loans for home construction (since they could not
borrow against the equity of their property).515 El Portal was not an especially easy place
to put down roots. Despite the cooperation of agencies like the FHA, the suburban dream
of home ownership remained elusive.
Relocated from the dense confines of the Valley, these NPS and concessioner
employees confronted social and physical isolation, bad commutes, and difficult
financing while also inventing social rituals befitting a typical suburban community.516
They also took their place—whether intentionally or not—in a larger pattern of postwar
residential development around the nation.517 However, simply slapping the ‘suburban’
label on the town undersells its impact. El Portal was the most tangible success of the
Vint plan yet. Like many Cold War enclaves, it was a product of federal legislation and
financing; however, it was designed to save the metaphorical city—not supplant it. While
many of the nation’s newest converts to environmentalism lived in suburbs, El Portal was
one of the few such communities that actually eased overdevelopment in a nearby
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national park.518 It was a suburb, but also a company town; it created space in the Valley,
yet it also made cars more important than ever before to the park’s basic functions. Like
most parts of Mission 66 in Yosemite, El Portal simultaneously lessened dependence on
the Valley and reinforced the importance of a downtown district. After all, where else
would El Portalians work?
--El Portal provided even more proof of the uneasy relationship between cars and
conservation in Yosemite. Cars embodied the possibility of decentralization, both for
employees and visitors. Internal combustion could thus help Yosemite Valley by
distributing human impact far and wide. By midcentury it was evident that the National
Park Service was not an environmentalist organization; its mission was too complex, its
political support too tenuous. Groups like the Sierra Club, however, had no problem
reminding affluent Americans of their responsibility to other life forms and future
generations. The controversial modernization of the Tioga Road—and attendant
development in Yosemite’s high country—showcased the complicated role of
environmental activists in the debate over the Valley’s decentralization.519
John Muir famously founded the Club in 1892. To boost membership, Sierra Club
officials began to organize outings in the early twentieth century. The first official Club
outing took place in 1901 around Tuolumne Meadows, a splendid (and little-visited)
subalpine ecosystem perched just to the west of the Sierra Crest. From a base camp along
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the Tuolumne River, club members took day trips into the surrounding mountains; in the
evenings, they listened to lectures around the campfire. The Sierra Club established a
campground and later a library on the site of Soda Springs (a naturally-carbonated
upwelling in a scenic meadow), and from that spot originated hundreds of skiing, hiking,
mountaineering, and botanizing trips.520
As jealous defenders of Yosemite, Club officers tried to improve the park in any
way possible—even the burdensome and poorly-funded task of private land
acquisition.521 After World War II the Sierra Club assisted the Park Service in acquiring
large tracts of land near Tuolumne Meadows.522 The Tioga Road would be modernized
roughly a decade later, threatening the Club’s control over their favorite part of
Yosemite.
Owned by the Park Service since 1915, the Tioga Road was mostly paved by
midcentury—notwithstanding a twenty-one mile portion extending westward from
Tuolumne Meadows. Preston believed an improved trans-Sierra route would siphon
crowds from the Valley; accordingly, the park’s Mission 66 plans called for tripling the
number of campsites elsewhere in the park—with Tuolumne Meadows shouldering much
520
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of the burden.523 Each year, the plowing of the Tioga Road marked the start of summer in
California.524 Yosemite’s superintendents received an “annually recurring plea” from
surrounding towns hungry for tourist dollars.525 Yet for the road to open, the California
Department of Highways had to plow the road that climbed 3,000 feet from Highway 395
to the Pass. Responding to overwhelming support from communities near and far, the
state agreed to upgrade this route in the late 1950s; it would be “the largest cost highway
job ever performed in the district.”526
Construction on the unfinished stretch began in 1957, spurring concessioner
development at White Wolf that exists to this day.527 The Park Service’s Mission 66
funds provided improvements for the Tuolumne Meadows campground, new walk-in
camping sites near the outlet of Tenaya Lake, and a trail connecting Tenaya Lake to the
Tuolumne Meadows area.528 These new facilities drew their fair share of users, and in
1961 Tioga Pass showed the greatest increase in usage of any park entrances: almost
thirty-five percent.529
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The same year that construction started on the Tioga Road, Director Wirth
preempted his critics by publishing a large color brochure entitled The National Park
Wilderness. After the victory against the Echo Park dam, the environmental movement—
and particularly wilderness advocates—gained considerable strength. Unsurprisingly,
Wirth’s assertion that Mission 66 was actually a win for the wilderness movement fell on
deaf ears; early in 1958 David Brower, the head of the Sierra Club, penned a scathing
rebuttal in National Parks Magazine. The Club was particularly incensed at the proposed
widening of the Tioga Road near Tenaya Lake, a process that would involve the
destruction of glacially-polished granite around one of the High Sierra’s most scenic
lakes. The famed photographer Ansel Adams, another Sierra Club member, published yet
another anti-Park Service screed in National Parks Magazine late in 1958 in which he
urged the agency to re-dedicate itself to its original mission.530 Other members argued
that, like the Valley’s urban attractions, the new highway would attract undesirable
visitors like “the restless driver…and trailer tourist.”531
The idea that a road could actually help Yosemite Valley was incompatible with
the Sierra Club’s aggressive postwar stance.532 Yosemite’s superintendents, however, had
always cultivated allies outside the park.533 In 1959 Superintendent Preston marshaled
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these connections in defense of the road’s modernization. He reiterated that support for
the project “came from the California State Chamber of Commerce, local city and county
chambers of commerce, such as Merced, Fresno, and others, County Supervisors, State
Senators and Assemblymen, as well as other groups and organizations,” demonstrating
that “groups other than the Sierra Club are extremely interested in what goes on in
National Parks.”534
The Tioga Road was finished in 1961. The Assistant Secretary of the Interior cut
the ribbon, remarking that—if the Service had to build roads—“they might as well be
good ones.” The Curry Company newspaper touted the road’s “gentle curves” and
“scenic turnouts” with “diagrammatic plaques for identification of points of interest.”535
Like other Mission 66 projects within the park, the Tioga Road made nature accessible
through a civilized veneer. The signage, “[l]ocated where there are outstanding views or
interesting geological or historical sites” and “easily seen or read from ample parking
spaces,” epitomized the auto-centric philosophy of the program. Signs “resembled the
granite mountains,” and—thus—“do not intrude on the scene.”536

534

Quoted in Runte, Embattled Wilderness, 197.
“Completed,” Yosemite Sentinel, 30 June 1961.
536
“Sign Language,” Yosemite Sentinel, 28 July 1961. This symbol of interpretation and promotion
mingling in the built environment gestated in Yosemite, but spread elsewhere; the park’s sign shop (slated
for removal to El Portal) utilized a new combination of sand-blasting, tinting, and coating; at the time, it
served all other western parks, ensuring the dispersal of this new signing vocabulary. David Louter’s
Windshield Wilderness and Paul Sutter’s Driven Wild both investigate the relationship between
roadbuilding and nature in midcentury America. Louter’s account is more of a technical primer on three
different road-planning paradigms within the Park Service; Sutter argues that wilderness advocacy in the
1930s and beyond coalesced around an opposition to roads in wild areas (rather than an ethereal and
aesthetic defense of nature).
535

211

Figure 46: The Tioga Road at Olmsted Point, one of the most popular overlooks in the park. Note how the
highway seamlessly melds into a large pullout. Brian Grogan, 2001. Courtesy Library of Congress,
HABS/HAER collection
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Figure 47: Aerial photograph of Tuolumne Meadows looking southwest, 1967. Notice how the Tioga Road
(lower right corner) cuts through the subalpine scenery. Courtesy NPGallery Digital Archive
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Along with its opposition to the Echo Park dam, the fight over the Tioga Road
would cement the Sierra Club’s transformation from a hiking club to a national political
force; it would also prove useful in refining the language of the bill that would eventually
become the Wilderness Act, passed in 1964.537 The Act, which prohibited roads,
motorized vehicles, permanent structures, and timber harvesting (while greatly restricting
mining activity), essentially excluded technology from certain federal lands.538 When
postwar bureaucrats like Vint, Drury, Kittredge, and Preston talked about decentralizing
Yosemite Valley, they implicitly put their faith in the automobile as the best chance of
changing visitor (and employee) patterns. Unwittingly, then, the Sierra Club’s arguments
against the Tioga Road aligned them with the Curry Company. Both groups accepted the
Valley’s urbanization as a permanent fact, the Company for reasons of profit and the
Club for reasons of pragmatism.
--The decentralization of Yosemite Valley remained a pipe dream, especially given
the popularity of the Curry Company’s overnight accommodations; concessioner lodging
reached its peak pillow counts in 1962, staying relatively static until the mid-seventies.
However, some evidence suggests that the National Park Service’s quest for an
“efficient” visitor experience (featuring better roads and a new visitor center) did
convince postwar visitors to shorten their stays. In the 1950s, sixty percent of visitors
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stayed overnight; by 1975, however, only forty percent stayed longer than one day.539
The elimination of Valley overflow camping in the late 1960s helped to limit the
overnight population, as well.540 By 1970 campsites outside the Valley became more
popular, perhaps owing to the backpacking boom amongst members of the
counterculture.541 And yet, as we will see in the next chapter, descriptions of the Valley’s
city-like atmosphere persisted.
Yosemite’s Mission 66 projects further blurred the lines between the park and the
sprawling metropolitan areas outside its gates. Yet Curry Company and Park Service
officials disagreed vehemently over how to modernize Yosemite Valley. The
concessioner favored a more compact downtown, cultivating a pedestrian retail
environment that encouraged visitors to spend money; the NPS, however, sought to
disperse tourists, services, and employees throughout the park and—ultimately—lessen
visitor impact. The Sierra Club weighed in, as well, opposing the improved Tioga Road
that promised to siphon visitors away from the overcrowded Valley.
Despite their disagreements, though, all parties tacitly acknowledged the primacy
of the automobile in Yosemite. As auto registrations rose nationwide (and especially in
California), cars reshaped patterns of work and play; John C. Preston other advocates of
the Vint plan hoped that the same would hold true within Yosemite. Yet whether or not
he could deconstruct the city center that had accumulated on the Valley floor, Preston—
and his combatants in the Curry Company and the Sierra Club—saw the writing on the
539
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wall: postwar visitors would use their cars to utilize the entire park, for better or for
worse.
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Chapter 5
“Ghetto Yosemite”: San Francisco and the Development of the Park’s Police Force,
1960–1970

The addition of El Portal, the historical village at Wawona, and the modernized
Tioga Road did nothing to quell criticisms of Yosemite Valley’s urbanity. As the 1960s
progressed, critics focused less on the park’s built environment and more on certain types
of visitors. Administrative responses to new classes of tourists created an even more
urban environment, transforming park rangers into a makeshift metropolitan police force.
The superintendents’ office changed the image of the park and its rangers forever through
alliances with metropolitan police forces around California. A host of urban areas—
Oakland, Berkeley, Fresno, Merced, Los Angeles—shared expertise, manpower, and
extensive knowledge of California’s criminal networks. Yet none loomed larger than San
Francisco, the breeding ground of the Park Service’s newest enemy: the hippie.542
Urban rioting throughout the nation, and some soul-searching by President
Lyndon Johnson, provide another layer of context for this chapter. America’s racial
tensions grabbed headlines as major American cities—Los Angeles, Detroit, and even
Washington, D.C.—turned into occupied zones. The workings of white flight, in place
since the inception of the Federal Housing Authoring in the 1930s, continued to separate
America into two societies: one white and suburban, the other black and urban.
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Complaints about Yosemite City, then, reflected much broader doubts about the future of
America’s metropolitan areas.543
Yosemite Valley’s urbanization in the 1960s occurred at three different scales.
Most immediately, Yosemite’s crowds—featuring new levels of misbehavior—created a
city-like atmosphere that caused employees and visitors alike to fear for their safety. At
the state level, park rangers joined a regional intelligence network including city police
departments, county sheriffs, and the California Highway Patrol; these external agencies
viewed Yosemite as merely another site of potential hippie misdeeds. At the same time,
the entire country witnessed riots that would forever link cities with civil unrest. On July
4, 1970, hippies and park rangers clashed in Stoneman Meadow, a popular youth hangout
at Yosemite Valley's eastern end. Deemed “the Stoneman riot,” the confrontation
instantly garnered national attention. Not since the damming of Hetch Hetchy had
Yosemite’s reputation as a sanctuary been so publicly challenged.544
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--As the sixties began, crime in Yosemite hit close to home. Without any consistent
connection regional and national arrest records, hiring officials had no way of knowing
whether potential employees were seasoned criminals. This uncertainty created one of the
park’s biggest criminal populations; in fact, employees committed forty-three percent of
Yosemite’s crime in 1958, and thirty-three percent in 1959.545 This trend had changed
little by 1961, when rangers discovered that “a surprising number of concessioner
employees” had either active warrants for their arrest or prior felony convictions. That
year, four employees of the concessioner committed a grand theft and a burglary,
victimizing their own employer—the Curry Company—in each case.546
Befitting tradition, Ranger Ben Twight described Yosemite Valley in the summer
of 1961 as “a city of 25,000 persons” with amounts of thefts, burglaries, and stolen
property that “compared quite similarly” with nearby Merced. He noted one important
caveat, though: excepting “transient types employed in the kitchens and on other
concessioner cleanup crews,” the Valley’s population had no “lower strata” of its
population. Generalizing, Twight asserted that cooks employed by the concessioner
“were the most common type of employee in serious trouble,” noting that rangers had
discovered three such individuals with hidden felony records; the FBI arrested one for
embezzlement after he fled, and another escaped with over $300 from the Village Store.
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A night watchman for the Curry Company even stole a car in the park! Twight also
lashed out at other concessioner employees, citing a night watchman who somehow
missed a rather conspicuous stolen car—with “expired license plates and both wind
wings kicked out”—on his nightly rounds for two weeks until a ranger from another
district eventually noticed it. Perhaps owing to a Park Service bias, employees of the
Yosemite Park & Curry Company came to embody misbehavior of all kinds. If Yosemite
Valley was a city, then they constituted its “lower strata.”547
With these homegrown evildoers and their enablers right under their noses,
Yosemite’s rangers felt understandably underprepared. The job ‘park ranger’ remained
impossibly broad, and—while some specialized in law enforcement—their training
remained minimal.548 Only one permanent ranger was assigned to criminal investigation
for the entirety of the 1961.549 That same year, Valley District Ranger Robert Branges
called for more “crime prevention and analysis.”550 Twight put it even more succinctly:
“most Service personnel presently assigned to this park are not too familiar with modern
police investigative methods and policy.”551 As an alternative, he suggested that
only rangers who show interest and talent in the detection and prevention
of offenses, who take an interest in learning who and what belongs where,
and who take an interest in getting to know and know about the local
people (particularly those who might be involved in some offense or have
been involved before coming here)…be assigned to patrol duty.
547
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In his view, rangers with “one or two days of FBI training” who were subsequently sent
off to a campground or entrance station experienced “very little contact with actual police
work.” Instead, he recommended that incoming seasonal rangers train in “non-patrol”
jobs, receiving the FBI training only when they graduated to a patrol vacancy in
subsequent years.552 This tension between public contact and law enforcement would lead
to a seismic shift in the time-honored image of the National Park Service ranger.
Aside from restructuring the workforce, both Twight and Branges maintained that
new technology—whether in the form of training, equipment, or expertise—could help
Yosemite’s law enforcement woes. Twight suggested that officials vary the annual
training program to include “defensive tactics, use of firearms, interrogation, and
investigation.”553 With a mixture of pride and dismay, Branges noted the purchase of “a
deluxe ‘black-light kit,’” which rangers used twice—albeit unsuccessfully—to lay a trap
for burglars.554 But perhaps the most important new form of technology was not any
singular innovation, but rather an increasing camaraderie with law enforcement agencies
in California and beyond.
A major milestone came in the fall of 1961, when a representative of the
Department of Justice (writing from Sacramento) requested that Yosemite’s rangers
submit crime reports, thus adding “to the overall modus operandi picture in the State.” He
suggested that, due to the “large number of transients” frequenting the park, Yosemite’s
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crime reports could be “correlated with other offenses in California.”555 This simple
suggestion spoke volumes about changing perceptions of Yosemite. Owing to the state
highway system, the park had become increasingly accessible to visitors from all corners
of the state (and beyond). The newfound crime problem in the Valley, however, linked
Yosemite and its guardians to surrounding metropolitan areas in an entirely new way.
Even if park rangers failed to submit their reports, they relied on other districts to
provide important information. Investigations often created a tangle of connections across
the state. In the summer of 1961, rangers arrested two juveniles and—after checking with
San Diego police—discovered prior offenses. In the suspects’ cars, they found a license
plate from Visalia, which had been stolen in Long Beach. A Deputy U.S. Marshal arrived
to take the pair to Sacramento.556 In just one arrest, rangers traced perpetrators’ tracks
through four of California’s biggest metropolitan areas. This delicate dance involved
dated technology by today’s standards, but it succeeded in creating new intelligence
nonetheless. Airmail helped to cross-reference records with the FBI, but telephone and
teletype often sufficed to communicate with urban police departments or the California
Bureau of Criminal Identification.557 In several instances, this knowledge sharing made
the difference between jail time and a simple slap on the wrist; locating records in other
jurisdictions allowed prosecutors to escape a generic disorderly conduct charge (under
the Code of Federal Regulations) and prosecute violators to the fullest
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Figure 48: The greater Yosemite region, from a Park Service brochure, 1961. Notice the relatively straight line
eastward from San Francisco to Yosemite, as well as numerous outlying towns much closer. Courtesy of the
Yosemite Online Library
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extent of the law (using the California Penal Code).558 After one particularly tricky case,
Twight expressed his gratitude for the opportunity “to get acquainted with various local
police agencies outside the Park.” It was “a good education for this ranger,” he added.559
Connections with other enforcing bodies created a sense of mutual dependence
and shared responsibility. Puzzled by an uptick in car burglaries in Yosemite, Chief
Ranger Elmer Fladmark asked the sheriffs of Madera, Merced, Fresno, Tuolumne, Mono,
Tulare, and Kern counties if they had experienced a similar trend; he had a feeling that an
experienced thief was working a single location for one or two days and then simply
moving to “another resort.”560 Even if these intra-agency connections failed to produce
any important information, they proved successful in other ways. In late 1961, Fladmark
took pains to thank Mariposa-based officers of the Highway Patrol for driving to El
Portal—the farthest eastern point in their jurisdiction—to stake out “one of our local
drinking drivers who just doesn’t learn.” No arrests were made, but the presence of a
CHP vehicle outside the suspect’s whereabouts reinforced the sense of surveillance
network larger than the Park Service itself could provide.561
When Ranger Twight mentioned that Yosemite and Merced shared similar crime
rates, he neglected to mention the longstanding partnership between each city’s law
enforcement professionals. One ranger thanked Chief of Police Ralph Bond for the
“thoughtful assistance” their department provided to Ranger Twight (who was charged
with creating a summary of park-wide law enforcement trends in 1961). The Merced
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Police Department also helped Twight with “record and report creation, fingerprint
creation, [and] investigation advice”; they also invited him to meetings of the Central San
Joaquin Investigators Association, welcoming him into a larger brotherhood of regional
law enforcement officials.562 Consisting primarily of social meetings over at places like
Lucca’s Restaurant (Madera, a smaller city near Fresno), the group gathered to “discuss
and exchange ideas on cases presently being investigated.” The informal group was
known to break difficult cases—often over heaping plates of prime rib.563 The downside
of Yosemite’s rising criminal activity was obvious enough. On the plus side, however,
law enforcement agencies near and far began to recognize rangers’ potential
contributions to statewide intelligence efforts. If Yosemite Valley had become a city, at
least it was in good company.
Yosemite’s crime problem radiated even farther outward, touching federal
authority as well. Late in the summer of 1961, Fladmark contacted chief rangers at Grand
Canyon, Sequoia, Lassen, Crater Lake, Death Valley, and Lake Mead to warn them of a
prolific car burglar; he included the subject’s modus operandi; his vehicle’s make, model,
and license number; and his physical description.564 Graduates of the FBI National
Academy seemed to gravitate to Yosemite, with one—Granville Liles—serving briefly as
assistant superintendent.565 As part of his attempts to improve park policing, Twight
suggested that another academy graduate, Bruce Hiller, be made “technical advisor for
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the ranger assigned to investigation work.”566 Despite the annual FBI training for
seasonal rangers, this new influx of interurban intelligence, technical training, and
enforcement expertise suggested a sea change in the position of park ranger. Yosemite
National Park, no longer isolated, became a part of larger networks designed to identify,
track, and apprehend criminals. A crime problem, a police force, and a (summertime)
population comparable to nearby cities announced Yosemite Valley as something more
than just a getaway.
--Even those convinced of Yosemite Valley’s urbanity noted that it failed to
compare in one crucial aspect: violent crime. Ranger Twight, pondering this exact
question in 1962, argued that the low rate of violence stemmed from “a generally low
percentage of the skid row and unskilled laboring class of people in the visitor
population.”567 Twight, and many of his co-workers, assumed that most of Yosemite’s
visitors knew how to behave themselves; it was the rangers’ job to ensure that these
innocents could enjoy their visit safely and securely. The thought of violence within the
park remained blissfully far from administrators’ and rangers’ thoughts.568
Even without violence, the sixties provided plenty to police. Those with potential
to upend the park’s preferred moral code suffered discrimination—or expulsion—at the
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hands of the ranger force. Homosexuals, “an evil we have each year without fail,” elicited
quick and decisive action.569 Indeed, a group of one hundred motorcyclists held “a
homosexual party” in the park in 1960; when they returned in 1961, the District Ranger
told them to leave.570 People without traditional family structures clashed with traditional
Park Service morals. Flagmark pledged to throw the book at two un-chaperoned
juveniles, less for their offenses (possession of drugs and stolen property) than for their
non-compliance with norms of “family type patronage” encouraged by park brass.
Rangers, he argued, needed to make an example of these two juvenile offenders—if word
of ranger leniency got around, it would “only encourage such people to come to
Yosemite.571
The phrase “such people” indicates a rather elastic cast of persona non grata,
subject to revision according to changing administrative priorities. “Such people” proved
a narrower title as the sixties wore on. Juveniles, particularly those without their parents,
proved a continuing thorn in the rangers’ sides. In early 1962, Twight noticed an uptick
in a “rowdy, hoodlum type of youth” recognizable by “their ‘hot rod’ type cars, and
‘duck-tailer’ or flat-top haircuts.” As to why these miscreants might visit the park instead
of other their “former haunts” (like Santa Cruz), Twight summarized Yosemite’s
magnetism: “it was cheap, one could stay, swim, drink and pursue the girls for a very low
cost.” Indeed, the summer of 1960 saw… In addition, former areas popular for these
ne’er-do-wells were experiencing curfews and “police crackdowns”—things that would
not trouble them in Yosemite Valley. Twight warned his superiors that, unless rangers
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made similar crackdowns, increasing numbers of “young delinquent types” would
descend on the park.572
When pressed for more specific descriptions, rangers often turned to popular
stereotypes in order to create a visual picture of undesirable characters. Beatniks,
synonymous with San Francisco’s North Beach neighborhood, came to symbolize
everything wrong with young people—in the park and across the nation.573 In the summer
of 1960, a ranger working road patrol encountered “five boys of the beatnik type and
appearance riding motorcycles, with extremely high handlebars” on the road to Wawona;
without specifying any violations, he simply noted their “outward appearance of being
beatniks or trouble makers.”574 By early 1961, rangers began to act on this classification.
Branges, the Valley District Ranger, shared a solution that “always seemed to work”:
escort the suspected beatniks to the park boundary, take their permits, and tell them not to
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come back.575 It gradually became common knowledge that Yosemite National Park
reserved the right to refuse service to anyone.
Even young visitors without motorcycles, cars, or flat-tops caught rangers’ eyes.
In early 1961, Branges expressed concern over a new camping trend: parents who arrived
with their children on the weekend, then left them unsupervised in Yosemite Valley
during the work week (presumably returning the following weekend to collect them).
Unattended males often banded together in “roving packs,” chasing young women and
causing what Branges described as “questionable” behavior.576 Rangers broke up at least
ten fights in 1960. One melee at a dance—which Fladmark blamed on “increased
patronage by drinking, unsupervised juveniles”— involved roughly twenty-five
people.577 Even organized sporting clubs turned ugly when alcohol was available. A ski
club from Merced, all under the age of twenty-one and many under eighteen, acquired “a
large quantity of beer” while visiting the Yosemite Lodge. Not surprisingly, park rangers
corresponded with Merced’s police force regarding the proper dispositions of these
troublemakers.578
Struggles with young visitors continued to intensify. Between June 1963 and June
1964, rangers responded to over 400 incidents of juvenile disorder; local Park Service
officials noted that this statistic placed Yosemite on par with many cities, although any
other community with this kind of problem would have a staff as large as Yosemite’s
entire ranger force dedicated specifically to juvenile crime. Rangers continued to receive
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training regarding “how to handle young people who come to Yosemite, throw their
weight around and get into trouble.”579 In late 1965, following Twight’s invitation in
1961, seven of Yosemite’s rangers attended a meeting of the Central San Joaquin
Investigators Association; prompted by a Hells’ Angels rendezvous in the resort town of
Bass Lake the previous summer, representatives of the Madera County Sheriff’s Office
presented their plans for “preventing any untoward acts of violence and vandalism” in the
future.580 Yosemite’s rangers still struggled to control younger visitors, which had
become their most fundamental task.
In another instance of low-tech technological improvement, Yosemite’s brain
trust introduced a horse patrol in 1966. As any visitor knows, the sight of a ranger on
horseback is a quintessential national park experience; rangers, however, had more than
just public relations in mind. Horse patrol, then, marked the tipping point between
rangers’ dual duties as garrulous interpreters of natural wonders and protectors of the
peace. The first mounted patrol of Yosemite’s campgrounds took place on June 23, 1966.
From his perch, the ranger issued over one thousand greetings to “every type of camper
and all ages,” receiving a “great and genuine” response expressing “[r]espect and
admiration for the man in uniform and his beautiful horse.”
Rules were enforced and done so effectively. Several underage, possession
of alcohol camps were discovered and removed from the park. Speeding
through the camp and vehicles with loud mufflers were controlled without
difficulty. Campground boundaries and dog rules were easily handled.
Respect of the Ranger on a horse is noticeably different from that of one in
a patrol car.581
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And so the horse patrol proved its value. After initial skepticism of mounted patrol’s
anticipated expenses (both money- and manpower-wise), Park Service officials
begrudgingly noted that—aside from their visual appeal—horses also allowed rangers to
“observe a greater area due to being able to see over the tops of vehicles.”582 In terms of
respect, the results were equally unanimous; a mounted ranger noted receiving “much
less static” from young people while enforcing anti-loitering statutes.583 Horses allowed
rangers to see and be seen, each action enforcing desired standards of behavior in the
country’s busiest national park.584
No one could deny that the horse patrol made law enforcement more efficient. At
the beginning of the summer of 1967—the first full summer of horse patrol in
Yosemite—one ranger noted that horses could actually help the park overcome its
manpower problems. In addition to providing visibility, horses were themselves quite
visible, providing “the desired deterrent in a preventive law enforcement program.” The
conspicuous image of a horse helped stop potential lawbreakers, but increased publicity
of the mounted patrol extended influence beyond park boundaries, as well. Park officials
sent four mounted rangers to Mariposa’s County Fair Parade during the summer of 1967,
announcing the park’s modernized enforcement techniques to all in attendance.
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Participants reported “many favorable comments about our mounted patrol unit being
there, our equipment, and our personal appearance.”585 Yosemite’s mounted rangers
meshed public relations with preemptive social control in a fashion that an ordinary
ranger—on foot or in a car—simply could not.
--Drastic changes in rangers’ duties signaled a larger change in the idea of
Yosemite itself. In 1961 Twight posited that, since the crime rate was rising across the
country, it stood to reason that it would rise in Yosemite, as well.586 This is a completely
logical hypothesis, but it reveals a new kind of thinking about the park: rather than a
refuge from nationwide trends, it was an embodiment of them. A few years later, the
authors of Yosemite’s master plan put an even finer point on the topic, observing that the
Valley had become “almost urban in character.”587 By 1966, Yosemite’s chief naturalist
argued that the Valley “must be considered a city park.”588 This was not a new idea, but
the sixties produced a new iteration of it. In the place of “the incomparable valley” was a
crowded, crime-ridden strip of land, roughly seven miles long and a half-mile wide,
complete with its own police force and a population density on par with many other
major cities.589
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In June 1966, the Wall Street Journal brought the urban metaphor to national
audiences with an article entitled “Severe Overcrowding Brings Ills of the City to Scenic
Yosemite.”590 Park brass took issue with the authors, who described the Valley as a “skid
row,” claimed the park saw roughly one murder per year, and quoted a ranger as saying
he “didn’t join the Service to be a lousy cop.” Journalists from nearby newspapers like
the Modesto Bee and Fresno Bee took notice; national outlets, like NBC, CBS, and
Forbes magazine, clamored for comment, as well. The superintendent stressed that park
personnel “should be prudent and cautious” in their remarks to the press. In particular, he
instructed them to emphasize that Yosemite Valley only constituted some seven of the
park’s 1,189 square miles, and that—even in the Valley—visitors could still find
solitude.591 Even as Park Service officials and rangers compared their park to a city, they
could not let media outlets think they had accepted this condition.
The metaphor spread far and fast. One writer suggested that the Valley closely
resembled “an urban amusement park,” with hot rods, marijuana, and rock music
assaulting the senses on a daily basis.592 Other visitors complained about the air quality,
noting that the Valley's smog rivaled that of Los Angeles.593 Tents, normally seen as
symbols of pastoral contentment, took on different connotations. A Texan bemoaned
preeminent work on cities and nature—and perhaps environmental history, in general—is William
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numerous campgrounds crowding visitors “as in a city in dwellings that would be
condemned in any American City.”594 Accusations like “tent slum” and “instant city”
were leveled at the Valley floor.595 One incensed observer compared the scene to “onestory tenements, not unlike Arab refugee camps.”596 A visitor described “Yosemite City,”
replete with “parking problems, traffic snarls, rush hours, gang warfare, slums, and urban
sprawl.”597 Perhaps more than anything the valley felt like a city. Surrounded by high
cliffs and total strangers, many tourists responded with anti-urban rhetoric gleaned from
the decade’s widespread urban unrest. Campgrounds shifted from small groups of likeminded families to sprawling skid rows; nylon tents became concrete tenements, the thin
Valley roads major freeways.
Surrounding cities, San Francisco in particular, provide context for the park’s
supposed urbanity. In 1967, poet and novelist Richard Brautigan gave the park-city
connection a visual form. As part of a project for KQED (San Francisco’s public
television station), Brautigan wrote and narrated a four-part short film entitled “Ghetto
Yosemite.” Stark footage of trash, sidewalks, and windblown neighborhoods
accompanied Brautigan’s free-associative words: “This is Ghetto Yosemite located in the
Western Addition of San Francisco. A lot of poor people live here. This is their Vernal
Fall, their Castle Cliffs, their Inspiration Point[…]”598 With just some suggestive images
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Figure 50: Packed roadside parking over Memorial Day weekend, 1975. Courtesy
NPGallery Digital Archive
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and a creative script, Brautigan expressed the fluidity of the terms ‘park’ and ‘city.’ More
importantly, he counteracted a time-honored tradition of associating Yosemite with
scenic vistas. “Ghetto Yosemite" expressed a connection between the nation’s cities and
its wild places in one pithy metaphor.599
--The San Francisco Bay Area had always been symbolically important to
Yosemite; the Sierra Club, the University of California-Berkeley, and the O’Shaughnessy
Dam (to name but a few) represented a continuing dialogue between the fin de siècle
metropolis and its closest example of the sublime. By the late 1960s, however, this
conversation had a decidedly different tone. A new cultural icon, the hippie, stepped in as
intermediary between city and country.600
Before hippies, though, there were beatniks—the same ones Yosemite’s rangers
had noticed in and around the park. Beat culture first made national headlines in 1958
when Jack Kerouac published On the Road and San Francisco’s district attorney
prosecuted Lawrence Ferlinghetti—owner of City Lights Bookstore—for selling obscene
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material. San Franciscans fretted over new forms of youth socialization that flew in the
face of traditional family values.601 Like hippies later in the decade, the beats would
challenge popular assumptions about work, leisure, and family.602 Not coincidentally San
Francisco’s police department underwent a concurrent change in image and function,
shifting to a professionalized model of urban policing that relied on displays of force.
The tactical squad, or ‘tac’ squad, proved the most noticeable addition to the city’s
landscape.
Arranged in four separate groups of eight, the tac squad dressed its
officers in masked helmets and all-black coveralls and schooled the men
in judo, wrestling, karate, baton use, antisniper control, and house-tohouse combat. Neither City Hall nor the Hall of Justice made any attempt
to downplay the tac squad's physical capabilities. Department leaders
described its members as 'outstanding physical specimens,' and one squad
sergeant summarized, 'We don't want little guys.'603
Despite this menacing countenance, many citizens and reporters threw their support
behind the tactical squad, believing—like Yosemite’s top brass—that more stringent
enforcement could endorse “proper” behavior. Interestingly, enforcement professionals in
both city and park entered the national spotlight due to riots; San Francisco’s tactical
squad made news in 1968 when the Federal Bureau of Investigation utilized squad
leaders as coauthors of its report on riot control.604
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Yosemite’s ranger corps learned a lot about hippies from their colleagues in the
Bay Area.605 It is difficult to tell when park rangers’ concerns narrowed from youths to
hippies in particular but, early in the summer of 1967, Yosemite’s personnel asked the
Regional Solicitor for guidelines in handling this new type of visitor.606 A month later
staff meetings began to include an approximate count of hippies in the park over busy
weekends.607 To learn more about their supposed enemies, the superintendent’s office
again sought help from neighboring law enforcement agencies. In 1967, two rangers—
Steele and Cahill—shadowed police departments in San Francisco, Berkeley, and
Oakland in order to study “'hippies' and juvenile matters” with police departments wellversed on the subject.608 In San Francisco's Haight-Ashbury neighborhood, ground zero
for hippie culture, rangers noted that hippies lived not with families but as tribes, where
“intercourse is freely indulged in by all parties of either sex”; this stood in stark contrast
to beatniks, who preferred to remain somewhat exclusive. As part of their “evangelistic
activities,” hippies welcomed naïve “crashers” into these hedonistic social structures.
Thus, otherwise promising youths flocked to San Francisco as if they were “following a
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pied-piper.”609 Hippies represented a contagion, threatening to influence otherwise wellbehaved children at a moment’s notice.610 Popular perceptions of the burgeoning
subculture readily exacerbated any and all fears—sex, drugs, disconnection—of a
changing nation.611
Steele and Cahill also visited Golden Gate Park, which—owing to its proximity to
the Haight-Ashbury—experienced more than its fair share of hippie visitors.612 Police
officers estimated that “hundreds and sometimes thousands of hippies and teenagers”
slept in the park at night, exacerbating San Francisco’s problems with runaway youths.613
City parks, like Golden Gate Park and Berkeley’s People’s Park, represented havens from
authority; rangers and Park Service officials feared that Yosemite Valley would be
next.614 In many ways, the rangers’ observations resemble anthropological fieldwork,
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attempts to unravel different value systems and ways of life. More importantly, they read
as a tacit denouncement of cities as incubators for physical and moral decay.615
Even members of San Francisco’s municipal government reinforced this
connection between hippies and filth (in multiple senses of the word). In 1967 the city’s
Department of Public Health sent inspectors to 691 buildings in the Haight-Ashbury;
disappointingly for them, they found only 39 houses in need of “sanitary repair.”616 The
following year the Department’s chief of community mental services, J.M. Stubbledine,
penned a report entitled “Health Hazards of the Hippies.” According to him, hippies were
preoccupied by anything filthy: language, appearance, grooming habits, and living
quarters. Stubbledine comes prepared with statistics and anecdotes, noting that, in 1967,
the Haight Ashbury (comprising 0.9% of San Francisco's total population) accounted for
7.6% of the cases of infectious hepatitis citywide; additionally, he blames hippies for
slaughtering one (possibly two) of the buffalo in Golden Gate Park for use in their
“communal cooking pots.” Despite shenanigans like this, Stubbledine seems to possess
sympathy for the subculture he describes as largely white and affluent “expatriots (sic)
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from suburbia” who, after moving to San Francisco for school, fell in with the wrong
crowd.617
Hippies were stereotypically estranged from their parents, especially their
fathers—who, as “white, breadwinning, heterosexual husband[s]”—epitomized the
“model rights-bearing citizen” of the postwar era.618 Younger people visiting Yosemite
without their parents therefore represented a threat to the “family type patronage” that
Park Service personnel had been encouraging for so long. The collaboration between the
park’s police force and their Bay Area compatriots reinforced what sociologist Kristin
Ross calls “the police conception of history”:
The police do their counting statistically: they deal in groups defined by
differences in birth, functions, places, and interests…. These groups, when
counted, make up the social whole—nothing is missing; nothing is in
excess; nothing or no one is left uncounted.”619
Ross’ “police conception” was incredibly useful for law enforcement officials during the
1960s, as it distilled complicated social matters into a system of simple categories. It is
imperative, then, that any attempt to understand the 1960s not fall into the same traps.
The anti-hippie ideology that park rangers inherited from their counterparts is vital—not
just for the spatial connections it illustrates, but also as evidence of how ideologies
harden over time.
Steele and Cahill’s trip to San Francisco, then, shows how the incredible social
and political polarization of late-sixties America pervaded park boundaries. Their
experiences made it clear to them (and, thus, their superiors) that hippies were an urban
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issue, a frightening discovery, given Yosemite Valley’s reputation as a city in its own
right. Thus San Francisco’s police force and city health officials and—by proxy,
Yosemite’s superintendent and his ranger force—joined an intensifying debate over the
future of America’s cities.
--Just as the interchange between Yosemite and San Francisco blurred the line
between wilderness and city, nationwide civil unrest led Americans to conflate many
different kinds of crime. In the beginning of the 1960s, murder and robbery rates rose
conspicuously; the number of African Americans held accountable for these crimes
jumped disproportionately, as well.620 This criminalization of blackness—on top of years
of political, economic, and physical mistreatment—led to rioting in many of the nation’s
biggest metropolitan areas, which had hosted large black populations since the second
Great Migration. In addition to street crime and urban rioting, a third specter haunted the
nation: political protest, beginning with Berkeley’s well-known Free Speech Movement
and culminating in opposition to the Vietnam War. Ascendant conservatives like Ronald
Reagan and Richard Nixon parlayed these three fears into a catch-all cry for “law and
order,” which discredited liberal politicians as soft on criminals and dissidents.621
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Figure 51: Ronald Reagan's stance as California's governor in a nutshell. Yosemite
National Park archives, Protection Division Riot Collection
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American cities—or, at least, their reputation—bore the brunt of this anxiety. This
vague but widespread fear of crime, coupled with quantum leaps in economic and
technological growth, led to worries about the future of the American metropolis. New
patterns of living, enabled by suburbanization, air travel, and a booming service sector,
suggested that center cities might become obsolete.622 If the idea of the metropolis had
indeed passed its prime, what then did America’s historic cities represent? The National
Advisory Commission on Civic Disorders, convened by President Johnson in the wake of
the long, hot summer of 1967, described the inner city as “an environmental jungle.”623
This metaphor proved easily interchangeable with the humid environs of South Vietnam,
where the U.S. military daily trudged through an uncertain war.624 One retired colonel
envisioned American cities as war zones, with “[r]ooftops, windows, rooms high up,
streets low down, and back alleys nearby…a virtual jungle for patrolling police or
military forces at night when hidden snipers could abound.”625 Around this time, the
phrase ‘concrete jungle’ gained widespread currency in popular culture, as well.626 The
divisions and insecurities plaguing the American public provided immense fluidity for
traditional referents like ‘city’ and ‘jungle,’ subtly intermixing the two until they were
almost inseparable. If Yosemite Valley could be a city, then a city could be a jungle, as
well.
This city-bashing led to another major area of debate: urban versus suburban. For
many decades, white Americans had taken advantage of guaranteed loans, improved
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transportation, and unprecedented housing development in their “flight” from the nation’s
inner cities. 1968’s Kerner Report, a dispatch from the crumbling—and largely black—
American metropolis, brought white Americans face to face with “the consequences of
their suburban dreams.”627 While the city-suburb dichotomy paralleled this narrative of
racial prejudice, it also (supposedly) explained the hippie problem: middle-class youths,
bored by their parents’ lifestyles, left the suburbs en masse and headed for cities like San
Francisco.628 Major works from this era, like Jane Jacobs’ The Death and Life of Great
American Cities and William Whyte’s The Organization Man, presupposed that built
environments—be they urban or suburban—obviously influenced their residents’
behavior.629
By 1968, then, a slew of urban riots triggered an existential search for the future
of the American city. Many agreed that, despite their industrial connotations, these
metropolitan scenes resembled jungles: confusing, frightening, and densely packed. The
ongoing quagmire in Vietnam only made jungles more menacing. The broken windows,
shattered glass, and angry faces beamed through the television created a vivid scene,
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but—more importantly—they reinforced the idea that urban environments created a
certain kind of social disorder. When visitors commented on Yosemite Valley’s
“tenements” and “slums,” they vilified more than just the park’s maintenance practices.
In the spirit of the age, which conflated (and exploited) different environments and the
behaviors they provoked, criticisms of the Valley’s built environment acknowledged a
breakdown in traditional terminology. Despite this uncertainty, criticisms of Yosemite
City and concrete jungles suggested a consensus that environments, especially urban
ones, shaped their residents’ actions, often for the worse. In this way, Yosemite Valley—
whether urban, suburban, or wild—fit right in with the dominant narratives of the sixties.
--Visitation swelled to over 2 million in 1968, almost all of whom headed directly
to Yosemite Valley.630 The superintendent’s office moved to curb hippie behavior and
disprove the slogan that “Smokey The Bear is wide open.”631 One newspaper columnist
noted that “rangers were making more raids on hippies than the bears were on food-laden
campgrounds.”632 This campaign reached its apex the night of June 26, as rangers
descended on a group of more than one hundred hippies relaxing in Stoneman Meadow.
Since none were found in possession of drugs, rangers detained younger suspects until
their parents arrived and escorted older ones from the park.633 Almost a month later,
Assistant Superintendent Ted Thompson crowded, “There’s no doubt of the impact this
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drive has had on them [hippies]. Since then, they have been fewer in number and are
enjoying the park as others do.”634
“Enjoying the park as others do” meant visiting with one’s family. The raids of
1968 were blatant attempts to endorse a certain kind of tourism and a certain kind of
tourist. The early 1960s saw an unprecedented recreational boom, with outdoor
recreation—and camping, in particular—leading the way. In 1958, Americans spent $1
billion on camping; by 1972, that number had risen to $105 billion.635 In fact, publishers
launched five new family camping magazines were launched in the year 1960 alone.636
Even lifestyle magazines like Redbook capitalized on this outdoor renaissance. Some
suggested camping as a way to reinforce a family hobby, like fishing or hiking.637 In an
article entitled “Fun and National Strength,” Colonel Adolph H. Humphreys stated that
parents were engaged in “an ideological war” for youthful minds. Outdoor activities like
camping helped combat “televisionitis,” thus teaching youths about the value of fitness in
a relaxed atmosphere.638
The quaint picture of a family camping trip proved difficult to achieve in
Yosemite Valley. In a master plan from the early 1960s, park planners endorsed
“numerous small, family-type campfire circles where groups can get together and share
the experience of the day.”639 By 1968 this family-centric camping philosophy had yet to
produce discernible results:
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We must view campground management as a priority operation for this
summer—it must have priority in our thinking—for everyone on our staff.
There is nothing more important or more pressing than to get
campgrounds under positive control and management. There is implicit in
this all of the thing that bear on the publicity the parks has had with
respect to hippies, drunkeness [sic], violence to persons and property,
smoke and smog, noise and confusion. I believe campground
management, properly applied, will tend to eliminate a lot of things that
have worked against us in the past.640
There was a reason that campgrounds surfaced again and again in visitors’ complaints
about Yosemite City. Theoretically, campgrounds promised an idyllic evening beneath
the stars with only the company of one’s nuclear family; instead, they often provided a
close look at a subculture that many might have preferred to ignore. “The real values of a
park experience” proved elusive, and no changes in the Valley’s built environment could
guarantee their presence.
Yet there is considerable evidence that younger visitors—hippies or not—were
“enjoying the park as others do.”641 Historian Roderick Nash argues that members of the
counterculture actually had more in common with the National Park Service than meets
the eye. Eager to escape society’s “fixation on progress, growth, and competition,”
members of the counterculture viewed wilderness “as a way of resisting the so-called
establishment.”642 As one self-identified ‘hippie’ told a journalist, “I guess we’re like
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everybody else. We’re lovers of nature, too.”643 In search of a more authentic way to live
and think, the counterculture adopted anti-modernist beliefs—in existence since the
Progressive Era—that would form the backbone of the environmental movement.644 In a
sense, then, Yosemite’s campgrounds formed an important bridge to the back-to-the-land
movement in which young people (many of them reared in suburbia) found community in
remote outposts; Table Mountain, a famous commune in Mendocino County, was
actually founded as a safety valve for the inherently unstable Haight-Ashbury scene.645
Nor was there any evidence that younger campers’ activities in Yosemite were
materially different from their older counterparts. Despite the obvious exceptions—all
night parties, acid trips, naked swimming—many younger visitors simply enjoyed the
change of pace that a park campground provided. Visitors on both sides of the generation
gap brought “artifacts and expectations” of everyday life into Yosemite; after all, were
music and drugs that much different from televisions and martini fixings? As one
journalist commented, “[t]he longhair’s loud and showy motorcycle…may be no more
than a modest takeoff on the ostentations 350-horsepower sedan driven by the established
family man.”646
Despite these material similarities, no one could deny that the atmosphere in
Yosemite Valley had changed beyond recognition. In 1968 Yosemite aficionados
nationwide lamented the demise of the firefall, a time-honored park tradition; at night, a
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Curry Company employee at Glacier Point would push a ball of flaming embers off a
cliff as visitors watched it float to the Valley floor. Many complained that this left
nothing for young visitors to do at night, “making Yosemite an old folks home.”647 A
more sarcastic visitor suggested that the Park Service replace the firefall with “a hippie
hanging by the hair from the top of Glacier Point-with a bottle of LSD in one hand and a
switch-blade knife and a tire chain in the other.”648 While Park Service personnel
considered it an artificial spectacle, the firefall represented Yosemite’s salad days—an
antidote to the widespread changes in the visitor experience. More than that, it provided a
wholesome nighttime activity for younger visitors, something in short supply.
1968 saw more changes in the Valley. In an effort to reduce traffic, the eastern
third of Yosemite Valley became a one-way road system; the superintendent’s office
believed this would “reduce the inevitable conflicts between autoists, walkers and hikers,
bicyclists, and saddle horse parties.”649 Superintendent John M. Davis also trumpeted the
unitization of Camp 11, one of the biggest campgrounds in the Valley (with other
campgrounds to follow). Unitized campgrounds held specific numbers of sites, thus
lowering their capacity; before this practice, visitors simply pitched their tents in any
patch of dirt that would fit them. Davis allayed any worries, noting that this project
guaranteed visitors a picnic table, a fire pit, and ranger supervision to prevent “additional
campers crowding in to usurp sites occupied by others.” While site-stealers presented a
major nuisance, Davis minced no words in blaming “juveniles and young adults whose
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only interest in coming to the Park has seemed to be purely selfish.” He promised that
campground improvements, despite limiting the Valley’s capacity, would ultimately aid
those interested in “the real values of a park experience.”650
The announcement of the firefall’s demise, one-way roads, and campground
improvements caused a panic in nearby communities. Rumors flew that the Park Service
planned on excluding visitors from the Valley and barring cars from the park.651 However
exaggerated these rumors were, park concessioners’ business suffered that summer.652
Visitor use also declined, although only one gate—Arch Rock, the entrance most
convenient to the Bay Area—experienced a major drop in numbers. Members of the
business community in Mariposa, the community closest to this entrance, blamed
“reports of hippie invasions,” signs falsely stating that all campgrounds were full, and the
increasingly public nature of Yosemite Valley’s overcrowding.653 These changes to
campsites, roadways, and evening activities were meant to provide a more “authentic”
park experience, especially in campgrounds; however, they terrified economic entities
that relied on tourism to fill their coffers. Would the superintendent’s ploy to control the
Valley pay off, economically or otherwise?654
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Figure 52: Younger visitors likely to be dubbed “hippies” by park administrators
disobey posted rules, 1968. “Hippies Outnumber Bears at Yosemite Park This
Summer,” Anniston (Ala.) Star, 21 July 1968
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The summer of 1969 saw more of the same problems with drugs and liquor, but in
increasing numbers.655 By that summer, patrol rangers had developed a thorough list of
violations commonly perpetrated by hippies in campgrounds, including possession of
marijuana, “dangerous drugs,” or stolen property; harboring runaway juveniles or
individuals wanted by other law enforcement agencies; indecent exposure; underage
possession of alcoholic beverages; and (occasionally) possession of a firearm or another
deadly weapon. Rangers, in return, developed a common set of violations related to park
statues that hippies happened to break most frequently: dirty campsites; too many
individuals per campsite; violation of the seven-day camping limit; unauthorized pets;
and camping out-of-bounds.656 These lesser charges, trivial though they were, helped
rangers enforce proper park aesthetics and social norms.
Rangers’ most valuable new weapon, though, allowed even more room for
interpretation. Taking their cue from the San Francisco Police Department’s battles with
hippies and beatniks, park rangers discovered the wondrous and multifaceted disorderly
conduct charge.657 This broad charge served as a kind of umbrella offense, allowing
persecution of a wide range of unruly behavior; it proved useful as a way of
“controlling…the troublesome hippie types,” especially when the offender’s behavior fell
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short of an assault charge. Rangers grew quite fond of it—between the summer of 1968
and the summer of 1969, arrests and citations based on the disorderly conduct charge
increased almost fivefold.658
Short of the time-honored practice of simply escorting undesirable visitors to the
nearest entrance station, the disorderly conduct charge represented the rangers’ greatest
weapon against a large but loosely organized subculture that threatened Yosemite’s
officially sanctioned value system. After a summer of nationwide unrest, park officials
endorsed particular park uses through changes in the Valley’s built environment; rangers,
on the other hand, used broad discretionary charges—like urban police forces—to control
the hippie population. By the fall of 1970, though, these new levels of social control
would appear tame.
--The “police conception of history” is alive and well in National Park Service
accounts of the riot in Stoneman Meadow. On Friday, July 3, 1970 visitors packed
Yosemite Valley as usual. A crowd of roughly three hundred youths, many conforming
to hippie stereotypes, socialized in Stoneman Meadow—home of the anti-hippie blitz of
1968. Park rangers announced the superintendent's orders that the meadow was to be
cleared by 7:00 p.m. When it came time to enforce the curfew, no one left the meadow.
Park rangers and other employees swept through the meadow, on foot and on horse,
making sure everyone headed their separate ways. Campgrounds that night were quiet.659
The following night saw the same setup. Again, the superintendent decided to
658
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Figure 53: A scene from the riot. “A Blade of Grass in Every Hand,”
Berkeley Tribe, 17–27 July 1970; Yosemite National Park archives,
Protection Division Riot Collection
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enforce a curfew, deeming the meadow's infestation an ecological issue; not surprisingly,
the assembled youths refused to heed the curfew. Rangers on horseback rushed the
crowd, followed by twenty-one NPS employees on foot, armed with mace and ropes. The
crowd threw bottles and rocks in retaliation; a few individuals threw knives, and one
threatened a ranger with an axe. The above photo of the riot, presumably taken after the
Park Service’s initial charge, shows a crowd of young males—some holding sticks, bats,
or other weapons—with their arms raised as if in triumph; it is difficult to identify any
female participants, many of whom had probably left by this point. By 7:40 p.m., all Park
Service personnel fell back, setting up roadblocks as they retreated to stop all traffic to
and from Stoneman Meadow. In turn, some rioters erected a roadblock of their own: a
large bonfire. Local police forces (from places like Madera, Merced, and Fresno
counties), U.S. Marshals, and the California Highway Patrol sent help; all told, 146
individuals from other jurisdictions came to help. Between midnight and 8:00 a.m. on
July 5, rangers searched campgrounds to find anyone involved in the riot; in total, rangers
and other law enforcement officers arrested 138 people. Despite the severity of the
situation, no one suffered anything worse than a laceration.660
At least, that is one version of the story. News of the riot spread rapidly, the
debate influenced by the fresh memories of Los Angeles, Detroit, and Kent State. As
journalist Robert Jones noted, Superintendent Hadley’s report on the riot displayed
considerable “rhetorical sophistication”—like the sentence “21 footmen and 16 horse
patrolmen entered the meadow.” “There are many ways to ‘enter’ a meadow,” he noted,
implying that Hadley was downplaying the violence of his rangers. Jones, a 26-year old
freelancer from the West Coast, was well suited to document the stories of younger
660
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visitors. Another account provided by a college student from the Bay Area suggests a
different story:
About 7:20 P.M. people began screaming and scattering off in all
directions. I stood up and saw rangers running with clubs. They had
surrounded | the meadow and were charging without warning…. I got up
and ran along with everybody else. As I ran I had to duck to avoid the
lassos, and the horses were so close I could have touched them as they
swept by. A friend of mine was not as lucky as I and was trampled by one
of the horses. Many others were struck down and beaten.661
Other witnesses confirmed this account. John Fischer’s widely circulated eyewitness
testimony decried Superintendent Lawrence Hadley’s decision to “order his troops into
such action,” recalling the National Guard’s role in urban riots throughout the sixties.
Fischer, a former state legislator (and a Republican, at that) offered a reminder of the past
decade’s troubles in more personal terms: “[I]f this came about in the peace of one of our
National Parks, how soon shall we dread the middle of the night knock on the door at
home.”662
Once again, more than a trace of fear kicked in as a visitor described Yosemite as
part of the world outside its boundaries. Pro-ranger accounts touched on similar themes.
One visitor railed against “so-called hippies, drug addicts, ordinary thieves, and social
anarchists,” noting that handling a situation like Stoneman Meadow would have been
impossible without “a police beat situation, as in a crowded city.” He also claimed that
Yosemite Valley’s problems with drug use, theft, noise, and traffic violations—all
stereotypically urban issues—correlated directly with the presence of hippies.663 With the
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specter of the long hot summer looming, the comparison between the Valley and the
nation’s urban centers seemed more fitting than ever.
The riot also fanned regional flames. The Berkeley Tribe, a rather militant
counterculture newspaper from the Bay Area, reacted rather predictably to the events of
July 4. It advertised “a membership drive” to form “a 10,000-freak army by Labor Day,”
asking that enrollees bring “dope, maps, music, marijuana seeds, bodies, equipment
(technical and otherwise), food, imagination.”664 Though it came six months into a new
decade, the Stoneman riot announced Yosemite Valley as yet another site of urban
dissent and militaristic backlash. San Francisco and Berkeley—key components of
Yosemite’s early years—now constituted a threat to the park’s safety. More importantly,
the uprising represented a collision between an ascendant idea (the troubled American
metropolis) and one on the decline (the national park as a sanctuary).
--Late in August of 1970, an Emergency Planning Council consisting of U.S.
Marshals, F.B.I. agents, U.S. Attorneys, superintendents and rangers from other parks,
and the Governor Reagan’s personnel met in Sacramento. Regarding the “10,000-freak
army” planned for Labor Day, Assistant Superintendent Russ Olson stated that rangers
“were not expecting much in the way of a problem.” An assistant to the governor noted
that was no “street talk” about Yosemite, and that no pamphlets were circulating
regarding any kind of planned protest; supposedly, the hippies’ attention had shifted to
the Chicano Moratorium in Los Angeles, as well as an American Legion convention in
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Portland.665 Here the “police conception of history” surfaces again as the assembled
assume some kind of unified purpose behind hippie actions; although the Stoneman riot
had damaged Yosemite’s public image, there is no evidence that it was planned or
coordinated. The same council met a week later, agreeing that hippies turned away at
Yosemite’s gates would most likely head for the resort town of Bass Lake, near the
park’s southern entrance; ‘Burn Mariposa’ stickers seen in Los Angeles constituted the
only other park-related news. Attendees also discussed camp-in for gay liberation on the
Kern River and stolen dynamite in the Modoc National Forest (in the state’s northeastern
corner).666 Like so many times before, Yosemite’s troubles revealed the park as an active
participant in statewide enforcement.
All this planning could not prevent a sense of anxiety inside the park. A week
before Labor Day, one of the concessioner’s security guards found a large stockpile of
rocks near Stoneman Meadow.667 Rangers moved the park’s central dynamite cache from
a central location in Yosemite Valley to its “outlying district caches” around the same
time.668 An unknown party stole a large supply of explosives from the California
Division of Highways' powder magazine in Coulterville, roughly an hour and a half away
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from Yosemite Valley.669 As Labor Day approached, violence lurked in and around the
park.
The Stoneman riot—and ranger professionalization throughout the sixties in
general—underscored the need for outside help. In anticipation of Labor Day, sixty-five
park rangers from outlying parks—“all fresh from cram courses on law enforcement
techniques and crowd control”—arrived to beef up security.670 U.S. Park Police,
deployed after the Stoneman riot, stayed in the park to train park rangers in crowd
dispersal.671 Trained in crowded urban parks, they knew how to handle to protest, dissent,
and overall chaos. Clearly, the traditional ranger— “protector of park resources and host
to park visitors”—hailed from a more innocent era.672
Western park rangers, in particular, had long enjoyed a reputation as friends of the
forest—biologists, botanists, storytellers, and hosts. This friendly façade faded in the face
of new regulations, as helmets, sidearms, and handcuffs entered the picture. Once
friendly, they became “hired assasin [sic] rangers trying to rob [people] of their last
sanctuaries.”673 In a memo to superintendents, the director of the Western Region stressed
the importance of “soften[ing] the visual effect” so that park rangers did not appear “a
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threat, either physical or psychological.”674 To a newer generation of visitors, Yosemite’s
park rangers came to represent government intrusion in a formerly sacred place.675 A new
police force became another integral component of the Valley’s urbanization.
--Steps to increase Park Service authority did not stop with the ranger force. The
major changes implemented in the summer of 1968 foreshadowed park architecture’s role
in encouraging orderly behavior. The ranger corps had long understood the relationship
between crime and the built environment. In 1961, Chief Ranger Elmer Fladmark wrote
that, as roads improved, so did the odds of fugitives visiting the park.676 The same year,
Ranger Ben Twight surmised that the park’s entrance stations accounted for its low rate
of violent crime.677 Roads and entrance stations theoretically worked in tandem to
provide visitors with access to the park; in reality, though, rangers often used them as
defense mechanisms to protect the “park experience.” Indeed, as Ranger Robert Branges
wrote in 1961, rangers often took undesirable visitors to the park boundaries and told
them not to come back.678
As Labor Day loomed, anxiety bred innovation. Orders came down that all
entrance stations would stay open twenty-four hours a day; in addition to fee collectors,
three to four rangers with shotguns visible would staff each entrance in order to present a
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“strong show of force.”679 The ranger reinvented these rustic waystations—no more than
two people wide, at best—as a new kind of surveillance technology. Even more craftily,
Assistant Superintendent Russ Olsen instructed entrance station personnel to utilize the
California Vehicle Code (since, technically, vehicles in line to enter the park were still in
California) to turn back any suspicious vehicles; publicly, though, he denied the existence
of “the anti-long hair policy.”680 This clever usage of the federal-state boundary gave
rangers unprecedented personal power. At the sight of any kind of defect—dim
headlights, bald tires, broken horn—they simply expelled the offending car from the
park.681 One ranger estimated he denied entrance to forty percent of the vehicles he
checked. Another complained that young visitors were parking down the road and
entering with other groups; this prompted him to check “approximately 100%” of cars at
his duty station. Not surprisingly, those deemed “straights” or “family types” gained
entry with ease.682
Young visitors that did gain access faced increasing levels of scrutiny. In their
Labor Day plans, protection supervisors ordered rangers to place “potential law violators”
in Camp 11, the Valley’s biggest.683 They issued a more politic version of this mandate,
advising rangers to avoid “the assignment of many adjacent sites to similarly interested
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groups,” closer to Labor Day.684 In another feat of surveillance, campgrounds rangers
were to notify the park command center when they encountered large groups from
Berkeley, Hayward, or Fremont, nearby urban areas thought to have played major roles in
the Stoneman fiasco.685 Without explicitly saying so, the powers that be attempted to
keep young, long-haired visitors from the Bay Area from entering Yosemite.
In the weeks following, concerned citizens attacked this discriminatory policy.
Older visitors wrote their Congressional representatives to protest the targeting of “young
people, especially if they were in old cars or Volkswagons [sic] or were dressed suitably
for hiking, camping, or climbing.”686 Younger visitors complained that the mere presence
of mountaineering gear aroused the suspicion of rangers.687 Rangers planned to invoke
another aspect of state law, California Welfare and Institutions Code Section 601.
Enacted in 1937, probably in reaction to wandering and unemployed children during the
Depression, it targeted youths deemed “in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or
immoral life.”688 Even the executive director of the ACLU wrote the Park Service’s
regional director, who denied any attempts “to repress and/or harass youthful visitors
wishing to enter.”689 The Berkeley Tribe noted that Yosemite “may have started a trend
by becoming the first National Park to effectively close its gates to freaks, longhairs,
684
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misfits.”690 After years of unparalleled automotive access, Yosemite’s visitors—
especially young ones—encountered a militarized border.
Increased media scrutiny only added to the tension. Still reeling from July 4th, the
park was desperate for a quiet and uneventful weekend. The official plan for Labor Day
was full of minute details, but its broad message was clear: “The eyes and ears of the
country will be focused on Yosemite during this period.”691 The park kept an ongoing
log throughout the weekend, a stream of consciousness memo filled with every phone
call, observation, and suspicion regarding counterculture activity. The sheer number of
media requests stressed Yosemite's public relations machinery. News stations from Los
Angeles and Sacramento taped interviews with management assistant Larry Quist. The
Los Angeles Times and San Francisco Chronicle called continuously, hoping for new
scoops.692
Sadly for news outlets, park life reverted to its default Labor Day conditions:
crowded, warm, and non-violent. On the evening of Sunday, September 6, a reporter
called asking if the park had “won the battle”; the commanding officer replied, “[T]here
wasn't one.”693 After the dust settled, Yosemite's rangers and administrators had time to
congratulate themselves. A law enforcement briefing commended the rangers for a
“good clean crisp weekend,” stressing the advantage of being “'combat ready' at all
times.”694
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In the month following the riot, the Berkeley Tribe announced those “going to the
mountains to get away” that “You CAN’T get away!”695 Shortly thereafter, urban theorist
Peter Marcuse noted the same interconnection between “the most blighted inner cities”
and “the natural areas of the United States;” he also criticized the national park
movement for creating a “socially acceptable way of fencing off…unpleasant urban
problems.”696 Since their inception, national park boundaries cordoned off certain
landscape features, sometimes seemingly at random. The measures taken by the Park
Service to strengthen Yosemite’s boundaries, however, said as much—if not more—
about surrounding areas than they did about the park itself. Police patrols of one-story
tenements. “Random” searches targeting specific populations. Discriminatory residential
policy. All these measures to protect Yosemite from “urban problems” actually
heightened its similarities to the archetypal city of the sixties.
The events of the sixties (and very early seventies) cemented Yosemite Valley’s
reputation as a city at three different scales. Locally, the sensory experience of the
place—marijuana smoke, engine noise, lines of traffic—disappointed many of the park’s
older visitors and its custodians. The influx of hippies added a new chapter to the story of
Yosemite and the Bay Area. Although park officials blamed many of their problems on
San Francisco, the city’s police department helped acclimate park rangers to modern law
enforcement techniques; they also reinforced popular stereotypes of hippies, leaving
Yosemite’s rangers paranoid of some major countercultural conspiracy. At the broadest
level, the Stoneman riot resonated with national skepticism about America’s inner cities.
The idea of Yosemite City had grown in both scale and severity, making Mark Daniels’
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fifty- five-year-old assertion of “municipal problems” seem quaint by comparison.
Census designations aside, Yosemite National Park—and Yosemite Valley, in
particular—had become urban in nature.
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Conclusion
Despite its violent aspects, the summer of 1970 also brought some positive urban
change to the Valley floor in the form of a public transportation system. On July 10, less
than a week after the infamous riot, the New York Times announced “the turning point in
the people vs. cars battle”: Park Service officials banned all traffic from the eastern third
of Yosemite Valley, instituting a 24-hour-a-day shuttle service in its place. George
Hartzog, the Service’s director at the time, hailed the potential to “materially diminish
congestion and pollutant effects of noise and exhaust emissions.”697 After a decade of the
nastiest aspects of city life—drugs, crime, police brutality—the Valley’s residents and
visitors experienced some of the benefits of metropolitan living.
--From 1913 to 1970 automobiles drove both sources of Yosemite Valley’s
urbanity: its increasingly modern built environment, and its flourishing connections to
metropolitan California. It is easy for a modern observer to condemn these phenomena,
but—if history is any indication—the Valley’s urbanization was not always a travesty.
Even before the Park Service, Berkeley-ites like Mark Daniels and Stephen Mather saw
the “village” plan as a potentially positive form of social organization; the massive
crowds represented an opportunity to teach conservation. In the 1920s and 1930s, the
Auto Club of Southern California fostered a different kind of urbanization by shrinking
the metaphorical and physical distance between Los Angeles and the park. The new allseason roads into the Valley allowed Southern Californians to claim their share of
California’s great natural treasure, redefining Yosemite as an extension of both the Bay
697
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Area and the greater Los Angeles area. The park buoyed its immediate neighbors, as
well. For a quarter century, Merced funneled a steady stream of rail and auto traffic into
the park, the result of a virtual monopoly on tourist transportation; two of the town’s
biggest business ventures, the Yosemite Lumber Company and the Yosemite Valley
Railroad, also made a tidy profit logging the park’s western boundary. Yosemite
developed in tandem with many of California’s biggest cities, both near and far.
By World War II, though, both aspects of the park’s urbanity underwent seismic
shifts due to fuel and rubber rationing. Yosemite Valley, normally buzzing with activity,
fell relatively quiet—save for the shouts of Army men or the hushed conversations from
the Naval Convalescent Hospital. The park’s connections with other cities faltered, as
well, since most Californians could not spare the fuel to reach Yosemite’s gates.
Merced’s business community, desperate for a lifeline, soon discovered that the Park
Service’s commitment to preservation had major ripple effects outside park boundaries.
The demise of the Yosemite Valley Railroad signaled that automobiles would be the sole
intermediaries between the park and its urban neighbors.
The park’s urbanization soon became a source of anxiety for both Park Service
personnel and the public at large. Cars and people flooded Yosemite after World War II,
leading to worries about the future of the overcrowded Valley. Perhaps inspired by the
nation’s rapid suburbanization, the superintendent’s office sought other parts of the park
as pressure-release valves; however, Yosemite Valley could never truly be decentralized,
as the Curry Company’s future depended on a densely packed downtown. Even if this
downtown could never be disbanded, an influx of hippies in the late 1960s proved that it
could be destabilized. The National Park Service scrambled to impose order, using new
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regulations, partnerships with other police departments, and its own newly transformed
ranger corps to quell these young and supposedly unruly visitors. Worries about the
future of the American city, prompted by the long, hot summers of the late sixties, spilled
over into peoples’ vacations. The idea of Yosemite City had broken the park’s boundaries
wide open, letting in the problems of the American metropolis and—more importantly—
displaying the intimate ties between the nation’s public lands and its less-than-savory
historical narratives.
--To define national parks as “America’s best idea” misses a major part of their
significance. It can be disappointing to acknowledge the traits of urban America—traffic,
pollution, discrimination—in parks across the country; perhaps this is because we expect
these meticulously managed landscapes to provide escape valves from an urban industrial
society that seems to be careening off the rails. In reality, the unpleasant aspects of
Yosemite’s story (and others like it) attest to the natural world’s role in broader historical
narratives—and not just the inspiring ones. The enlightened and ever-improving quest to
preserve wild nature is only one of many narratives at play in our nation’s parks.
In addition to seeking new stories, we must also question the categories in play.
The tension between nature and civilization has been drummed into us, and—even
though we may not be able to define either term—we know them when we see them. To
best understand “the long dialogue between the place we call city and the place we call
country,” we must focus on the relational history of the terms.698 In the case of my work,
this means following connections—some (quite literally) concrete, some less tangible—
that have linked Yosemite to cities across California. The park’s history thus holds the
698
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power to illuminate unlikely interchanges; far from being isolated, Yosemite is an
integral part of the world outside its gates.
It is time to expand the ways in which we appreciate national parks. As Yosemite
and other places like it burn summer after summer, it becomes clearer that park
boundaries cannot protect against climate change. Dwindling appropriations and federal
shutdowns serve as reminders that parks are inherently politicized; they are subject to the
whims of a government headquartered 3,000 miles away. And yet they continue receive
millions of visitors each year, single-handedly propping up rural economies and shaping
travel corridors well beyond their boundaries.
The idea of parks as escapes from “real life” is incredibly appealing, and its
power should not be underestimated. But in the coming years, it will only become harder
to ignore the impacts of the outside world on national parks. This is precisely why the
urban history of Yosemite is important: it serves as a reminder that certain habits of
thought (i.e. the urban/nature binary) can blind us to important linkages. This relational
history of Yosemite National Park and California’s cities provides a new way of seeing
public lands in relation to their surroundings, and—on a broader scale—a new way of
questioning the long-held cultural binary between wilderness and civilization (however
one construes them).
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